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Folder, "[September 15, 1967 - Meeting with AFL-CIO Executive Council]," Meeting Notes Files, Box 2
(Item)
- dip in the desertion rate in the South Vietnamese army. This rate will come down even lower, as certain South Vietnamese generals are replaced. The President said every day, each day, we are offering to negotiate with Ho Chi Minh. Our position is clear
- military forces and limit the size of U. S . forces. Political fragility continues in South Vietn am. We hope that the political situation is at last settling down. Based on recent local elections, a national election held now would not go to Ho Chi Minh
- no results. ... , •, .. '.' 3. .The President feels Ho Chi Minh is farther away from negotiations than he ever was; his views seem to be we cannot ,. ; ·• : 'defeat him, he can defeat us, and we will not stay the course. • J ~· : ' 9 • \ ; : 4
- that we are trying to probe in every way to find some way to get Ho Chi Minh to talk even while they continue to fight. The President read President ' Thieu's peace overtures which were made during the campaign and which included bombing pauses
- Chi Minh' s objectives are to divide us from our allies and to divide us at home. We should be cautious in making statements about what we expect to come out of the Paris talks. UK Fo r eign Minister Stuart may get something during his coming visit
- it." The President said the bombing would give protection to our ground troops. The President said that Ho Chi Minh hasn't moved one inch from his statement which was published earlier this year. The President continued, "If you want me to get out of Vietnam
- York Times - January 29, 1966 Text of Ho Chi Minh's Letter on Pe2ce Speclal lo Tht );rw Yor~ Tin:ts WA.SHINCTON, Ja11. 28-Fol lotoill!J is tlle text of the letter of PYeMdcnt Bo Chi Millh. of North. Vietnam to .some 1leads of .state and. otllcr
- out now," and "try the enclave theory. 11 I have stopped the bombing six times. I did not get any indication of any action on their part. We are in touch with Ho Chi Minh today. The problem is not one of communication. The problem is that Ho wants
- policy is wrong. Where do they get us? Nowhere. The popular thing now is to stress the mis-management in Vietnam. there has been very little. I think I wish Mike (Senator Mansfield) would make a speech on Ho Chi Minh. Nothing is as dirty as to violate
- countries, trade, security matters, or helping build a stable peace. Question: Does the President think there is a serious possibility of productive talks taking place with Ho Chi Minh leading to a peaceful settlement in Vietnam.? Answer: We simply do
- said was that the Asians believed the ir enemy Wbo is the enemy - - Peking or Ho Chi Minh? The Vice President : The Vietnamese know their enemy is the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese. Wounded South Vietnamese soldiers know who the enemy is . Senat
- be willing to do. We hear from travelers and from self-appointed spokesmen from time to time this and that. On occasions we have attempted to confirm it, and we have negotiated directly with them. I think the last position stated by Mr. Ho Chi Minh is a safe
- Secretary of State, Pope Paul VI, and Ho Chi Minh Top Secret 1 p. FPesiaeBt to Oh8:fl:eelloP Kiesingap___; 'Possible ela~sified informa_tion--. ©fis:I1callor Kiesiriger to PresideR-t Possible classified inrormatlon Rostow for the President 8/Jl/68 Top
- Lodge -- Bunker should be well publicized when he returns. Robert Murphy - - We need a hate complex directed at Ho Chi Minh similar to Hitler. General Omar Bradley -- Our troubles can be blamed on the communications media. We need patriotic slogans
- Wheeler said it is not necessary to approve this target tonight. - 2 The President said he should go ahead and approve it. "If we send a McNamara to talk to Ho Chi Minh, we don't want to approve it after he gets there." Wheeler said the weather
- and teat thls v:as why the ARV.N had been so success.fa! until recently. 'The President remarked that we all know that it is a bad situation and we wish we were ten years back or even ten months back. Senator Long said that Ho Chi Minh tal!\:s of a twenty
- to the North Vietnamese and sought their views. They did not respond to our suggestions and the exchange culminated in my February letter to Ho-Chi-Minh and his flatly negative response, which Hanoi chose to publish. Since that time, despite additional efforts
- trouble than we get gains. He said we'd bombed Hanoi within half a mile of Ho Chi Minh 1 s hous e . (The President pointed toward the Washington monument as he said ". "That's as close as those people down there, and him sitting there oil: .' his front
- public statements be made. 5. Tiw President then departed and Mr. McNamara requested that the group remain for a general review of the problem. It was pointed out that the balance of forces in Laos generally favored the Pathet Lao with their Viet Minh
Folder, "Meetings With the President -- 4 January 1964 - 28 April 1965," McCone Memoranda, Box 1
(Item)
- a course of action. He indicated he had talked to the Canadian Foreign Mlniater and had presented the question of Canadian approach to Ho Cbi Minh. He questioned whether the threat ehould be as po•ltively atated as Lodse'a cable indicated. The basic
- conomy is such t hat Rollin~ Thunder can affect directly only a small f racti on of the ponulati on. There is very l ittle hope that the Ho Chi Minh Government ..,ill l ose control of population because of Rolling Thunder. The l essons of t he Korean War
- greater nurubar of men. wngELEll: J 'l'he more men we have th~ greater the 1 tke: l itwod of smaller loafl,.,B. JlHESIDENT: What makes you think if we put in 100, ono meu Ho Chi Minh won't put in another 10~, 000'? WHEELEH: which will allow
- an emissary to make a peace proposal to Ho Chi Minh. Ho turned him down flatly . This reveals the present attitude of Hanoi very clearly-- directly from the rankin g Hanoi leader . Secretary Clifford: For some weeks we have had reports that Hanoi
Folder, "Meetings With the President -- 6 January 1964 - 1 April 1964," McCone Memoranda, Box 1
(Item)
- available, but we coulrl continue to operate the Canal. 10. Mr. McI'iamar.::i~ ·u ho had stepped outside the roa:n to converse wi"th. C.eneral O'Meara. by phone, reported that the poszibility of the l~~rnulfista-Commie coup had been passed to Chiari. I t
- . Some of General Taylor: Will General Minh be a help or hindrance? General Abrams: So far, he has been neutral. Walt Rostow: Do you believe offensive is primarily answer to maintaining the morale of our men and ARVN? Does the maintenance
Folder, "June 4, 1968 - 1:45 p.m. President's Tuesday Luncheon," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 3
(Item)
- not do much better. General Wheeler: The Vietnamese appointed General Minh to run the Saigon defense -- ARVN, police, RF and PF. The President: Would you brief us, Dick. (CIA Director Helms) Director Helms: There are new elements around Khesanh
- in sevl.!ral n1ajor capitals so th;1t Lhcir point of view c;-in be put across to other countries . , '.l ( 4) The relationship between Khanh and Big Minh is not entit·cly satisfactory. Ambassador Lodge is trying to bring these two men closer together