Solr Search · Discover Production

. You have to bear in mind that Ho Chi Minh and his crowd fought the French before World War II, then the Japanese came in and they fought the Japanese, then the French came back and they fought the French again, and then the Americans came

Oral history transcript, Douglas Pike, interview 1 (I), 6/4/1981, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

the best organized and can most successfully disorganize the other side and stay organized itself. Diem simply didn't have the organizational skills that were necessary to win. He was up against Ho Chi Minh, an organizational genius in terms of forming

of men and supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. And then finally, to remind Ho Chi Minh and his advisers in Hanoi that they were no longer sitting in a sanctuary directing a war without paying a price for it. And that little by little

Oral history transcript, William DePuy, interview 1 (I), 10/28/1985, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

, but they weren't very good. They weren't good, dedicated communist fighters. But then later, of course, the larger issue was not the Pathet Lao but was to protect the Ho Chi Minh Trail. So they kept their troops in there, and they did protect the Ho Chi Minh Trail

Oral history transcript, Phillip B. Davidson, interview 1 (I), 3/30/1982, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

, of course, in the triple canopy [jungle], forget it. can't penetrate that canopy. You Aerial photographs, which had been a very excellent source in World War II, and a very usable source in Korea, were virtually useless, except out in Laos in the Ho Chi

Oral history transcript, Phillip B. Davidson, interview 2 (II), 6/30/1982, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

would have been near the end of November 1967, we had noticed some unusual activity in North Vietnam. I don't think it had any relationship to the trail, that is, the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos. We went to see General Westmoreland and told him

Oral history transcript, Samuel A. Adams, interview 1 (I), 9/20/1984, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

Oral history transcript, Rufus Phillips, interview 2 (II), 5/27/1982, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

the government, that they were running anything. And that just helped the VC politically. G: You'd known Big [Duong Van] Minh, I presume, hadn't you? P: Yes. G: What was your estimate of his capability? P: I liked Big Minh; he had a lot of political
the Vietnamese wanted to accomplish; the Buddhist crisis of 1963; programs involving pigs and fertilizer; progress reports and their depiction of events vs. eye witness accounts; coup in Vietnam; Ed Lansdale; Big [Duong Van] Minh; Diem’s assassination; John Paul

their lives miserable for twelve to fourteen. Second, to restrict and make more difficult the infiltration of men and supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. political. The third reason was both psychological and It was to remind Ho Chi Minh and his

Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 1," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 47 (Item)

for several months, now, that the Communists planned a massive winter-spring offensive. We have detailed information on Ho Chi Minh' s order governing that offensive. Part of it is called a general uprising. "We know the object was to overthrow

Oral history transcript, Don Oberdorfer, interview 2 (II), 9/17/1981, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

he felt that he was going to have to recommend, probably, to Washington, cutting the [Ho Chi Minh] Trail in Laos. G: That would mean invading, of course. � LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B

FR0~l 1ATIJN OF THE ALLIA~·JCE FO~ ?ZACE AND 3AIGON TELLS O? .TH~ FOR[ DEt•108R::\CYCLIE:t'l MINH CAC LU LUONG DA~-JTOC V.~ HJ.~ BIUH). GP- 1 • 900 1 1 .-:_~y:f' ··t:::z r, 2 a -,tottrt·· ., w · ...... ----~---~---··· ·•••·-;-4~7

and on the Conimtmists and the Outc~~es of Present activity there weakened. ftu·ther 13. l'le believe of rnili tary into the poll tical e::1erge from the present the GVU/ARVN will Alternative occu.r, to be contained,; manifest being ho:·rever, hand, US

kno'Wil for several months, now, that the Communists ·planned a massive winter-spring offensive. We have detailed information on Ho Chi Minh's order governing that offensive. Part of it is called a general uprising. • We know the object was to overthrow

Oral history transcript, Barry Zorthian, interview 4 (IV), 5/27/1982, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

TIMES LOCAL} I 21 -FEB ~WED} ~ ~ l i ! 1950 ETD ANDREWS AFB i i. l r ! i ~~----~----~,..._.;,. ji COHT .. 01.. i;·~ .; ~--------..'.'..-nt.:C.f 4 AOING :i ' I ...J i _____ __, ______ lj TOR/TOO HO. ___ :;G

and interrogated by Saigon police, the-:-V-1e~Cong°pfaii..to.:.:.lfrg:-aiii~~~ ..~:ti'o, ti~o1.:Paople:!2.~:llM~.=-iiegoJiate~for peace,.: /.rhis new Front plans -t;·-• substitute General Duong Van Minh for Thieu and Ky as National Leader of South Vietnam

.:~iHER ?ERi~IfZ Tticrrc~L ~l'~ TJ PXOV!DE. VISUt1L !~TL~CK SU?PJRT Fu'.~ KX£ S/UH. IN II C01PS, ~E ARE~OT PLA~NI~GJN O~i ~AJOR OFF:~sIVZ. HO;:£Vi:r(, lhE HOKS A;n: O~J THE. ~:uVE tLC!~G THi COA::·r _!;~ A :~t:LTI 1 BATI !!LIO,~ J?l::.!AI-10fJ. GE

position to enter n~gotia::ions, ho-oin.~ a ....,. ,_,. to fo:-ce . coalition gcvern:mer:.1: by derr.:.onstratir.1.g that -:he X.ationc.:l Liberation Front. com:r..a11.ds ~he ioyalty of the South Viet:n.amesa people and in;is't have a rr ..ajor voice i

Oral history transcript, Robert Komer, interview 3 (III), 11/15/1971, by Paige E. Mulhollan (Item)

Oral history transcript, Barry Zorthian, interview 3 (III), 5/26/1982, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

messages to the Vietnamese, to [Nguyen] Khanh, who had just overthrown Big [Duong Van] Minh, "no more coups." G: I've heard it quoted slightly-- Z: Taylor was with them, perhaps one of the greatest scenes of all history. They were the two most unlikely

Discover Our Collections