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27 results
Folder, "NUCLEAR - Nuclear Detonation - CHICOM Bomb," Files of Charles E. Johnson, NSF, Box 36
(Item)
- . 3/19/2009 ---- Initials - THE NEW YORK TIMES, 'Pf[URSDAY, JANUARY 4, 1968 China', Late,t At~m.. Teat I• -Believed a Failure . ~ IIY JORNW. FINNEY -.i .. '1'1111..., Tenll'lmle WASRINGTON,Jan. :f-Pre- '· ,. UJ. lfetn • Ducr,,-c1 off
- and we were able to put him on the job. We had one in New York, an FHA insuring office, in which the White House had no problem, but the fellow was a Republican and the Democratic Congresswoman from that area was all up in arms, and she raised a horrible
- Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
- in anticipation of eventual Presidential approval of the new guidance. Bennewitz in Defense also told me yesterday that they were hoping the NSAM could be issued shortly because the new guidance will have considerable impact on our approach to stockpiling. I think
- that they had indirect control of where a missile could reach Washington or New York and not reach Moscow. So the situation was somewhat different. Furthermore, the bulk of opinion was that what we were witnessing in the build-up in the summer of 1962
- Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
- after he went back to New York, Doug Dillon once or twice did, a matter of sending messages. But the decisions about what we ought to try to achieve, and a good share of the public relations about such increases when they came to public attention
- Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
- - ,.~Lrv) ID NOYember 1959, howeYel', after these new agreemat• for coopen.tlon had 1one Into effect, the Committee wu lnformallJ adriaed of a plaD whenbJ a U. S. nuclear weapon, the MB-1 (th6''Genie"air•to-air rocket) the nucleai- componBnt, would be mated
- . The 13 detections of 18 night launches detected by 440L comes out to only 70%. 2o @perational Readiness. The Feb ruary readiness date for the interim detection system is a new target date for initial operational capability. As of 1 November we were
- on Atomic Energy December Dear Mr. 18, 1965 Secretary: I note that articles in the December 18 issue of the New York Times by Thomas J. Hamilton and in the Washington Post of the same date by Anatole Shub report in considerable detail on the plans
- to explore questions some of the fundamental and iuvolved. from ~hose intereeted We are requesting conaents in ACDAand in the State ~partment. However, because of the immediate concern with the subject in New York,, I thought you might be interested
- an arms control agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States. 9. How to reassure the US public and allies that deterrent posture is not impaired by the development Soviet and CHICOMstrategic capabilities. 10. antees Nlpahj the US of new How
Oral history transcript, Norman S. Paul, interview 1 (I), 2/21/1969, by Dorothy Pierce (McSweeny)
(Item)
- twenty years of government service which began in 1948 after completing your law degree and an association with a New York City law firm. From 1948 to 1955 you were associated with the Economic Cooperation Administration, and your last position
- Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
- that the next and succeeding dispersal plans focus princi ally on changes of this sort as far and that any recommendation for significant net increases in the stockpile beyond the level authorized by this NSAM wili be made only on the basis of new circum
- their resolutionJ and c) to define the membership, locus and terms of reference for a new Working Group or reconstituted Paris Working Group to continue the multilateral d1acusaion1. An under11tanding 1n advance of thia somewhat l.im1ted 1et of objectives would
- or military areas. e. A Control Team examines the "Move Message" which each team provides and determines the positions of other countries and influences. A scenario projection is then prepared which advances the situation to a new point in time and requires
- was not available from others, before proceeding with assistance deemed to be in the United States interest. The Department is now reviewing the whole of United States policy toward Africa, and we will be developing new proposals for fu ture guidance. /S/ Dean
Oral history transcript, Ivan L. Bennett, Jr., interview 1 (I), 12/11/1968, by David G. McComb
(Item)
- at Grady Memorial Hospital which is one of Emory University's teaching hospitals . In 1952, having completed my post-graduate training, I accepted an appointment as assistant professor of medicine at Yale University in New Haven. After two years
Folder, "NUCLEAR - Indian Nuclear Problem [2 of 2]," Files of Charles E. Johnson, NSF, Box 33
(Item)
- the atudy of to ■peed tb1 ■ problem. the •tudy of tho Indian nuclea~ problem au Mid be wow.cl laaue a NSAM ahortly. PRESERVATION COPY ~/DRAFT June•• 1966 MEMORANDUM FOR THI: PR.E;IDENT We picked the Indian nucleu in your new ••ri••of meettaa
- only 5% to 15% of the capability of this new machine. Therefore it seems to me our denial would be effective to forestall a significant contribution to French nuclear warhead and delivery capabilities. Accordingly, I would propose IBM not be authorized
- be continuously evaluated in terms of both the potential end intention of the recipient country to engage in n mrtional program. 7. Mo new control mechanisms or formalized inter-llecncy committee:i i,ra required, but improved coorclinntion, cr.chnnna of views
Oral history transcript, Paul C. Warnke, interview 2 (II), 1/15/1969, by Dorothy Pierce (McSweeny)
(Item)
- immediately assumed that somebody had duplicated the key. Now in the case of Vietnam, I've always had the feeling that we reasoned from the analogy of our experience in post-World War II Europe. We looked at Communist China as though it were Russia; we looked
- participants, a tran script of the video-film summary and commentary of BETA I & II-67, post-Critique comments of the Game Director and several game participants, transcripts of the Senior Critique and extracts from the Action-level Critique. The object
- be required. The Secretary has worked out an agreement wit:4 Minister von Hassel under which our Joint Chiefs will work with the FRG military authorities to make a new joint study of the potential military effectiveness of ADM 1 s. The Secretary 1 s • request
- _ _. ~. INB/WQl - D&yid la Mark Clldr Satt.rwait• IIIO!ll"F ="'DS-322 ..... REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITEDUNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" February MEMORANDUM SUBJECT: 19, 1963 FOR THE RECORD .Alsop Column in Washington the French Mirage Bomber Post
- that I can recall was [Leverett] Saltonstall of Massachusetts, a very scholarly and distinguished and reserved New England gentleman. He made some changes in his family plans and came back and privately expressed his disgust at what had been done. G: I
- Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
- conventional war stock pile objectives. (2) The assumptions, techniques, and goals used in the establishment of post-nuclear attack supply re quireme'n ts. · ECI.AS.SIFIED "'CONFIDENTIAL N5< nt.Uuf 11.ff' 8p 'ff NARA, Date I J. -~'11 - I
- that the Soviets have proceeded with testing very vigorously. The meeting adjourned with no decision being reached. # # # [4 of 4] SW:RV!CE SET THE V{ASl-iI?'JGTON POST Octcoer 25, 1967 SECRET PROTES':' ON A-BLAST TOLD by Chalmers IvI. Roberts 1
- . MEMO - . REPORT cc, OTHER: 11/19/64 OTHER NO• .. ' ]894 J, X OST cy no 1 CLASS, Secret DESCRIPTION, I REC'D, (Mu POST REG. OFFICE NO. b• Unclas,lfudl DATE REPI...Y NECESSARY, NO REPt... Y NECESSARY: BY: ANSWERED, Fl1LE CODE