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117 results
- . also be covered in new tasking for CIA collection efforts. 1. 2. We should do more to exploit the intelligence as sets of other countries. The Australians, for example, should be encouraged to add at least one officer to-their :.Wlilitary Attache
- , and labor. Our economic statistics are the best and most compre hensive in the world. But they can be and need to be further improved. The costs will be exceedingly small relative to the benefits. To this end, my 1969 budget provides for several new
- Assembly. That body went deliberately to work fra.ming a new constitution for the war-ravaged country. ~T ' - NOFORN A-2 (BLUE) Page 2 of 9 Pages SEC~ ;,;;,- - NOFORN Prior to the US elections, a prominent opposition spokesman stated, "The recent
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs aa-vv," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 47
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- are: -----· to to to to to strategy in.stead generate a massive popular uprisinz in the cities; administer a significant defeat to US/GVN/ FW forces in the field; destroy the government2l apparatus o! South Vietnam fron,. top to bottoi.n; create a new popular front, dominated
- their new military plans. It is unlikely that present political actions will meet th e situation. should plan for a bigger political effort to reverse the current trend . political actions should be proposed for consideration. We New An overall
- there are str onger. Willia1n Bundy: As to South Vietnam, Prime Minister Khanh has suspended the constitution and t he Buddhists have made their demands on the government. The Military Council will meet tonight to elect a new President. A new Na tional Asse m
- already assigned in NSAM 343, and will be appointed Special Assistant to the President for this purpose. This new organizational arrangement represents an unprecedented melding of civil and military responsibilities to meet the over riding requirements
- the sending of U . S. military forces to Vietnam would require a new Congressional Re solution. He felt that our sending troops to Europe i n the early 1 50s was not a relevant analogy. The President asked the group what Ambassador Taylor wou l d be taking
- Thieu is a stabilizing force. He prefers to sit in the back ground, consequently, he will not take the post of Prime Minister. The present Saigon Government framework is solid but the members of the new government are not yet well - known to us
- pressur es . McGeorge Bundy summarized briefly the latest U.S . intelligence estimate of Hanoi ' s reaction to a new U. S . air strike . (A copy is attache d. ) ( Tab D) The President sugg ested w e discuss our position w ith the Soviet Ambas sador
- but this may not be s o. We should look again at our programs and examine all ideas without thinking whether or not they can be done without increasing our expenditures . {8) The Defense Department i s studying several new military recommendations made
- private investment by industrialized countries in Southeast Asia. 5. A review of the pros and cons of an immediate increase in U. S. assistance to Southeast Asia even before the estab lishment of a ·new regional development program. In par ticular
- Departments of the Govermne.it with special competence in our continuing attack on hunger, ignorance and disease to bring their resources to bear in Vietnam. I have expressed my special interest in the progress of these new initiatives
- : Reviewed in summary form the Vietnam negotiations since October 9 when the new phase opened in Paris. a. On October 14 he informed the three Presidential can didates tha t the DRV was prepared to sit down with representatives of the South Vietnamese
- calm. The President 1 s message to De Gaulle and the latter's reply probably had a favorable effect on the market, over and above its political impact. 2. First assessment of the measures taken by the French government: The new exchange controls are s
Folder, "NSAM # 273: South Vietnam, 11/26/1963," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 2
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- for execution unless be has serious objections. A. POLmCAL l .. A~eelttaUpn of aMqsJWed StratE!gic Hamlet Ers>gram. BackS1t9u.nd: The new OVN bas decided to concentrate on the improvement of ex1st1nCJ strategic hamlets. to ~re that they serve the purposes
- STATES:MIGHT BE MADE'. •-:°'.'-'. .. , .... ' ,,r 1 1I~' • •· . IT WAS LEVISON'S SUGGESTION THAT.':.PEOPLE LIKE-:JQHN KENNETH GALBRAITH,,' . ,_..:;·;-· :: ' KING, JAMES WECHSLER, ·THE EDITOR ·or THE' "NEW ·YORK POST~, DR.,'.JOHN .. BENNETT, PRESI DENT OF UNION
- ..,,_ has been considerable, .. ~ inflated_by civilians.·. .. ; ~ .... _ ,,,._ incltli¼io~ ~~ To some extent .... by measures already taken. 2 - Heavy S•E•C ft•E•'f infiltration of both new units is continuing. made prior A strenuous
- covered 61 SA-2 sites. One of these sites was occupied, 30 unoccupied (including one new site), and 30 could only be identified. The 30 October mission covered 92 SA-2 sites. Thirteen of these sites were occupied (including one new site), 74 unoccupied
- , for it would be folly to undertake i. I I I a brand new effort without realizing that a large number of people have spent •1 I extensive little time and effort effort persons to tell the story has been spent trying working with veterans
- In response to a reques t from t he President, Mr. lvlcCone reported that there was nothing new out of Vi etnam this morning worthy of mention . Secretary Rusk said that we had preliminary information about what might become an important new development , l. e
- of evidence from the North Vietnamese. General McCon n ell: Our bombing is ineffective because of the restrictions placed upon the Air Force . We should lift these restrictions and we would then g et results . l'OP SECRET/SENSII lvE SERVICE SET .. New
- , with the Korean, Australian, and New Zealand Governments, of the possibility of rapid deployment of significant combat elements from their armed forces in parallel with the additional Marine deployment approved in para graph 6. · 9. Subject to continuing review
- , 000 men. The Chiefs are opposed t o the deployment of U.S. forces in t he highlan ds of South V ietnam and want t he new forces to be used as a mobile rese rv e near the coast. Gene r al Wheele r: The ARVN fo rc es d i d not do as well a s we expected
- at the March 4, 5, 12, and 15? House initiative cessation? - When were. these decisions made? Why? - What was the nature of the troop discussions on March 19? 6. Was the President already when he received McPherson's thinking of a new negotiating proposal
- for meaningful programs. It is now anticipated that a joint GVN/U. S. policy on cadre will be developed at the Central Rural Reconstruction Council- Mission Council level; for this purpose a new proposal is being prepared at the staff level in USOM, USIS and MACV
- be taken to encoura ge additional private inve strn.ent by industri a li ze d countries in Southea st Asia .. 5. A re\.riew of the pros and cons of an immediate increas e in U. S. assistance to Southeast Asia even befo r e the estab lishment of a new
- elections in which the Communist Party did better than the Socialists . The result will be difficult negotiations before a new Government can be formed . Current East German act ivity, such as travel restrictions now being ilnposed, indicate that the East
- to avoi d undermi ning the confidence which exists between the President and Ambassador Taylor. No great new decisions are expected to result. Under Secretary Ball Reviewed the problem of military assistance to Jordan. The Arab States are jointly tryi ng
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 4, Tabs C-M," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 48
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Khe Sanh battle--------------------------------------- paper, vv xx announcement----------------------------- Msg, 31 -- Remarks CofS-- to appointment--------------------- new offensive 30 Rostow ss move
- announcements in Hanoi and Was~..ington that formal negotiations would begin 1n Rangoon on 25 November. Conferees were to be the United States, Sou~h Vietnam, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, North Vietnam, the National Liberation Front, the Soviet Union
Folder, "South Vietnam and U.S. Policies [X-File] [2 of 2]," Files of Walt Rostow, NSF, Box 19
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- : September, 1969 Page Numbers: 76 pages By Judith Viorst B-4 Society-Home THE EVENING STAR Washington, D. C., Wednesday, January .15, 1969 Chennault Dinner Delights GOP Guests By JEAN POWELL · Star Staff Writer , The "New Party" definitely
- the feeling of security had been strong. Those who had been "within the protection of the · Government" found out how wlnerable they were. There is a fear of further attacks.and there are new opportunities for Communist . .:. propaganda and subversive
- DEFENSIVE, AS I UNDERSTAND TH E JCS D IR E C TIV E , TH E MARINES ARE TO ENGAGE IN OFFENSIVE COUNTER INSUR GENCY OPERATIONS E A R L IE S T . TH E MISSION AS OUTLINED IN R EF A SHOULD BE STRENCTHENED BY DELETION OF THE LAST SENTENCE AND IN SERTIO N OF A NEW
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol 7, Meeting Notes," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 49
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- is the.earliest the new provis~ons for drafting • be thoroughly conunanders, clea~ed divisional up? conunanders, possible date when they can get through of 18 and 19 year olds? In the light of the changed situation, does some rede ... ~oyment ~ or example
- . In recent weeks I have asked those Departments of the Government with special competence in our continuing attack on hunger, ignorance and disease to bring their resources to bear in Vietnam. I have expressed my special interest in the progress of these new
- , the new Thai troops are doing very well, the Koreans are e.>..1:ra ordinary, and the Australian units' morale is very high. Two problems which need attention: 1. The Communists are trying to win over the youth of South Vietnam. In Saigon, the youth
- a discussion Deliver our new strategy support civilians purge corrupt administration of negotiations to be provided a Presidential address strategy stated and force re~ in the NSAM. to Saigon with General it must broaden their and move
- the present period. The President reviewed thr ee years of involvem e nt in the Vietnam problem, expressing doubt chat an unusually large amount of tim e w;i.s spent consider ing new proposals or changes in policy. Our strategy has been the same for three
- . He declined to tell our Charge in Vientiane whether the Hanoi leaders told him anything new. The President: We must get the news fastest about the Ronning mission . Secretary Rusk: Prior to executing any new orders on bon1bing, we must give 24