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  • should go ahead. DeGaulle great problem. If we think we are having problems with DeGaulle - think what other members of are having - Belgium, Netherlands, Norway - Next move - contact with Gromyko· in Moscow envelop DeGaulle - Immediately
  • . Kohler that he would discuss subjects: (1) Nuclear - MEETING the conference in terms ban. (3) Berlin He said that the principal conclusion of the test ban discussion was that the Soviets would not accept inspections. Gromyko's position was adamant
  • of the arsenal on a provisional basis~ strictly he tbUD \!scd terms rc.miniscot developed in 1962 and 1963 for retaining to the of the Gromyko so~a nuclear weapons the end of the process of general and complete disaroac.cnt. The impH.cation vas
  • at Panmunjom • . Summaries of these meetings have been cabled to you. 2. We are also considering possible desirability of letter on Pueblo case :from Secretary to Gromyko. Your comments are requested on the wisdom of such a letter at this time and on draft
  • principles tor outer space, and some possibility for progress on limited arms control measures. In the economic field, the US is reviewing its policy. The Secretary suggested to Gromyko talks on what could be done to improve SovietUS trade, specifically
  • ALONG. GROMYKO BIHIND TJUS MEMO. BUT TH£ POINT IS TKAT IOSCOI'IUST BE.WILLINGTO KEEPCAIRO BEHIND SUBSEQUENTNEt;OTIATIO~JS. OBVIOUSLY, HAS CAlllO THESEARf JUST ROUGHIIITfAL THOUGHTS. THE CENTRAL POINT IS IT IELlD' TbT'ff SHOULD "ov f!SOVE BACKINTO
  • MOSCOW 1 " . · · :1. ; :j . unanimous vote on the Middle:Eas{ resolution.in:the Security Council, I • •• win pass alon~ my own thq~hts re
  • .: aome time about limiting of- \, The Paris peace talks have Nixon wlll be the next Amer-,;.~ fenaive and defensive weap,- changed this atmosphere in , lean President.. In the paat ,~ : ., • • ·on■. But why doe■ Gromyko a notable way. Between Com
  • . President: You wlll be interested 1n thh report of what Gromyko told Debre about Vietnam and Phantom•. w. W. Ro1tow 25X1A WWRostow:rln Approved For Release 2000/09/11 : NLJ-019-040-4-5-1 ACTION Friday, October 11, 1968 -- 9:15 a. m. Mr. President
  • . That Ambassador Kohler raise the subject of Laos with Gromyko on the occasion of the interview which he has already requested on another matter. 4. That Governor·Harriman proceed to London and Moscow to discuss -~·Laoswith both co-chairmai1. 5
  • HAVE JHSHED TO RENEW - PERSONAL- CONTACT WITH GROMYKO .IN ~HE -NEAR FUTURE, AND - ;, -WHAT MORE· SUITABLE· OCCASION COULD THERE BE FOR DOING SO THAN ' YOUR .· o~~. s~ .: · " - i:;..- :-. _. .._ ,., , -.. -~:}/ .. ?~~; ~:~~NT
  • the would like to see it stopped. I think everybody stopped. position? nation, except our adversaries, a spokesman for the Soviet Union. or Mr. Gromyko, but I have every fighting stopped as much as we else in the world would like to see it "Perhaps
  • discussion with Gromyko on March 18 and the President's discussion with Gromyko on March 27 were all designed to reemphasize our desire for a reasonable settlement but that the United States as a great power could not renege on its c01IDDitments
  • . Here are the things close Gromyko and that of your government. apparently those of the negotiation on the problem the President Minister serious that a bombing and _casualties is this. cessation to US f)rces that he has insisted could