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  • thing Stevenson we can do is examine ingoing & outgoing manifests or examine at sea & how far (open crates, etc?) Ball If Russia wants Castro to cooperate they can make him 80% of his trade is with Russia. Taylor says ask Russia what is your withdrawal
  • targets have been authorized but have been delayed because of bad weather. Also four are inside the lO : mile circle and are being held. These total 18. Of the 51 remaining, 9 have been removed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff after careful examination. Some
  • not recommend 77. Of the 350" which they did recommend, 320 were approved including those that were approved last week. In re-examining the 30, the Joint Chiefs recommended .against 13 of the 30, including small targets s .u ch as 4 or 5 small POL' s
  • are examining the helicopter production schedules. We are in good shape with fixed wing aircraft. The President: What about Khe Sanh? General Wheeler: The supplies at Khe Sanh are very adequate. There is plenty of anti-tank ammo and they have used
  • said if I Thieu concurred in instructions given Harriman and Vance. There is a later cable. He is ready to go along to try to see if they are serious about stopping the war. A message was sent to Bunker to examine loop-holes and.contingencies
  • they will soon propose a cease fire. preliminary report and full report are at TAB F}. {Texts of 11. On Monday the President sent a message to Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams informing them that one of his ma~or concerns was to examine with utmost care
  • , Special Ass istant to the Pres ident for National Security Affairs Dr. Jerome Wiesner, Special Assistant LO Lhe President for Science and Technology Theodore C . Sorensen, Special Counsel to the President Walter J enk ins Bill D . Moyers Maj . Gen
  • then t:eviewod most recent JntolUgenco Report a ea outlined in the attached rsurnmat'7 in.de ap from cornmunicatlone received bf me on Janu:iry 1th (o~ccpt lo• numbered ltam 6, which \'\'l\S not ccvorod bocnuso of lach o1 timo). (1) P:reeident John.aoa wtahea
  • but this may not be s o. We should look again at our programs and examine all ideas without thinking whether or not they can be done without increasing our expenditures . {8) The Defense Department i s studying several new military recommendations made
  • forces in the vicinity of the village oi Lo Go, Tay Ninh Province, in I South Viet-Nam, was subjected to heavy small arms and machine gun fire from the Cambodian side of the Cai Bae River, which forms the Cambodian/South Vietnamese border
  • ; a ll have played a parto DECLASSIFIED Authority NL .J ~ 3 - ;;)_ .S- h By .c--
  • the Ambassador personally responsible. Secretary McNamara stated that he had examined the economic situation and that he felt we must give generously of economic aid and must not ask the South Vietnamese government to do the impossible at this particular time
  • no plan to reduce the troops in Vietnam. cannot predict the return of any troops. I Secretary Clifford: We are preparing a statement to clarify this. There is no sort of plan to bring the number down. General Wheeler: The examination of forces in Vietnam
  • count of :V:iet Cong dead of any, month of the war, and a very high ratio also of e nemy to friendly los ses . We SERVICE SET - ------ -- - - -- .; · ,. I ~ 1"015 SECRET f - ... - 3 ­ believe that General Westmoreland. is right (and General
  • tu.rDJe.d do.wn tr.i1e ~f1er t01 pr~·vid.e: ~rctei.ittgs ·~ tb.,e g;.l"'O~nds ;:;a:t . :iit 'Wta.:s l ,¢SS ~~~n Wici \si, ~ttei les"s than. W'ho;le·he\.&:~;te,.cl ts~.e ~a.:t~ f'.(;):'1!' ~J.~;,$ l:~ ~~,~ ;r lo i e:~l" e:ta ·iy 'l~;~s ~ cil:at·e.d A~ :r
  • µJ 4-j.6a.,- t - ­ -fJ9'I o4/ 6M---t--.i"'­ CAP 82318 to Presiaant from Walt Rostow top secret ~rf' ~ -#3j RES TR ICT ION N'-j J.J l,J 13 " )~ 8'f- 31.3 A 1 p SA11'l f'j,.,·_ ..,t,J C/£ -cc·l.·lo • 'PO eountries .,..,.1t>C> • -.~ •• ,e 11
  • reall·.: ris ks a direct Greek- Turk confrontation. T he President asked G eneral Wheeler whether we have taken into account the demands that a Turkish invasion would place on NATO . Gene :- al Wheeler !OP "EGRET .. . 4. felt we had examined
  • harmful wny to cut los~~s in SVN is to let th~ government decide it doe8n't want us ~o stay there. ThP.r~fore, put such proposals to SVN govern­ mr?nt that they c~n' t accept, then it would mov-e in to a neutrnli~t position -- and J. heve no illuoions
  • there for 17 years. Furthermore, if th.ey do believe we are telling the truth, they think we shouid have our heads examined because we would \>e throwing away everything we fought for. Ball said we should consider all these in terms of the American national
  • tr cm Defens.e {headed by Fu'bbd) and CIA (headed by Vlheelon) who could examine all facets ot the problem and .b enct MeNamara and l would be 1n a po$.l tion to n'lab a firm recommendation to ·the Pr&atdent and the Executive C0mrnittet> at a. meeting
  • that the President had talked about this problem with President Macapagal d:.iring his visit here. He believed we should examine the situation carefully, particularly the results of the Ma.nila meeting, that further consideration should be given to dispatching
  • •on• they are delicate and danseroa•: I. Hitting them might result in the po••lble involvement of China and the Soviet Union. 2. There could be mo!'e lo•• of live• and •lrcraft involved than the cle•tructlon of the target• would 1atn. There arc four place• where
  • ? We ought to respond promptly and in a firm manner. Walt Rostow: We should examine whether this is really a Soviet job. The North Koreans expect an air strike on Wonsan. Richard Helms: This is part of a well-calculated program, first the Blue House
  • examined these together and specu­ ...._ lated as to the probable m2ntal cn:-idition of the suspect . @G_lf ££dz7i iifd ARA?..A/L...\:CTO!i•:er:bfo lLf~u ~ 1 O&::Q
  • . Ways and means of countering this growing military power in the Mediterranean will also be examined and recommendations considered on increased surveillance by NATO countries of USSR fleet movements, and the adoption of a watching brief for Brosio. · 3
  • to examine the question of a continuous pause, the only kind useful with the Soviets. ·Benevolent, but not internationally significant unless we have a clear specific period. We ·could get a major political advantage from this. One paragraph in Lodge's
  • how we proceed to examine wne::e we go with Vietnam policy after the winter- spring offensiveo My strong reco~""T~enda:::ion is: have a separate meeting on that subject.) 6. Depending on your feeling and judgment at the end of the session, you may
  • ROOM APRIL 8, 1968 THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE: The President Secretary Rusk Secretary Clifford Walt Rostow George Christian The President examined a proposed reply to Hanoi 1 s mes sage which arrived through our Ambassador at Vientia
  • administrator who could run the Country Team. The President again repeated his insistence that the Ambassador was the Number One man and he, the President, was holding the Ambassador personally responsible . Secretary McNamara stated that he had examined
  • him to examine this. We should put civilian road and construction experts to work and replace military construction personnel so they may be sent up north. General Wheeler: Westmoreland wants combat troops in construction brigades. Frankly I think he
  • in obtaining US arms. We should adhere to present commi tments and resume shipments as urgently as our general arms policy allows . We should be prepared to examine means of strengthening the internal security systems of friendly governments. b. At the same
  • of the National Committee, Walt Rostow and Alfred Jenkins Mr. Rostow said that the visiting China specialists had examined three subjects for discussion with the President: (1) the situation in China; (2) alternative future directions of the evolving situation
  • in private discussions to establish a site at almost any point Hanoi might suggest, since the talks would not be substantive. We could, therefore, take very considerable risk on this point. After several drafts were formulated and examined, the attached
  • Wheeler: The 1967 figures do not reflect a better spotting and night vision this year. Justice Fortas: The program you outlined seemed to be right. If it is important to move up to the 20th, move up. Should examine whether Paris platform is being used
  • friends, including Britain on the is sue. President: ls there anything new on General Wheeler's condition? Secretary McNamara: He is doing fine. for an examination. He is in the hospital today Secretary McNamara: On targets, the JCS recommends
  • r.nonths as set forth in reference. b. Th(; Wl.P.. . CV v/l:c~ civilic.~ nization program is deferred; however, as and conditions permit, examination of substitution of contractor effo~t in lieu of rnilitary sup?.=n·t effort will be reopened. c
  • Clifford: On the '70 budget we have been examining our assumptions. We had assumed the war would continue at the same level. You can't cut down without it leaking. The President: The situation seems like they are taking advantage of our restraint. Every B
  • we seek short term solutions or should we examine the virus" the decay which exists in our cities. We face immediate problems as to what tactics we employ including the use of the FBI and the National Guard. The President said that we may have
  • ? The President: For the same reason that a passer keeps the ball a second too long and gets tackled. Secretary rvf.cNarnara: \Ve must also examine this man's conduct against a record of at least 1000 harassments. In one incident last year, the Pueblo's sister