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- Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh the Vietnamese air force, Nguyen Cao Ky, was going to do the briefing. This was going to be a nice story about joint American-[Vietnamese] air cooperation, a common installation, all
- ://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh Phillips -- II -- 4 [Ngo Dinh] Diem on down. I saw Diem, I saw Nguyen Dinh Thuan, I saw everybody, and [Ngo Dinh] Nhu. I talked about a kind of a teamwork situation in which we would create a provincial coordinating
- a charismatic leader have succeeded? depends on the psyche of the Vietnamese. It I personally don't think so. I think that Nguyen Cao Ky had all the charisma needed, and all he evoked among the Vietnamese was plots to gang up against him. The Vietnamese
- ; the intelligence community; Thieu and Ky; self-immolation; the Tet Offensive; the Phoenix program
- to hirn., that could address itself to problems across the board in Saigon and the provincial centers affected by the Viet Cong attacks; and tn.at he ~ight. wa-:1t - to consider delegatil1.g supervision to Vice Presid_ent Ky.. On the Government of Vietnam
- 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh think you gave me some examples of [Nguyen] Khanh and [Nguyen Cao] Ky and so forth, so we can skip that. What kind of guidance existed for the individual not high
- sense. That was why it was rejected. I remember it very well. He was working in the most nebulous of areas. I don't think anybody, and this includes everybody from [Va Nguyen] Giap on down, had any idea, within 50 per cent, of the true strength
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol 7, Meeting Notes," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 49
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- . In talking with Thieu and Ky, you should make clear that we wish to see it through at their side. If we are to be pe~mitted to do so by American public opinion, they must move fast t~ing their forces back to strength; wherever possible to get the forces ,b'i
Oral history transcript, Earle Wheeler, interview 2 (II), 5/7/1970, by Dorothy Pierce (McSweeny)
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- [Nguyen Van] Thieu, and with Vice President [Nguyen Cao] Ky. Now, the situation I found was this: it being Tet, a substantial number of the South Vietnamese units were only at half strength, because, follm'ling the Vietnamese tradition, they had returned
- ._ ...... ·::, .,· ,:~~·~-~ ....~. ~ ♦ ... ,. ,,. .,, .• • 5 g. The task of organizing to meet the emergency needs of relief • ... and rehabilitation got off to a good start. .! • The special task force continues to function, although the direction and drive provided by Vice President Ky • is no longer
- “pacification”; comparison of Ky and Thieu; differentiating between ambassadors in Vietnam; working with General William Westmoreland; Bill Moyers; problems with being the only full-time high-ranking government official workingon the Vietnam situation; who
- of the senior U.S. commanders. I also talked with Ambassador Bunker, President Thieu and Vice President Ky. There were a number of factors which surprised me. I certainly learned things I did not know before: The TET attack was very powerful and nationwideo
- disunity being have Relationship The failure their dotie are weapons These and organized The Thieu-Ky groups 10,000 latter. being planned 9. self-defense measures and need be GVN. of levels .. to of Leadership. lack cohesive We
- , but it is better to have them there when they are needed than to need them there and not have them. General Wheeler: I will call now and get my men drafting the order. (General Wheeler left the room.) The President: What is the status of Buttercup? I see where Ky
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs aa-vv," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 47
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- of the United States losing jurisdiction Chicago and Detroit. over Similar "inside jobs" were im pending in other cities when Prime Minister Ky with great skill and courage finally put the If there had been a well-organized II II strugglen down
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs a-z," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 47
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- and interrogated by Saigon police, the-:-V-1e~Cong°pfaii..to.:.:.lfrg:-aiii~~~ ..~:ti'o, ti~o1.:Paople:!2.~:llM~.=-iiegoJiate~for peace,.: /.rhis new Front plans -t;·-• substitute General Duong Van Minh for Thieu and Ky as National Leader of South Vietnam
- - SAIGON22548 Mar 20 -· RECENTINITIATIVES BY KY ANDLOANTHATSOMEOF THEIR FOLLOWERS. OF WAR • URGINGA "MARCHTO THE NORTH"AND f!.. DECLARATION :AGAINST NORTHVIET-NAMPROBABLY REPRESENT,INTER·ALIA, A .·~E~CTIONTO THIS FRUSTRATION. J3. THIS FACTORHAS A BEARINGON
- ~ght 5 p Holder· w Thomes-Johnson The President: Will you get 135, 000? General Abrams: Yes. The President: Are they drafting 18 year olds? General Abrams: -Yes. Thieu and Ky are determined to do it. The President: What ·percent of the ARYN
- , call up 18 year olds and give the American people the impression that they are doing as much as we. Secretary McNamara: When I was in Vietnam I talked with Thieu and Ky. They told me then they intended to call up 18 and 19 year olds. The President
- compound from Embassy or buildings. greatly about here: is now well protected our people press corps - - how the people attack damaging And, intrusion out of proportion of course, Ky, or both could in Saigon with an account we somehow
- politicai groups. 3. In talking with Thieu and Ky, you should make dear that we "'.vish to see it through at their side. If we are to be permitted to do so by American public opinion, they must 1novc fa~t to b_ring their forces back /.'-v'1 to strength
Oral history transcript, Maxwell D. Taylor, interview 1a (I), 1/9/1969, by Dorothy Pierce (McSweeny)
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- policy. I think most people would It was the black year. The fifth government I dealt with was the Ky government, from which has sprung the constitutional government today. Things LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY
- that most a short have roughly to act urgently and Ky so that an announcement ~ and budget cuts alreadly largely needed reasons. Cessation Bunker however, effectiveness. reserve. - free GVN and ARVN could likely period. to continue
- Wheeler and General Westmoreland met with President Thieu, Vice President and General Vien. Topics discussed were not reviewed by General Westmoreland, but he indicated a wide-ranging, useful and realistic exchange of views. Ky 8. General Westmoreland
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 4, Tabs C-M," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 48
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- secret SC No. 01253/68 ~1:~ '/-;;;,.g. g.3 ~ . RESTRICTION ..._ 'J-1r-ky ~ 2 p 1 p Jl/~J-c..&S ~. 03/20/68 A NLJ/eA (_'l1-{ (g~' 03/28/68 A Nl.~-81-C,3 J t I I 1 .l FILE LOCATION National Security March 31st Speech, File, vol. NSC