Discover Our Collections


Limit your search

Tag Contributor Date Subject Type Collection Series Specific Item Type Time Period

228 results

  • Minister Gromyko may go. With respect to the Chinese Communist nuclear test, the short-run effect in Asia will be intense fear of fallout. A serious, long - run effect will be felt in Japan and India. Now is no time for a new policy toward Communist China
  • put Cairo right on this matter and help us eliminate that kind of needless inflammation. We have expressed to your government our views on the of Tiran in my letter to you of May 28 and Secretary of State Rusk's letter toForeign Minister Gromyko
  • (Kosygin's interpreter) __^_ __^ Minister Gromyko , Secy McNamara through Amb. , Mr. Firsov ' Thompson - mf Mr. Watson (marvin) I__ , Mr. Vorontsov -, Mr. Bundy ,_____„____________________-' Mr. Zamyatin _, , Secy Rusk (across from the President ) i Foreign
  • and that they probably had the sixty two votes to ~ct it. He said he ·had seen the ~1·;3ss speculation about a. Soviet dek: ­ g'-tion c:om.inr; to the U. N. that r:-.i .:Jht b1cluda Gromyko o:.· :~o::r.;in. I-!~ .eai.'! he h.o::w nothing mm:' e t~n w:~a.t he bad read
  • Rusk said that Ambassador Dobrynin mentioned NBC' s special show on Khr--.ishchev. Dobrynin was quoted as saying, p "Both Gromyko and I were surprised." Secretary Rusk said that Dobrynin is going back to 1v1oscow "for major political purposes
  • should go ahead. DeGaulle great problem. If we think we are having problems with DeGaulle - think what other members of are having - Belgium, Netherlands, Norway - Next move - contact with Gromyko· in Moscow envelop DeGaulle - Immediately
  • ---- -------------------------- :----------- 214 Effort to table partial draft treaty ------------------- 219 Rusk - Gromyko taj.ks --------------------------------------- 228 - Safeguards (l) ------------------------------ .------------ 231 Allied Consultations Security assurances (l
  • ............ 7 Initial Johnson Program . .......................... 8 Gromyko Missile Proposals ......................... 11 Soviet Collateral Proposals (1964). . . . . . . . . 13 Gomulka Plan....................................... 15 COtTFIDEHTIAii
  • these things to Gromyko. Is there anything we can put our teeth into? The President: Secretary Rusk: Yes, their willingness to proceed with clear under­ standing that if we don't get cities and the DMZ, we 1 ll restart. The President: What
  • to Gromyko. In it, Gromyko said he knew for sure that we had entered Korean territorial waters because the ship's captain had said he had entered territorial waters in his own hand writing. We do not believe he did. But we cannot deny it because we do
  • , Secretar y o f Stat e His Excellenc y Andre i A . Gromyko , Ministe r o f Foreig n Affair s o f USS R .Ambassador o f USS R - Dobryni n Anatoly ; Hon . Vladimi r Semenov , Deput y Foreig n Ministe r To Lobb y w/Andre i A . Gromyk o t o bi d hi m goodbye
  • overseeing group thought the Thieu-Ky election was a fraud. The President asked Director Helms to check this and if it is not true, get the information to the Senator. Secretary Katzenbach: Reported on tre Rusk-Gromyko talks which were underway in New York
  • parallel. 3. Ambassador Thompson should see Gromyko to back up Harriman's meeting with Zorii'n ......_,,, to tell the Soviets that unilateral restraint can go on only so long; that private talks are necessary. 4. We should keep all options open
  • . Kohler that he would discuss subjects: (1) Nuclear - MEETING the conference in terms ban. (3) Berlin He said that the principal conclusion of the test ban discussion was that the Soviets would not accept inspections. Gromyko's position was adamant
  • · light on this major problem. I am going to MoscovJ on the 13th March along \.Ji th the Indian Jim1bassador in tl e USSR and - expect to see Mr. Gromyko • Mr. Khruschev there. ·ter having a talk with hem about our two major headaches he India-Pakistai.11
  • tell Gromyko that we are willing to check this out with our allies, we may not get a real test o'f Moscow -- and it would be harder to put the monkey on the Russians' back. ~ .~Il;-t~pr..opo&8PWoakl gw~ u ch:-mo:P~On:wncinw,publi:~ s-ewtha~ h~'?ffl>¥ed
  • East question, Gromyko had no taste for going through the General Assembly again. The provisional draft is still the basis for talks. There is considerable movement on the Arab side but not enough. Egypt is not close to settling the Suez problem
  • of the Republic of Vietnam, could simply not be sustained." 4. Secretary Rusk discussed the US-USSR meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York on two occasions. He stated our three conditions, i.e., GVN participation, no abuse of DMZ, and no attacks
  • . - - -- -----·-- ----- ...... · -· -_- · ----- _-- - . ·-:-- ---~--- ·--.---:- --=-.:___:: .~_ ----==-:=- ~ ~------ -~ ---~ -- -··- - -,.-. .. ·.. ~ ·:_',-.> ...., ~ ! ~ -- .j . ·., .. ~- .. Lun.c heon with the President SEGRE:r Tuesday. September 26, 1967. 1:00 p. m. Agenda 1. Sect. Rusk-Gromyko Dinner. A Report and Evaluation. (Under Sect. Katzenbach) 2. :ttegotiati:ng ·T rack: SituatiQn Report and Next Moves
  • to send a Rumanian to North Korea. We advised Bunche that this did not bother us in principle. The Soviets may turn us down. The North Koreans said it was not the United Nation's business. Gromyko has asked for a gesture to red.ice pressure
  • . Then he decided not to go. be careful. We said it would be the 16th at Geneva. Let's Secretary Rusk: Gromyko said he couldn't comment on the 16th. think Thompson should see Dobrynin. I The President: What is your impression of Kissinger
  • and Berlin-Documents 10 Report of Four Power Working Group on Germany and Berlin September, 1961 Report of the Four-Power Working Group on Germany and Berlin Thompson-Gromyko 1st exchange [Trade with the Soviet Union] Notes on Dealing With Khrushchev Middle
  • • but they fit together 1n helplAg make clear the dilemma faced lsy Moscow at the present time -- 1n the Middle Eaat and elsewhere. 1. A leqthy l'eport from Arthar Goldbers cm hi• talk T9•terday with Gromyko and Dobryala. The e•aence o! 1t 1• that tba Soviet
  • , 1965 12:20 p. m. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT Here is Dean Rusk's first report on his conversation with Gromyko. We seem to have had more to tell hi'm than he to tell us. The Secretary's own su·mmary is in the last paragraph. Jn.-t t:>. McG. B. ~l
  • communication I have used virtually the same language he used in his message to me during the Middle East crisis. I have just received a message from Ambassador Thompson on Ambassador Gromyko's views. We know at the moment the Pueblo was seized and boarded
  • to reapproach the Soviets on this subject? Do we reapproach them at the Thompson-Gromyko level? The Pre.sident: I see no difference in this situation than in the one in which Kosygin messaged me raising hell over Israel. The President then sent Tom Johnson