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  • , and labor. Our economic statistics are the best and most compre­ hensive in the world. But they can be and need to be further improved. The costs will be exceedingly small relative to the benefits. To this end, my 1969 budget provides for several new
  • , for it would be folly to undertake i. I I I a brand new effort without realizing that a large number of people have spent •1 I extensive little time and effort effort persons to tell the story has been spent trying working with veterans
  • ..,,_ has been considerable, .. ~ inflated_by civilians.·. .. ; ~ .... _ ,,,._ incltli¼io~ ~~ To some extent .... by measures already taken. 2 - Heavy S•E•C ft•E•'f infiltration of both new units is continuing. made prior A strenuous
  • a discussion Deliver our new strategy support civilians purge corrupt administration of negotiations to be provided a Presidential address strategy stated and force re~ in the NSAM. to Saigon with General it must broaden their and move
  • . also be covered in new tasking for CIA collection efforts. 1. 2. We should do more to exploit the intelligence as sets of other countries. The Australians, for example, should be encouraged to add at least one officer to-their :.Wlilitary Attache
  • and Secretary of his· own which summary Rostow on the situation In addition and met a daily In addition, had requested. Taylor plus for for a Vietnam our world the San Antonio working out on new posture." formula. speech Rather asked
  • communist 4 8 -- State climatic may attack Vietnam in Vietnam-------------------- daily around public message F G H I a b d e f g stop--------------- --------------------- with the G VN
  • the feeling of security had been strong. Those who had been "within the protection of the · Government" found out how wlnerable they were. There is a fear of further attacks.and there are new opportunities for Communist . .:. propaganda and subversive
  • are: -----· to to to to to strategy in.stead generate a massive popular uprisinz in the cities; administer a significant defeat to US/GVN/ FW forces in the field; destroy the government2l apparatus o! South Vietnam fron,. top to bottoi.n; create a new popular front, dominated
  • . Their principal and to inflict I Corps. and military defeats Tne net result, situation new VC units, large units phase so2etime within objectives in nuch of the country; making a ,'ig­ are to destroy· also to reduce the on US forces in battles
  • . .D. . . . THE..FIGURES SHOWN. IN COLUMNCD ARE PREL.IM.INARY, UNRE.FINED. . ••BATTLEFIELD REPORTEDCASUALTIES RECEIVED DAILY. . . FROM. . COMUSMACV t·HE -FIGURES IN COLUMNS(2> THROUGHC5f ARE VERIFIED FIGURES REPRESENTINGCASUALTIES.REPORTEDDURING
  • aircraft and _JOPSECRET : replacements are urgently needed to maintain our observation and surveillance capability over our newly opened LOC, new areas urider pacification, enemy routes of infiltration and enemy base areas. The northern I Corps Tactical
  • with this reasoning, be sent in numbers sufficient only to enable us to keep faith with our troops in exposed positions, as in the northern end of South ·viet-Nam -- and not to continue the past emphasis on "search and destroy." The new emphasis should
  • COMNANDER HAS TO APPEAR DAILY THE SITUATION HERE MUST BE EXTRC:MELYSERIOUS, CERTAINLY· 110RE SERIOUS THAN WEBELIEVE IT TO BE. IF, AS IS CASENOW,ENEMY ACTIVITY TAP~:RS OFF ANDCLEANUP PROGRESSES TJ-1£RE\1ILL BE .LESS NEWS ANDWEFELL TK~T IF \vESTYwERETO GIVE
  • . • . . • . ! . • . ,. . • • •· .. · • .; . • .: sho .~·nin column (1). _are p1·eliminary; unrc.r°inecl •t -:·-:.-:: ;... ·battlefield-reported ca.sual ties· rec:e i ved from COM{)Sf,tAC~ daily. ••. =:••:·:-.~-.~ The· figures :.:.:: ..... ::: :· 1
  • :. • .. . • • . • .... -.:........ .:,. .. :.,:........ .. , •'·" ...:..; ' ...• ..."'·-:-'· . . ..... ..... . .. • ; . I ... . ·. . • --· ~--·---- . ,. ·-· .. ....-. . . . ID SUPPLY CONSUMPTION DATA IN KHE SANH • 111 reply to the question as to daily consumption. (on gross . basis) of Class I (Ratio1is), Class III {POL), and Cla~s V (Ammo) sup~lies at Khe
  • ~-~!)'_ : . '~ ~9, 1968 ~V/;.ro/' Mr. ... I SECRET ... . President: conversation of Herewith Westy 1 s telephone today. The best news is that Highway 1 should be open by March 1. . • Y1 ••• Gen. Johnson suggests a weekly rather than a daily call from
  • is the.earliest the new provis~ons for drafting • be thoroughly conunanders, clea~ed divisional up? conunanders, possible date when they can get through of 18 and 19 year olds? In the light of the changed situation, does some rede ... ~oyment ~ or example
  • and interrogated by Saigon police, the-:-V-1e~Cong°pfaii..to.:.:.lfrg:-aiii~~~ ..~:ti'o,­ ti~o1.:Paople:!2.~:llM~.=-iiegoJiate~for peace,.: /.rhis new Front plans -t;·-• substitute General Duong Van Minh for Thieu and Ky as National Leader of South Vietnam