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Folder, "Meetings With the President -- 23 November 1963 - 27 December 1963," McCone Memoranda, Box 1 (Item)
  • carried with him a letter from the Papal Delegate and also from the Bishop of Saigon, apparently praising the actions in upsetting the Diem government. Lodge said he saw dangers of an anti-Christian move and this was his purpose in seeing the Pope . He
Folder, "Policy Papers and Background Studies on Cuba Affair (V)," VP Papers, VP Security Files, Box 8 (Item)
  • to test of weapons - we keep pressure on Soviet Union by not saying we will not test. 10 a.m. November 3, 1962 -2lOP SECRET- HCC!t..SSL·•·Vi) B.O. ~'B5.J, S-:t. 3-4 ~J!:.J JJ-11.1/ _ Cy~ JM*, NiulA, Date TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRmNQ RLI l-~,t
Folder, "Meetings With the President -- 6 January 1964 - 1 April 1964," McCone Memoranda, Box 1 (Item)
  • with 'the--P~ident , 9)7--Zy S 1 . t.
Folder, "[NSC Meeting on] Secretary McNamara's Mission to Vietnam; OAS Action on Venezuelan Arms Cache, 3/5/1964, Volume 1, Tab 4," National Security Council Meetings Files, NSF, Box 1 (Item)
  • to make decisions prior to the re t urn of Secr etary McNamara . Secreta ry Rusk said he was taking a sober view, even a pessimistic vi~w of developments in South Vietnam . Listing the points of weakness in the situation in Vietnam was a way for us
Folder, "[July 1968 Meetings with Correspondents]," Meeting Notes Files, Box 3 (Item)
  • thousc:i:ds of children c.nc1 young peopb, I rcali~:ed how nrnch more needs to be
Folder, "[September 29, 1965 Luncheon Meeting with Foreign Policy Advisors]," Meeting Notes Files, Box 1 (Item)
  • defensive in our public handlbg of the tear ga.s situation, that we should remind the world that fae Vi.?t Cong slit throats anci bomb. chilcl::-en and that any hu.-nan being ·ic. orie of the Vietnam ca.ves wo\!ld prefo:- to cry from tear gas rather th.an
Folder, "[NSC Meeting on] Overflights of Cuba, 5/2/1964, Volume 2, Tab 2," National Security Council Meetings Files, NSF, Box 1 (Item)
  • ¥ political pressure at the UN and elsewhere. r Because he expects to gain complete control of the SAM system vi thin the next few wee.ks he hopes tliat, with Soviet support, his warnings will be taken seriously and the US compelled to abandon U-2 flights