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  • the Soviet plan unbalanced since it would preserve the con­ ventional military Superiority of the USSR even if the elimina­ tion of nuclear delivery vehicles could be satisfactorily verified. At the Moscow conference of 1963, Premier Khrushchev took
  • Impressions of LBJ; Khrushchev's departure and the explosion of the first Chinese communist nuclear device; attending NSC meetings; the Sino-Soviet split; field experience in Taiwan as it related to Southeast Asia; patriotism and dedications
  • came to the meeting in Geneva, they were really operating on a committee formula. divided between Khrushchev and Bulganin. The power was It was quite apparent to those of us present that the dominant figure was Khrushchev, but from a titular
  • friendly coexistence and all this junk because Khrushchev had just been over here. So I had a reluctance about the war. But once when we were in the war and in completely, there was a good deal of agony about it--a personal agony because my children felt
  • Ky; Robert Komer; Tex Goldschmidt; Nguyen Van Thieu; RMN; Khrushchev; Max Milliken; William Westmoreland; William Gaud; Henry Kissinger; Phil LaFollette; Mike Monroney; Abe Fortas; Harold Ickes.
  • talked to me about at that time was his desire to get along with the Russians. He hadn't worked out his policy yet but he did make one very important statement. He said that Premier Khrushchev had sent him the file on Oswald and this was the first time
  • the summit in 1955, the kitchen debate in '58, the Vienna meeting between Kennedy and Khrushchev--I saw him during the test ban negotiations--he has served in Moscow--he's just absolutely superb. He took the record. He took these elaborate notes, can do
  • . Stockholms-TiclninQc:m observe• that 11 the decision was not .free !ron1 risks even !or Khrushchev" since the Chinese Conununists " V1.'il.l n~urally take the Russian-American agreement a.a new evidence that. thoir theses are cor?'ect. 11 q -·.)J
  • suggestion of Kosygin's role in the Soviet Union. He said he wouldn't be surprised at changes there, that the Soviets had changed on Khrushchev to show they could change. Kosygin's period has seen failures in Latin America, Africa, Indonesia and the Middle
  • Control Policy under Khrushchev-Comparative Analy­ sis with Gorbachev's Arms Control Policy"; Davis S. Birdsell, "Rhe­ torical Dimensions of the Alliance for Progress" . 5 Evenings at the Library While she was deciding whether to make a run
  • , the Soviet Union, today a powerful force for change is already at work. Education, the bedrock of democ­ racy, the enemy of dictatorship, is plowing its way. Inside the Commu­ nist block, powerful currents are surging against the dam. Premier Khrushchev
  • in Leesburg, Virginia. 6/2 Khrushchev appears
  • on President" S Sp 11/26/63 A "Communications between President and Khrushchev" S 2p 11/26/63 A # FILE LOCATION NSF, Subject File, President's Meetings,NoverobecZS-29,J963 CODES RESTRICTION Box 42 (Al Closed by Executive Order 12356'governing access
  • the .question of Tito and asked if I could give him the name of the best rran who could serve as Ambaseador to Yugoslavia who would be able to "win the girl away from Khrushchev." He said that ln his opinion this man should be an experienced, able man. perhaps
  • modus• vivendi could be achieved without giving up recent ga!nso If U.S. military deployments were accompanied by a commun1·­ cation to Khrushchev conveyin~ our intent to employ our forces if necessary, while holding out hope of a negotiated arrangement
  • of Mr. Khrushchev's whicll he sent me a few weeks ago, waa responded to during these few daya, but aa. you Jr.now I can't glve you any de­ talls because we need mutual agreement to publlah the letter. Mr. SPlvAK. Mr. Chancellor, you and Presi­ dent
  • in the world, and he mentioned the Russians. He said, "We have to put ourselves into the minds of others, including the Russians, and see if we can't move on from the Test Ban Treaty to other things." He used the occasion of his response to Khrushchev's
  • , 1964, Chairman Khrushchev to President Johnson (Doe. 4). 11 Message, March 4, 1964, Pre sident Johnson to Chair­ man Khrushchev (Doe. 5). 10/ Under Secretary Ball's report to the President on his Cyprus Peacekeeping Mission, Memorandum for the Record
  • here with Khrushchev and Eisenhower, and I went over to represent him until he could arrive. And then, as I say, desalting --I was co-chairman of that delegation. Then I was the co-chairman of some of the series of special teams to NATO dealing
  • to sensitive places. You saw Khrushchev, for instance, in August of '63 and you went to Poland later, and so on. Do you ever get any sort of briefing from the White House on this? Are you ever in the position of being a semi-official emissary from the country
  • - The President explained that in the 3 years he had been in office, we had made no new treaties. with the Soviet Union. He had wished to make progress in relations He began with a letter to Khrushchev urging that they both cut back their nuclear production
  • -- and hund~eds of millions of other people -- would die within the first twenty-four hours of a full-scaie nuclear exchange. And as Chairman Khrushchev · le once said, the survivors would envy the dead~ This is not an acceptable future. We owe it to ourselves
  • and west. November, December, and January I was writing Khrushchev saying "We will cut down on our atomic ,,- LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781] More
  • -4/65," Document #124 NSF, Country File, USSR "Mikoyan Conversations, Vol. I," #6a(closed), #9a(closed), #9b(closed), #1(closed) NSF, Country File, USSR "Vol. I, 11/63, Khrushchev Conversations with Kohler" NSF, Country File, USSR "Khrushchev
  • the campaign. In retrospect the revelation of what the actual capacities were of course that we still had--without getting into the specific systems--a substantial advantage on our side, and that was clearly why Kennedy was able to push Khrushchev off on Cuba
  • . McNamara in hospital; Ambassador Kohler describes Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting and Soviet people; men adjourn for talks; women watch "Gambit;" Lady Bird watches "Gunsmoke;" description of maple tree and area
  • . Reversing Khrushchev's policy of mir..imum involvement in Southeast Asia, the new Soviet leaders have over the re.st several months begun to reassert the USSR's interest, pa.rticu.larly i n Vietnllm. Kosygin's vis1 t to &inoi 1s the latest step
  • it was difficult to underatand exactly what Khrushchev meant by the cutback ol O·Z35. It would be highly desirable if he would stop construction of aome o1 the new plants or plant expansiona; however, this was not indicated. J aald that once the plant• were built
  • of [crises]; this was at the time when Ike was meeting or had met with Khrushchev, when we were putting troops into Lebanon and so on. Johnson said, "I don't want the Democrats to be in a position of shortchanging the administration or crippling them
  • to the West" and inhibit the degree to which such an opening can be pursued. Khrushchev's overthrow did not alter this situation. On the favorable side, the following seem of primary importance: 1. The Balapce of Power. Especially in the aftermath of the Cuban
  • , June 4, 1968, Commencement Speech Glassboro Speech Pres. Kennedy-Khrushchev talks Czechoslovakia -- 1968 Non-Proliferation 7 National Archives and Records Administration http://archives.gov http://www.lbjlibrary.org/ SERIES DESCRIPTION and FOLDER