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  • , there is some evidence of admix­ ture with Malayan and Caucasoid strains. The only important minority group at the present time is the approximately 600,000 Koreans. There are also much smaller groups of Chinese and Caucasian residents. Religion Buddhism
  • ,....... . ; .. 1tayf Doe~·Tokyo agree with' Washington on Red China? Communist trade? Other issues? :;?/lo _tliist '.interview, iust before his U.S. trip, ,r,Jm ..... e ·.•.·.•·M .. ... · ~".ister Sato. gives his views to Robert ·,< M,a.,rt1n.:.of ~'U~S. News & World
  • time I had ever been on a long-distance train. Wetook the train and went out to Los Angeles. Mymemories of this are not very clear, except I do rememberLos Angeles, I do rememberour going downto San Diego. I remembermy father buying a Scripps-Booth
  • ..1'/..'J~ SUBJECT: January 12, 1965 Office of the President The White Time: d==-i¥1J, - GBClfflY u.s ••Japanese Current Participants: V and World Problems Eisaku Sato, Prime Minister Toshiro Shimanogchi , Consul Los Angeles (interpreter
  • ' Conference in Los Angeles July 4 and 5. On checking, without commenting and on a confidential basis, Attorney General Katzenbach said he would be available although he had planned a vacation, Secretary Udall said he was available·. apparently he does not know
  • to Washingtonfor my Senate hearing; flew out again the same afternoon. Then we drove on down to Los Angeles. By prearrangement, when I got to Los Angeles, I got the telegram from the Department that I had been confirmed. I went out that evening in Glendale. Wehad
  • Japs on 11 Nov. of 12 Nov. arrival (to avoid giving demonstrators time to get set). There will be some flak, but State and Reischauer agree Sato is right to tackle this one now rather than appear to be backing down, thus aaldng for more flak later. RWK
  • on uncleared memcon and is subject to revisiono Discussion of possible times for rescheduling 1oint Cabinet Meeting brought out difficulties for US before late January or February, Japan between late 1anuary and ·April. difficulties for It was agreed
  • ~, ISoAEC ·1 l,SAH 03pMC 01,~DP 0tuRSR 0· D/139 W A 0304092 FEB 68 ,M AMEMBASSY TOKYO TO SECSTATE WASHDC8561 iNF'O CINCPAC a a 1t : t B 2 14I I A t TOKYO5298 CINCPACFOR POLAD SUBJECT1 SPACE COOPERATION REF1 Ao TOKYO5 91 Bo STATE tel8419. lo
  • a potent restraint against excessive Japanese stubbornness, but commer­ cial irritants of various sorts are bound to arise from time to time, and Sato will probably become somewhat harder to deal with as part of the overall Japanese tendency toward greater
  • AsslJl!11ng GOJ release, PJ(Transmitting suggested reftel please cabl~ release time ASAP. through Embassy rather in order facilitate than direc~ cable as coordination publicity. ~ End. RUSK. LIMITEDOFFIC ~~ USZ ~ • ·' ~~ .::;L ;ri) t
  • together. Z) Hawaii in this case again serves as a bridge between the US and the Orient. l ) This is not a one-time occasion-this telephone cable will serve e very day year in and year out as a means of instantaneous communication b ringing
  • Commwtlsmin our own country and throughout the world. We are convinced that now is the time to go on an all-out offensive to unite the free nations of this continent on the basis of a superior ideology to Communism. I have just returned from New Zealand, where
  • -- as be has done so gracefully in Japan as well as in the western United States. More seriously, in these important meetings the Prime Minister and I find ourselves starting together on a new year and new time of opportunity in our respective lands. We both
  • ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified
  • instances where market disruption can actually be proved. It is only less important that when the U.S. must act contrary to Japanese trading interests, time and effort be taken to put the best pos­ sible face on the action through diplomatic and other
  • and that the Japanese Gove rn­ ment doesn 1 t seem to want that either. He said that things to be decided were: (1) what we need prim.a rily for our defense purposes, and (2) the timing and stages of new movement toward rever­ sion. He thought that action
  • . Emmerson) was criticized at the time of the so-called McCarthyism storm, and his appointment is considered quite shocking here by those who know his character and past history. After the war, he served as political adviser to SCAP from 1945. He pushed