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  • EeaenUally tb• plaa i• worked out on a local baaia -­ 1otna from military to political action. RUSK Gromyko ia intereatad iD the Cambodian Conference. Sibaaoak b palliq back 011 hi• oriaiaal iDJtut.ne• tbac Vi•t Cone be repreeented at th• coderence
  • Rusk said that Ambassador Dobrynin mentioned NBC' s special show on Khr--.ishchev. Dobrynin was quoted as saying, p "Both Gromyko and I were surprised." Secretary Rusk said that Dobrynin is going back to 1v1oscow "for major political purposes
  • these things to Gromyko. Is there anything we can put our teeth into? The President: Secretary Rusk: Yes, their willingness to proceed with clear under­ standing that if we don't get cities and the DMZ, we 1 ll restart. The President: What
  • to Gromyko. In it, Gromyko said he knew for sure that we had entered Korean territorial waters because the ship's captain had said he had entered territorial waters in his own hand writing. We do not believe he did. But we cannot deny it because we do
  • overseeing group thought the Thieu-Ky election was a fraud. The President asked Director Helms to check this and if it is not true, get the information to the Senator. Secretary Katzenbach: Reported on tre Rusk-Gromyko talks which were underway in New York
  • parallel. 3. Ambassador Thompson should see Gromyko to back up Harriman's meeting with Zorii'n ......_,,, to tell the Soviets that unilateral restraint can go on only so long; that private talks are necessary. 4. We should keep all options open
  • East question, Gromyko had no taste for going through the General Assembly again. The provisional draft is still the basis for talks. There is considerable movement on the Arab side but not enough. Egypt is not close to settling the Suez problem
  • of the Republic of Vietnam, could simply not be sustained." 4. Secretary Rusk discussed the US-USSR meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York on two occasions. He stated our three conditions, i.e., GVN participation, no abuse of DMZ, and no attacks
  • to send a Rumanian to North Korea. We advised Bunche that this did not bother us in principle. The Soviets may turn us down. The North Koreans said it was not the United Nation's business. Gromyko has asked for a gesture to red.ice pressure
  • . Then he decided not to go. be careful. We said it would be the 16th at Geneva. Let's Secretary Rusk: Gromyko said he couldn't comment on the 16th. think Thompson should see Dobrynin. I The President: What is your impression of Kissinger
  • the ship and the men back. I have talked with Gromyko. The Soviets have talked with North Korea. We do not believe the Soviets want an inflamation of this. The Soviets also have these ships. Three of them came within 3 miles of our shores in 1956. We had
  • on limitation of offensive and defensive weapons. We said we would give thought to continuing to pursue these things despite C zecho.s lovakia. Secretary Rusk talked to Gromyko and leveled with He got no contract on it. Secretary Clifford: with Kosygin
  • . C. D. E. Start with Kosygin 1 s letter. Mrs. Ghandhi letter. Views of House & Senate. Wouldn't stop unless it leads to stopping war. Rusk talked to Gromyko. Told him three things. 1. 2. 3. Inclusion of G VN. No attacks on cities. No abuse
  • of attention, the President said, if the man giving it came in and said he wanted to talk quietly and frankly. (The President had a comment about Gromyko asking some agreement on bombs or bombing; airplane noise blanked out the remark.) Drummond asked
  • between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York on October 6. Meanwhile, I di.5cussed our three points with Ambassador Harriman, whom I saw on September 17, and with Ambassador Vance, whom I saw on October 3. Both fully understood our