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Folder, "Jordan - Volume 3, 12/66 ‑ 5/67 [2 of 2]," Country Files, NSF, Box 146 (Item)
  • we can be P!Oud to be associated with, and everyone feels that Taylor can do an excellent job. State agrees that we should go ahead as economics dictate and stand our ground against any possible press reaction. Therefore, unless you have any personal
Folder, "Jordan - Volume 3, 12/66 ‑ 5/67 [1 of 2]," Country Files, NSF, Box 146 (Item)
  • OPTIMISTIC THAT QATAR, BAHREIN AND ABU . DHABI COULD BE RELIED UPON FOR CONTINUING CONTRIBUTIONS. 5. LOCAL PRESS HAS NOW PUBLISHED SUMS RECEIVED FROM BAHREIN, Q\TAR AND ABU DHABI, WHILE ONE PAPER REPORTED FEBRUARY 20. IHAT HAD PLEDGED BETWEEN 4 AND 4.5
Folder, "Administrative History of the Department of State, Volume I, Chapter 4, Sections H, I, J [1 of 2]," State Dept. Administrative History Box 2 (Item)
  • consulted in advance. Israel, i.m.ile refraining from drastic reactions to Syrian and Egyptian provocations, pressed the United States for a public statement on the extent of the American com­ mitment to Israel's security. But in lieu of making a public
Folder, "[Briefing Papers for Tuesday Luncheon, February 6, 1968]," Meeting Notes Files, Box 2 (Item)
  • entirely. The Arabs are beginning to believe that we aren't even trying to press Israel. In fact, we can take some credit for Eban 1 s acceptance of the resolu­ tion last week. But we haven't made a dent on his Jerusalem position, and we are trying
Folder, "C.F.- CO 142 Jordan," WHCF Confidential Files, Box 10 (Item)
  • Govern­ ment can be expected, as a minimum, to press for ~~;r_ly.-~r.al.e:a:a: b-."their~e1\U1""1.nfng re ·t:atm1 E.O. 12356t Sec.3.4 NLJ ~£Gii8t-- By-4,4.~· l""-1 /- ;)D N.ARA.,Date IP-JS- 9~ 1 .I! i.. r. .#lJ/J;{!~/-~ THE WHITE HOUSE C!tJ
Folder, "[NSC Meeting on] Vietnam; Jordan Arms, 2/1/1965, Volume 3, Tab 26," National Security Council Meetings Files, NSF, Box 1 (Item)
  • the negotiations until it is certain there is no alternative and the n decide to give the supers onic s . Assistant Secretary Talbot should press as hard as possible for some other solution but at the end of the r oad, he should refer back to Washington