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  • ROSTOW SUMMARIZES HIS CONVERSATION WITH DEAN RUSK, WRITES THAT RUSK IS SENDING DETAILED REPORT ON HIS MEETING WITH ANDREI GROMYKO TO WH VIA COURIER; ROSTOW WRITES BRIEF SUMMARY OF RUSK AND GROMYKO'S DISCUSSION OF VIETNAM, MISSILE TALKS, AND MIDDLE
  • v i e t structure is built that way, there's not much point in trying to do business, say, with [Andrei] Gromyko, whereas you can occasionally with Kosygin. This was truer in the days of S t a l i n than I think it is now when you really have
  • Biographical information; Vietnam War; Clark Clifford; Paul Nitze; Dick Helms; DeGaulle; Phil Farley; Henry Kuss; morale problems; Wriston Report; McGeorge Bundy; Christian Herter; Walt Rostow; Dean Rusk; McCarthyism; Yalta; Andrei Gomyko; Kosygin
  • think we would all have been somewhat impatient . And in the end, about the 18th of March, [Andrei A .] Gromyko gave the British as cold a turn-down as you could get . That's an interesting episode in hindsight, whether the Soviet hesitation indicated
  • . We had the cards. And they know how to play their cards. It's just pitiful. That's why I say I'm glad that George Bush, today or yesterday got around to where some of us who had some experience out there were thirty years ago talking to [Andrei
  • EeaenUally tb• plaa i• worked out on a local baaia -­ 1otna from military to political action. RUSK Gromyko ia intereatad iD the Cambodian Conference. Sibaaoak b palliq back 011 hi• oriaiaal iDJtut.ne• tbac Vi•t Cone be repreeented at th• coderence
  • Rusk said that Ambassador Dobrynin mentioned NBC' s special show on Khr--.ishchev. Dobrynin was quoted as saying, p "Both Gromyko and I were surprised." Secretary Rusk said that Dobrynin is going back to 1v1oscow "for major political purposes
  • these things to Gromyko. Is there anything we can put our teeth into? The President: Secretary Rusk: Yes, their willingness to proceed with clear under­ standing that if we don't get cities and the DMZ, we 1 ll restart. The President: What
  • to Gromyko. In it, Gromyko said he knew for sure that we had entered Korean territorial waters because the ship's captain had said he had entered territorial waters in his own hand writing. We do not believe he did. But we cannot deny it because we do
  • overseeing group thought the Thieu-Ky election was a fraud. The President asked Director Helms to check this and if it is not true, get the information to the Senator. Secretary Katzenbach: Reported on tre Rusk-Gromyko talks which were underway in New York
  • parallel. 3. Ambassador Thompson should see Gromyko to back up Harriman's meeting with Zorii'n ......_,,, to tell the Soviets that unilateral restraint can go on only so long; that private talks are necessary. 4. We should keep all options open
  • . Kohler that he would discuss subjects: (1) Nuclear - MEETING the conference in terms ban. (3) Berlin He said that the principal conclusion of the test ban discussion was that the Soviets would not accept inspections. Gromyko's position was adamant
  • East question, Gromyko had no taste for going through the General Assembly again. The provisional draft is still the basis for talks. There is considerable movement on the Arab side but not enough. Egypt is not close to settling the Suez problem
  • of the Republic of Vietnam, could simply not be sustained." 4. Secretary Rusk discussed the US-USSR meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York on two occasions. He stated our three conditions, i.e., GVN participation, no abuse of DMZ, and no attacks
  • to send a Rumanian to North Korea. We advised Bunche that this did not bother us in principle. The Soviets may turn us down. The North Koreans said it was not the United Nation's business. Gromyko has asked for a gesture to red.ice pressure
  • . Then he decided not to go. be careful. We said it would be the 16th at Geneva. Let's Secretary Rusk: Gromyko said he couldn't comment on the 16th. think Thompson should see Dobrynin. I The President: What is your impression of Kissinger
  • the ship and the men back. I have talked with Gromyko. The Soviets have talked with North Korea. We do not believe the Soviets want an inflamation of this. The Soviets also have these ships. Three of them came within 3 miles of our shores in 1956. We had
  • on limitation of offensive and defensive weapons. We said we would give thought to continuing to pursue these things despite C zecho.s lovakia. Secretary Rusk talked to Gromyko and leveled with He got no contract on it. Secretary Clifford: with Kosygin
  • . C. D. E. Start with Kosygin 1 s letter. Mrs. Ghandhi letter. Views of House & Senate. Wouldn't stop unless it leads to stopping war. Rusk talked to Gromyko. Told him three things. 1. 2. 3. Inclusion of G VN. No attacks on cities. No abuse
  • of attention, the President said, if the man giving it came in and said he wanted to talk quietly and frankly. (The President had a comment about Gromyko asking some agreement on bombs or bombing; airplane noise blanked out the remark.) Drummond asked
  • between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York on October 6. Meanwhile, I di.5cussed our three points with Ambassador Harriman, whom I saw on September 17, and with Ambassador Vance, whom I saw on October 3. Both fully understood our
  • been sent to 34 foreign governments . Further details are contained in a State Department memorandum attached.) The reaction from th e other side is not what it was last May when Hanoi rejected our note, Soviet Foreign Minist er Gromyko said the note
  • and the Philippines President Marcos. There fo llowed a discussion of public information problems which was initiated by the President who referred to a leak to Drew Pearson of the sub­ stance of the President's conversation with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko
  • recommended He and Nasser considered themselves quite close, being so-called neutrals. And I'm rather interested that Gromyko now is on his way to see Tito, having just returned from a visit to see Nasser in Cairo. It may well be he went to talk to Nasser
  • . So they have no complaint for almost all They did have a complaint on that very first week or so when the Secretary was working with Gromyko and others on the text of this thing. LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY
  • Washington informed. Now it's important to note that Wilson and Brown were both a little disappointed with the composition of Kosygin's delegation when they first were aware of it. For variornreasons Gromyko wasn't coming, and indeed there were very few
  • . McGeorge Bundy), the group met at noon to consider the operational alternatives immediately ahead of us and, perhaps, further down the road. The meeting opened by bringing them up tc date with the late st word of the Panmunjom contact and Gromyko's reaction
  • and operating of view was to persist the point proposals senior Union and Communist China were acting The difference two things: Others, were thinking the Soviet crisis, Thompson in·Moscow and other Gromyko's presence see him. in the US, 3/18
  • — ^ ----­ t i l \ . ^ E m b te l 4 3 0 (Moscox-?) ; Gromyko re a c tio n COPY LBJ LIBRARY V ie tn a m , 0 8/11/64 *J J r8 ----- m n i T b h V o l. XV - Page 8 §irmr&-B-4-p-. Em b te l 781 ( P a r i s ) ; p r e s s re a c tio n w it h attached two page
  • discussion with Gromyko on March 18 and the President's discussion with Gromyko on March 27 were all designed to reemphasize our desire for a reasonable settlement but that the United States as a great power could not renege on its c01IDDitments
  • Soviet Approaches to th e US . ^ 7» While in cre asin g t h e i r involvement in the Vietnamese c r i s i s , the S o v ie ts have made i t a point to keep in touch w ith the US. Gromyko to ld Ambassador Ko hler in Moscovr la s t month that i t was J