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  • or President of the Council, General Ky, a communique was issued calling for a joint study of postwar development. Before that meeting in Manila and before the communique, I had had discussions with the Johnson staff-B: May I ask who would this have been? L
  • for a post-war development plan for South Vietnam; Lilienthal's skepticism on Vietnam quelled; effect of pacification programs; advising JFK on foreign aid; William Fulbright; Walt Rostow; James Rowe; HHH; RFK; Adlai Stevenson; Eleanor Roosevelt; Nguyen Cao
  • for himself, but the right decision for our country, for what they were doing in Vietnam. He was aware of that; he was aware of the need to inform them. But I suspect that's the reason why. G: Now, do you recall President [Nguyen Van] Thieu's reaction
  • Democratic convention; LBJ’s relationships with Nguyen Cao Ky and Nguyen Van Thieu; LBJ’s 1969 farewell address to Congress; the Fortas/Thornberry Supreme Court incident; LBJ farewell get-together at the White House; LBJ’s problem with TV appearances; Robert
  • IT IMMPOSSIBLE · TO CUT T'HROUGH REDTAPE AND, AT HE TASK- FORCE MEETING ON 9 FEBRUARY, THREATENED TO RESIGN. ~~UMt1A.RY•. ·. 1• IN HIS CAPACITY AS HEAD OF THE JO INT GOVERNt1ENT OF VIETNAM - CGVN)/U. S• . TASK FORCE, VICE PRESIDENT . NGUYEN CAO KY HAS ORDERED
  • your proposal now or at our next meeting,-. which I propose to be held on February _ •. Satarday, F~- J, 1968 l :00 p. m. Mr. Pffaldeat : It look• aa tbcMap TM- aad Ky an more M&l"ly la thaa ever Wore; and then la the beplllliq of aome exeaatt
  • to believe, however, that the full Assembly will validate the elections. Bunker has stressed to both Thieu and Ky the potentially serious impact on United States support for Viet-Nam of irre­ sponsible action to invalidate the elections. Both Thieu and· Ky
  • not share the western view of Thieu as a man of indecision. In l/sian terms, there is greater confidence and respect for leaders who are reflective and deliberate than for those who are impulsive and move swiftly. Moreover, Thieu was senior to Ky, he had
  • , Ky — se e travel activity Arrived Middlesboro, Ky — spok e t o rally there. 5. 6. 3:00p l:30p To Frankfort, Ky — se e travel activity 3:00p 7. Addressed rally at Capitol steps at Frankfort, Ky. 8. 4:30P To Owensboro, Ky — se e travel activity 9. 5:30p
  • , siding, timber, [that] sort of thing, to rebuild their own houses and did in a very big way and in a relatively short period of time. We did set up a joint US-GVN team which was headed up for a while by [Nguyen Cao] Ky to get on with the pacification job
  • [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh Durbrow -- I -- 26 have shot it all at Diem and knocked him all up, but they stayed loyal to Diem and [Nguyen Van] Thieu and [Nguyen Cao] Ky and the rest
  • are definitively halted. or even and This is the position stated to me during conversations in the last few days with Premier Pham Van Dong, Nguyen Duy Trinh, foreign minister and deputy premier, and other high-ranking government and party leaders. Hanoi
  • of its fir.s t meeting tt should move things in the .right direction in the days ahead. Getting Thieu and Ky to work together and stay togethe~ co~ld be a favorable consequence of the attack on the cities, t also noted how promptly you encou1:aged
  • . spokesman. At least, he was Then he was [Nguyen Cao] Ky's He was very close to Ky. G: Sounds like he had a talent for survival, too. J: Oh, yes. He was one of the smartest people I ever knew. was in the embassy here and was spokesman for the embassy
  • THE AMERICAN SABOTAGE THERE WOUl.D i HAVE BEEN NO GVN AND VIETNAM WOULD HAVE BEEN REUNIFIED • . -~: THE US SET UP DIEM, AND THE PRESE;N,T CLIQUE OF KY AND THIEU, ~ FIGHTING BITTERLY AMO~G THEMSELVES,COpLD NOT SURVIVE f.· WITHOUT us. SUP?ORT. THUY STRESSED
  • AND KY, I FULLY · ,· CONCUR IN THE NEED to PiCCELERATE OUfL PhESENT HATE OF PROGRESS ' ANq ----· .. . -··· TO DRAMATIZE WHAT Ht.\S BEEN AND SHOULD EE ACHIEVED TO ·MEET THE HEAVY PRESSURES I KNOW THE PRESIDENT Ai\D YOU ARE UNDER AT HOME. I ALSO AG~EE T
  • I want to ask you about in connection with the [Mike] Mansfield memo and that was a statement by General [Nguyen Cao] Ky that the U.S. should do the fighting on the perimeter where the South Vietnamese army would fight or do more organizing in rear
  • /pres/aides BACKGROUND BRIEFINGS January 2, 1966 ~ January 26, 1966 1/2 - Steel problem 1/5 - U.S. Steel 1/8 - Secretary Williams trip to Africa 1/12 - w/ Moyers, Califano, Schultze, M. Bundy & Cater 1/14 - Budget 1/15 - PM Nguyen Cao Ky's Address 1/17
  • Ai4BASSADOR LAM WOULD H£AD TH£ TALKS iN THE !il}lST l~ISTANC£, H£ WOULD NEED TO BE REINFORCED •. I . A5K£D IF . ri£ HAD IN.MINO TO USE VP KY, AS HE ONCE THOUGHT
  • , i.e., ou:i;> troops will witq.draw to NVN and US troops. withdr.~w to the United States an
  • the minor candidates before taking up complaints against Big Minh and the Thieu-Ky slate. One Council member states his view . t hat .t he_most serious problem for Min.h's slate is the complaint against the citizenship qualifications of Minh's running mate
  • '1' 0tq- ""') "Germany, --J-J.,J 2 PP . vr l VJ VT, #15a, NSF, Country File, 11 Vol. II Im) l I/ /J'-" "Germany, Vol. 16," 16," 189] Concilia~ory Attit~1d s ~f~P Ky and I "j/4-':::>/~ Pres . Th 1 e u ./ltvn~ s 2 pp. , l1M/ ~ 01 lJV,.._~3
  • and problems along the line, and there really wasn't any stability in the government from then until Nguyen Van Thieu and General [Nguyen Cao] Ky came into the government. But these three generals had a great opportunity, and they fluffed it. Everybody's got
  • Party victory and reinforced Labour's efforts to restrict Australian contribution to the war. During December, as the Ky Directorate and the newly elected Assembly sought to cope with mounting problems ot inflation, economic dislocation and an inept
  • administrative officials; LBJ's interest in developing the economic resources of Southeast Asia; LBJ not understanding Vietnamese history and culture; Nguyen Cao Ky using LBJ's speech transcripts to write his own speeches; the conflict between theoretical war
  • he has the Presidential bug also; but I am inclined to agree that in some mysterious way, he and Ky will work it out as his assurances on page 3 suggest. W. w. R. _ SECPFT/NO-DIS attachment (Saigon 23667 4/ZI/67) DEa.As.ffl'IED E.0. 12356, Sec
  • "front" (or bloc) composed mainly of government, Cao Dai, VNQDD, and Hoa Hao leaders working for the Thieu-Ky ticket, and a campaign committee probal:iy headquartered in the presidential palace, utilizing largely governmental/ military resources
  • , THE DIRECTORATE HAS ANNOUNCED THAT THIEU AND KY WILL RUN ON TKE SAME SLATE AS PRESID£Nt IAL AND VICE PRESU>ENT lAL CANDIDATES, RESPECIIVELY. THE NECESSARY PAPERS WERE 'FlLED LAST NIGHl TO MEET THE DEADLINE OF NIDNllKt (N.OON TODAY Olfi TIME). AS tHAT t lME 1 19
  • 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh think you gave me some examples of [Nguyen] Khanh and [Nguyen Cao] Ky and so forth, so we can skip that. What kind of guidance existed for the individual not high
  • hamlets program; Nguyen Khan; division among Catholic and Buddhist Vietnamese; Vietnamese view of government; Dr. Phan Huy Quat.
  • Honolulu meeting, they will travel, Washington for meeting with Harriman. if it is so desired, to 6. It is their·impression that ·Hanoi· timetable is not·,- re.peat not, • too· hurried. t Of possible interest is .fact that Nguyen Thoung, North Vietnamese
  • WITH THE NLF AS AN INTERNAL MATTERMUCHAS DIEM PAGE 2 RUr-JIR 25'+53/i € 8 N F :. B E IC :P ! A c LIMITED OFFICIAL USE NEGOTIATED WITH THE HOA HAO ANO CAO DAI IN 1955, FOREIGN MINISTER TRAN VAN 00 HELO A PRESS CONFERENCE I THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AFTERNOONAPKIL 23
  • . MINISTERS MEET~ WITH KY IN CHAIR, AT 0900 EVERY MORNING. '.tAKErr .:Ar _. T OD AY ,.. S MOR:N I NG MEETV~G. AOD!TONAL RED AR EAS .. TlIRNED. BLUE I N SA IGON • .. NOW 1700 TO 0730 CURF'E W AND MI NI MUM RESTRICTIONS APPLY TO ALL OF DISTRICTS 2
  • Vic:tn.3ll· DECLASSIFIED /· Authority /JL~/Cf>$ By-~ ' ~ABS Date ~- 7 -li ' • TS l8907J C opy_~"' , J. The, J'.lat.hoclology\fhich ue ,iso to clllculo.to t,h1.s 1;orth Viotn:n~cao ·doplo~ont rnte ta c~l'iplox nnd ou\,jr.ct to error. Hovoi.•:w
  • · me who my heroes · are-. I h11ve only one-Hitler." These ore the .words of Air Vice­ Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, latest Prime M;nister of South Vietnam, whose remote, unsf able country . hos the whole world holding its breath. Tl,e comment
  • in the towel, so he did something, and to his great surprise, there was one battalion that was loyal to them, and they went up and beat the hell out of the Binh Xuyen. During that whole thing, why, a Cao Dai general--that was one of the religious sects
  • VIEN, WHO lIN. THESE MATTERS CARRIES NO WilGHT AND IS NOT THE KIND OF PERS0n TO INVOLVE HIMSELF IN ISSUES OF THIS KIND, I •; . 12~ -1· ~M - OF FIRMLY -THE VIEW ~HAT HOWEVER DIFFICULT VICE PRES KY MAY BE~· IT ~OULD BE CONSTRUCTlVE FROM OUR POINT
  • TO ·THE DEADLINE... PROVIDED tOff:'. THE ~INAl.. ,'· -­ SELECT IO~! - OF -- CANDIDATES, . I .E·.- ~EARL"t:·_·JutY·~.-:.·r~HERE.: HAD" ' BEEM
  • like a kidney stone, but it went away. I'll try to make this fast as I can. We went to Guam with the President to meet with President [Nguyen Van] Thieu and [Nguyen Cao] Ky in 1967. It was a summit conference. The war wasn't going well. The President