Discover Our Collections
Limit your search
Tag- Digital item (23)
- new2023-Oct (3)
- new2024-Mar (3)
- new2024-June (1)
- Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (6)
- Joint Chiefs of Staff (3)
- Johnson, W. Thomas, 1941- (2)
- Jones, James R. (1)
- Rostow, W. W. (Walt Whitman), 1916-2003 (1)
- Stevenson, Adlai E. (Adlai Ewing), 1900-1965 (1)
- 1967-xx-xx (3)
- 1961-xx-xx (1)
- 1962-xx-xx (1)
- 1964-11-25 (1)
- 1966-08-01 (1)
- 1967-09-05 (1)
- 1968-06-19 (1)
- 1968-07-24 (1)
- 1968-09-25 (1)
- Arms control and disarmament (23)
- Nuclear weapons (9)
- Vietnam (4)
- Guided missiles (3)
- War games (3)
- Germany (2)
- NATO (2)
- United Nations (2)
- Apartheid (1)
- Berlin (Germany) (1)
- China (1)
- Czechoslovakia (1)
- Elections (1)
- Greece (1)
- India (1)
- Text (23)
- National Security Files (12)
- Administrative Histories (6)
- Meeting Notes Files (2)
- Papers of Tom Johnson (2)
- Vice President Papers of Lyndon B. Johnson (1)
- Administrative History Files [Arms Control and Disarmament Agency] (6)
- Committee Files (4)
- Meeting Notes (4)
- Agency Files (3)
- Files of Charles E. Johnson (3)
- National Security Action Memorandums (2)
- Vice Presidential Security File (1)
- Folder (23)
- Histories (6)
- Meeting notes (4)
23 results
- errectl\·.?·· defen;;e c.,tabhsh ment ever :itna\\"~ ~> m·,:1: Til'.? try_ !ca gotl::'.tcd nnd concluded -.nth the Inter·national Atomic Ener;y Aiiency" e.nd ture o! Uu:i dcc1s10•,m.,kmg tccl 1s 3 n that such D()~otiaUons commence within examination or e
- that the Ta•k -F orce r-opo11t wlll be available lo• the Prealctoai by the end of Jaawu.-y 1965. la. ·• dclltlon to Mr. Qlpatrlc, the ·members· of tba Ta•k .Fo..c• U•s M•. Ar.ttar H. tu-. -A llen w. Dean Dulle• General Allred M. Oft.ea11-r Dr. Geor.s• B
- On balance, some combination of pressures and inducements such as those examined in the next two alternatives below would seem preferable to relying solely on pressure. Moreover, given the fact that both the U.S. and Soviets have con tinuing interests
- targets have been authorized but have been delayed because of bad weather. Also four are inside the lO : mile circle and are being held. These total 18. Of the 51 remaining, 9 have been removed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff after careful examination. Some
Folder, "A Way of Thinking about Nuclear Proliferation (Rostow)," Committee Files, NSF, Box 1
(Item)
- with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION GSA FORM 7122 iREV. 5-82) CONFI DEN'fIAL DECLASSIFIED-~~-~- _::~ ,.~ w. w.. Rostow E.O. 12356. Sec. 3.4 _NY 2 7 - /lo;;J.. By ~ • NARA. Date 11-S"- g7 November 19, 1964
- , an arms control "Objectives Committee" was named by the Research Council for the purpose of: (a) developing an agreed list of U.S. arms control .objectives; (b) examining the research required and completed in areas related to each of the agreed objectives
- -proliferation in coordinated for military a pro• defense action in the contingencies. This memorandum examines a number of general iesues nuclear terms, form of the undertaking, and/or by the two major nuclear or by sny single or formal agreement
- in preparing for the exercise. Efforts are made to obtain participants with detailed and expert knowledge of the subject to be examined. c. JWGA's politico-military games are generally conducted on an interagency basis with participants from the principal
- coatrilMator lo tbe We•n ..._ of Ua.e armr ..,x1 •. U:CUT DECLASSIFIED E.O 1,:,,::n, Sec. 3.4 Ei'.4.a,J~. NARA, D3to~-/~ .. - .,, ~-OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department ~ATE, OCOWCI . ~~w ~ of ·state I . • ' '\ 'SECRET '\ 53 1 °' f I~ ,..,, DAC
Folder, "September 25, 1968 - 12:17 p.m. National Security Council," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 4
(Item)
- no plan to reduce the troops in Vietnam. cannot predict the return of any troops. I Secretary Clifford: We are preparing a statement to clarify this. There is no sort of plan to bring the number down. General Wheeler: The examination of forces in Vietnam
- recommended an intensified effort to negotiate an agreement with the Soviet Union and to develop the widest possible consensus in favor of non-proliferation. In dealing witli the near-nuclear* nations^ the United States should "examine on a case-by-case
- . Ways and means of countering this growing military power in the Mediterranean will also be examined and recommendations considered on increased surveillance by NATO countries of USSR fleet movements, and the adoption of a watching brief for Brosio. · 3
- Clifford: On the '70 budget we have been examining our assumptions. We had assumed the war would continue at the same level. You can't cut down without it leaking. The President: The situation seems like they are taking advantage of our restraint. Every B
- - state (and private) practice concerning acts of indirect aggression was examined. Second, an assess ment of the sufficiency of these international law principles in "a disarming world" was made. The report concluded that existing legal principles
- research paper are self-explanatory. We would appreciate it it you could have the NSC tiles examined to ascertain whether there is a memorandum to or from President Eisenhower (presumably sometime in the latter part or.1958) describing the functions
- of BETA I & II-67 was to examine some of the major issues, problems and questions associated with strategic weapons deployment; with particular emphasis on anti-ballistic missiles. In addition to this report, film summary of BETA I & II-67 813@IU!lT
Folder, "Problem of Nuclear Proliferation Outside Europe (Murray)," Committee Files, NSF, Box 1
(Item)
- ). The advantages of such an approach, largely psychological, are matters a£ judgm.ent. The disadvantages must be examined in the light of specifics~ These are some of the suggestions: diminished {a) Separation of nuclear visibility of the former;. from non
- DECISIONSCONCERNING ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS Introduction This paper examines to advance or inhibit The study also nuclear a balance of incentives countries weapons. and sanctions of continued However, no attempt and pressures of nucle~r incentives
- to Bonn had asserted that the United States .- SECRE'r - NOFURN B-II-1 B-II-1 .J 3 D or (Blue) (Red) Page 1 of 8 Pages _S_EC_R_lE':P __ ._!_fO_F'_O_R_N --.. had no choice but to "engage in basic re-examination of US policy toward Germany