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Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 6, Bunker Reports," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 48 (Item)
  • and war:1.ed against a coal:tion gove:i:nrne:"lt. Arr.ong the pa2.·tic!.pants in the us emi!:a=ti were L-riflue~tial Sen2.tors Nguyen Gia Hien ana. Tran Van Lam. The Se~ate Foreigr.. Affairs Committee 0::1.January 24 heard Foreig!'l Mir.:.ister Do's views
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol 7, Meeting Notes," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 49 (Item)
  • . In talking with Thieu and Ky, you should make clear that we wish to see it through at their side. If we are to be pe~mitted to do so by American public opinion, they must move fast t~ing their forces back to strength; wherever possible to get the forces ,b'i
Oral history transcript, Rufus Phillips, interview 2 (II), 5/27/1982, by Ted Gittinger (Item)
  • , they really were ex- traordinary. John O'Donnell we put down with the touchiest province chief that we had to work with but who was also the best, who was Colonel [Tran Ngoc] Chau, the guy that got thrown in jail by [Nguyen Van] Thieu, and then when
  • the Vietnamese wanted to accomplish; the Buddhist crisis of 1963; programs involving pigs and fertilizer; progress reports and their depiction of events vs. eye witness accounts; coup in Vietnam; Ed Lansdale; Big [Duong Van] Minh; Diem’s assassination; John Paul
Oral history transcript, Douglas Pike, interview 1 (I), 6/4/1981, by Ted Gittinger (Item)
  • Van] Thieu's secret then, do you think? P: Well, I think Thieu and Ky made a very good team in that Ky did have the charisma and he had the indifference to power. He gave the indi- cations that he didn't care that much by threatening to resign
  • ; the intelligence community; Thieu and Ky; self-immolation; the Tet Offensive; the Phoenix program
Oral history transcript, Barry Zorthian, interview 3 (III), 5/26/1982, by Ted Gittinger (Item)
  • messages to the Vietnamese, to [Nguyen] Khanh, who had just overthrown Big [Duong Van] Minh, "no more coups." G: I've heard it quoted slightly-- Z: Taylor was with them, perhaps one of the greatest scenes of all history. They were the two most unlikely
Oral history transcript, Robert Komer, interview 2 (II), 8/18/1970, by Joe B. Frantz (Item)
  • “pacification”; comparison of Ky and Thieu; differentiating between ambassadors in Vietnam; working with General William Westmoreland; Bill Moyers; problems with being the only full-time high-ranking government official workingon the Vietnam situation; who
Oral history transcript, Phillip B. Davidson, interview 1 (I), 3/30/1982, by Ted Gittinger (Item)
  • there very crestfallen, and I said, "You know, I can't help but say this: I told you so." (Laughter) Well, I think that's enough on that. G: That's a good story. 0: I've got a chapter in the book on all of [Vo Nguyen] Giap's major opponents
Oral history transcript, Earle Wheeler, interview 2 (II), 5/7/1970, by Dorothy Pierce (McSweeny) (Item)
  • [Nguyen Van] Thieu, and with Vice President [Nguyen Cao] Ky. Now, the situation I found was this: it being Tet, a substantial number of the South Vietnamese units were only at half strength, because, follm'ling the Vietnamese tradition, they had returned
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 5, Tabs JJ-TT and CIA Memos," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 48 (Item)
Oral history transcript, Robert Komer, interview 3 (III), 11/15/1971, by Paige E. Mulhollan (Item)
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 3, Tabs RR-ZZ and a-d [2 of 2]," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 47 (Item)
  • will be drafted beginning on March 1 and May 1 respectively. Some needed changes in top leadership (II Corps a;nd N Corps) are about to be made. President Thieu has reaffirmed his intention to proceed with the planned reotganiza_. tion in the armed forces
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol 7, Meeting Group Papers," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 49 (Item)
  • The "National Salvation Van Don and including r~ther completed its tion, and has is almost now trying to One chapter is Quang Tri. Neither ~ith the deeply reported Front, lessening; the promising. Two rival prod Thieu and broadening
Oral history transcript, Barry Zorthian, interview 4 (IV), 5/27/1982, by Ted Gittinger (Item)
  • , but I think I worked with seven different directors of information or ministers of information, depending on the title of the department in that particular government. A couple of those had been educated in the United States. Nguyen Ngoc Linh had been
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol 7, Meeting with the President and Draft Memo," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 49 (Item)
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 3, Tabs A-Z and AA-QQ," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 47 (Item)
  • .;,,.. IN1tORMATION THE WHITE HOUSE f WASHINGTON -I J Friday, Mr. Februa~y 16, 1968 -- 10:30 a. m. f President: Herewith (starting got from Mai Van Bo. page 2) what U Thant The simple answer is: They will talk if the. bo1nbing stops; They will not commit
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs a-z," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 47 (Item)
  • and interrogated by Saigon police, the-:-V-1e~Cong°pfaii..to.:.:.lfrg:-aiii~~~ ..~:ti'o,­ ti~o1.:Paople:!2.~:llM~.=-iiegoJiate~for peace,.: /.rhis new Front plans -t;·-• substitute General Duong Van Minh for Thieu and Ky as National Leader of South Vietnam
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs A-Z and AA-ZZ, [1 of 2]," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 47 (Item)
  • -------------------­ believed pp position-----­ qq man in Hanoi----------------------------­ rr of U Thant's ss account msg, away from Fanfani memo, memo, talks conversation with Mai Van Bo - - with NVN regarding Khe Sanh battle questions may be over related 5
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs aa-vv," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 47 (Item)
  • a Vietnamese (possibly President Thieu) would be the overall Force Commander and the United States v.rould provide the Field Force Commander. • 2. Your comments are requested on the feasibility and desirability of this or other command arrange~.aents
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 6, Khe Sanh Reports, A-S," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 49 (Item)
  • of the Ai Van Pass, within prompt reinforcing distance of Khe Sanh. We have plans to further reinforce t~is area on short notice if required. -ARVN ranger "4. We have a significant capability to reinforce Khe Sanh by fire in all weather conditions
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 6, Khe Sanh Reports, T-Z and AA-QQ," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 49 (Item)
  • of Hue ~xcept a quarter circle 500 meters in radius at the southwest corner of the Citadel wall. General Westmoreland commented that it appeared that enemy resistance was crumbling. President Thieu plans to visit Hue on 25 February, although General
Folder, "February 28, 1968 - 8:35 a.m. Gen. Wheeler"s trip to Vietnam discussion with Foreign Policy Advisors," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 2 (Item)
  • of the senior U.S. commanders. I also talked with Ambassador Bunker, President Thieu and Vice President Ky. There were a number of factors which surprised me. I certainly learned things I did not know before: The TET attack was very powerful and nationwideo
Folder, "February 12, 1968 - 1:45 p.m. Senior Foreign Policy Advisors meeting," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 2 (Item)
  • to the South Vietnamese and their determination~ I don't appreciate Thieu saying he needed more A~erican troops. I would think he would be looking for more ways to get more of his own men. But i f six battalions will help him exp~oit this opportunity, I am
Folder, "March 26, 1968 - 1:15 p.m. Foreign Policy Advisors Luncheon - regulars plus added group - Vietnam," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 2 (Item)
  • in urban areas to protect against a second wave of attacks. I told President Thieu that the South Vietnam forces had to go on the offensive. Thieu said South Vietnam could not take another Tet offensive. General Westmoreland has turned this around. sive
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 4, Tabs LL-ZZ and a-z," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 48 (Item)
  • WITH THE SPEEU .ANDVIGORWE MIGHTHOPE. IN DOINGSO, HE HAS.MADEHIM­ ~SELF VULNERABLE TO CHARGES OF BEI~G UNDULYINFLUE~CEDBY ~THEAMERibANS~ANDTHIS MAYBE ONE OF THE MOTIVESTHAT :LIE BEHINDTHESE NATIONALISTICINITIATIVES BY KY ANDOTHERS . .THIEU COULDTHEREFORE FIND
Folder, "February 9, 1968 - 11:02 a.m. Joint Chiefs of Staff," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 2 (Item)
  • , call up 18 year olds and give the American people the impression that they are doing as much as we. Secretary McNamara: When I was in Vietnam I talked with Thieu and Ky. They told me then they intended to call up 18 and 19 year olds. The President
Folder, "February 11, 1968 - 4:30 p.m. Senior Foreign Policy Advisors - Rusk, McNamara, Wheeler, Clifford, Taylor," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 2 (Item)
  • politicai groups. 3. In talking with Thieu and Ky, you should make dear that we "'.vish to see it through at their side. If we are to be permitted to do so by American public opinion, they must 1novc fa~t to b_ring their forces back /.'-v'1 to strength
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 1," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 47 (Item)
  • north to obtain be made Hanoi would The period for a period 24 of Vinh. the concurrence Sunday denounce night, of Thieu the 31st. the project of demonstrated of several weeks. and, restraint, thus, Twelve hours later to know how
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 8, Excerpts and Taylor's Memo," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 49 (Item)
  • the viewpoint that I expressed when I quoted the statement of Presi­ dent Thieu of South Vietnam in my interview with the • corr~pondents. • RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION Q. Mr. President, in your judgment, did the interview Premier Kosygin gave to Life
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 8, Draft Memo for the President," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 49 (Item)
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 4, Tabs C-M," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 48 (Item)
  • and opening of negotiations c~mmunist· concessions would be deeply to the Saigon government. There would be a real risk that the Thieu-Ky regime would collapse, in fact be part of Hanoi's calculation and this would in accepting negotiations
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 4, Tabs N-Z and AA-KK," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 48 (Item)
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs A-Z and AA-ZZ, [2 of 2]," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 47 (Item)
  • PERFORt1ANCE, THERE IS 00 QUESTION BUT THAT THEY WERE CAUGHT IN A "PRE-TET" POSTURE.WE DO DT HAVEFULL DETAILS, BUT THEREIS SOME EVIDENCE THAT UNITS WERE REDUCED BY TET LEAVEAND WERE NOT FULLYALERTDESPITE PRSSIDENTS THIEU'S ASSURANCE TO ME THAT 50 PERCENT