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- Johnson, W. Thomas, 1941- (11)
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35 results
- targets have been authorized but have been delayed because of bad weather. Also four are inside the lO : mile circle and are being held. These total 18. Of the 51 remaining, 9 have been removed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff after careful examination. Some
- not recommend 77. Of the 350" which they did recommend, 320 were approved including those that were approved last week. In re-examining the 30, the Joint Chiefs recommended .against 13 of the 30, including small targets s .u ch as 4 or 5 small POL' s
- are examining the helicopter production schedules. We are in good shape with fixed wing aircraft. The President: What about Khe Sanh? General Wheeler: The supplies at Khe Sanh are very adequate. There is plenty of anti-tank ammo and they have used
- said if I Thieu concurred in instructions given Harriman and Vance. There is a later cable. He is ready to go along to try to see if they are serious about stopping the war. A message was sent to Bunker to examine loop-holes and.contingencies
- they will soon propose a cease fire. preliminary report and full report are at TAB F}. {Texts of 11. On Monday the President sent a message to Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams informing them that one of his ma~or concerns was to examine with utmost care
Folder, "Meetings With the President -- 4 January 1964 - 28 April 1965," McCone Memoranda, Box 1
(Item)
- then t:eviewod most recent JntolUgenco Report a ea outlined in the attached rsurnmat'7 in.de ap from cornmunicatlone received bf me on Janu:iry 1th (o~ccpt lo• numbered ltam 6, which \'\'l\S not ccvorod bocnuso of lach o1 timo). (1) P:reeident John.aoa wtahea
- but this may not be s o. We should look again at our programs and examine all ideas without thinking whether or not they can be done without increasing our expenditures . {8) The Defense Department i s studying several new military recommendations made
- forces in the vicinity of the village oi Lo Go, Tay Ninh Province, in I South Viet-Nam, was subjected to heavy small arms and machine gun fire from the Cambodian side of the Cai Bae River, which forms the Cambodian/South Vietnamese border
- the Ambassador personally responsible. Secretary McNamara stated that he had examined the economic situation and that he felt we must give generously of economic aid and must not ask the South Vietnamese government to do the impossible at this particular time
Folder, "September 25, 1968 - 12:17 p.m. National Security Council," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 4
(Item)
- no plan to reduce the troops in Vietnam. cannot predict the return of any troops. I Secretary Clifford: We are preparing a statement to clarify this. There is no sort of plan to bring the number down. General Wheeler: The examination of forces in Vietnam
- count of :V:iet Cong dead of any, month of the war, and a very high ratio also of e nemy to friendly los ses . We SERVICE SET - ------ -- - - -- .; · ,. I ~ 1"015 SECRET f - ... - 3 believe that General Westmoreland. is right (and General
- tu.rDJe.d do.wn tr.i1e ~f1er t01 pr~·vid.e: ~rctei.ittgs ·~ tb.,e g;.l"'O~nds ;:;a:t . :iit 'Wta.:s l ,¢SS ~~~n Wici \si, ~ttei les"s than. W'ho;le·he\.&:~;te,.cl ts~.e ~a.:t~ f'.(;):'1!' ~J.~;,$ l:~ ~~,~ ;r lo i e:~l" e:ta ·iy 'l~;~s ~ cil:at·e.d A~ :r
- harmful wny to cut los~~s in SVN is to let th~ government decide it doe8n't want us ~o stay there. ThP.r~fore, put such proposals to SVN govern mr?nt that they c~n' t accept, then it would mov-e in to a neutrnli~t position -- and J. heve no illuoions
- there for 17 years. Furthermore, if th.ey do believe we are telling the truth, they think we shouid have our heads examined because we would \>e throwing away everything we fought for. Ball said we should consider all these in terms of the American national
- tr cm Defens.e {headed by Fu'bbd) and CIA (headed by Vlheelon) who could examine all facets ot the problem and .b enct MeNamara and l would be 1n a po$.l tion to n'lab a firm recommendation to ·the Pr&atdent and the Executive C0mrnittet> at a. meeting
Folder, "Meetings With the President -- 6 January 1964 - 1 April 1964," McCone Memoranda, Box 1
(Item)
- that the President had talked about this problem with President Macapagal d:.iring his visit here. He believed we should examine the situation carefully, particularly the results of the Ma.nila meeting, that further consideration should be given to dispatching
- examined these together and specu ...._ lated as to the probable m2ntal cn:-idition of the suspect . @G_lf ££dz7i iifd ARA?..A/L...\:CTO!i•:er:bfo lLf~u ~ 1 O&::Q
Folder, "[December 21, 1965 Meeting with Foreign Policy Advisors]," Meeting Notes Files, Box 1
(Item)
- to examine the question of a continuous pause, the only kind useful with the Soviets. ·Benevolent, but not internationally significant unless we have a clear specific period. We ·could get a major political advantage from this. One paragraph in Lodge's
- how we proceed to examine wne::e we go with Vietnam policy after the winter- spring offensiveo My strong reco~""T~enda:::ion is: have a separate meeting on that subject.) 6. Depending on your feeling and judgment at the end of the session, you may
- ROOM APRIL 8, 1968 THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE: The President Secretary Rusk Secretary Clifford Walt Rostow George Christian The President examined a proposed reply to Hanoi 1 s mes sage which arrived through our Ambassador at Vientia
- administrator who could run the Country Team. The President again repeated his insistence that the Ambassador was the Number One man and he, the President, was holding the Ambassador personally responsible . Secretary McNamara stated that he had examined
- him to examine this. We should put civilian road and construction experts to work and replace military construction personnel so they may be sent up north. General Wheeler: Westmoreland wants combat troops in construction brigades. Frankly I think he
- in private discussions to establish a site at almost any point Hanoi might suggest, since the talks would not be substantive. We could, therefore, take very considerable risk on this point. After several drafts were formulated and examined, the attached
- Wheeler: The 1967 figures do not reflect a better spotting and night vision this year. Justice Fortas: The program you outlined seemed to be right. If it is important to move up to the 20th, move up. Should examine whether Paris platform is being used
- friends, including Britain on the is sue. President: ls there anything new on General Wheeler's condition? Secretary McNamara: He is doing fine. for an examination. He is in the hospital today Secretary McNamara: On targets, the JCS recommends
- r.nonths as set forth in reference. b. Th(; Wl.P.. . CV v/l:c~ civilic.~ nization program is deferred; however, as and conditions permit, examination of substitution of contractor effo~t in lieu of rnilitary sup?.=n·t effort will be reopened. c
- Clifford: On the '70 budget we have been examining our assumptions. We had assumed the war would continue at the same level. You can't cut down without it leaking. The President: The situation seems like they are taking advantage of our restraint. Every B
- at A."'nerican planes overhead. 7) Visual sighting from aircraft of the WAKE of a small,· fast craft near the destroyers . -- ~ I i. .. Persons who have examined a.ll of theevioo~c~ can have no doubt that the MADDOX twice and ·the TURNER JOY once were
- nothing. reinforcing - - rebuilding - - re infiltrating - They are Meeting in Cabinet Room January 22, 1966 10 Even bombed us (unreadable) Saigon. We went into this in good faith, We wanted to examine every and any chance for peace. We have
- 205,000 personnel and should act to increase and improve our strategic reserve in the United States. An initial staff examination of requirements indicates that to achieve both will require: a. i A call-up of reserve units and individuals totaling
- there are domestic implications, we are inviting Orville Freeman to the meeting. The NSC meeting need not - - and in my view should not - - be the occasion for your deciding on the rice question; but it is a good occasion for debate and cross-examination. I suggest
- examination by his staff. Ambassador Bunker said it would be good to bring out a comparison oi the Vietnamese casualties which more accurately reflect the situation. Secretary McNamara said it was a fact that our regular Army losses are higher than the South
- wait until you get out of this war. Secretary Rusk: We should say: Point 1 - - It is important to have informal talks with the Soviets in Paris. Point 2 - We will examine a halt to bombing. Point 3 - We will be prepared to discuss this matter further
- the sheets in the mylar sleeve when you have finished examining them. May 17, 2004 LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET Classification Doc# DocType Doc Info 028 ~ostow to 11161110 s LSJ [SsRiti~ed ~ 1~tQ4 ~~Ld/F\)!r\e R:llir.16 Rosruw to tl
- could he really worry much about criticism in itself. He said public opinion polls rose and fell - his rating might go down to 5, he said - - but he still had to examine his options and make his decisions. He reviewed the Tonkin Gulf resolution