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  • . Secretary McNamara said he would provide 500 additional officers for pacification work by February. Bob Komer said he was for 3551 officers. Secretary McNamara said the military is short of this type of man. He said there are officers in Vietnam who can
  • on our ability to get talks going. We should try even if there is little hope for success. Even if you were to get them started and nothing mppened it would be good. We would step down some if secret talks began. I do not see a better channel
  • I would respond immediately. If they were to begin a major resupply we should deal with that immediately. THE PRESIDENT: Bob, how effective can you be in dealing out resupply? SECRETARY McNAMARA: Mr. President, I believe I can show beyond a shadow
  • speech will generate a process for peace in Vietnam. THE PRESIDENT: That is encouraging. We tried to convince our people some move had to be made. We felt this was a step. I hope conditions will permit it to be a big step. If there is any recognition
  • of the conflict. That chance •• that hope •• we cannot forego. We ·aould be misled - - and we are prepared for that contingency. We pray God it does not occur.. It should be clear to all of us that the new phase of negotiation• which will open on November Z
  • , for the past several months, and particularly in the past month or two, there has been increasing sentiment here and abroad urging the United States to stop bombing in the hope or expectation that this unilateral act would bring us to the peace table. While
  • of And though I cannot tell you precisely ~hopeful year in South Vietnam and elsewhere: t1r.t ~ . rr sv,N events has occurred this . _.l~A- ~ ·~ .o;ti~ ~ -- · ·/':' - - ~ 6teady strengthen~ng of_th constitutional where a million men are now arms
  • should delay a decision for a week are: 1. In paris we have a ·p osture based on the March 31 speech, and the fact that we have been bombing only up to the 19th. I do not think we should be t.he first to change our position. 2. Our hope
  • taken element of hope from so many people. I think the problem is to have to rr.ake a. statement when weight of .feeling is well, another ••• --tax issue --more troops ~ --more costs ($~ Billion) Is there a way of conveying an impression
  • week has been general support for your policy. will come out of Paris conference. I hope so. Something With limitations placed on the military, we have no real plans to win the war. If you limit ­ - no invasion into the north - no mining of harbors
  • CLIFFORD: 1. We are going through stage of negotiations you must go through with the Communists. Lengthy conferences are not unusual. I am hopeful about the meeting. President made an exceedingly generous offer last September. On March 31, President made
  • that the presence of the GVN there at the first meeting is only symbolic. We just need a warm body. Secretary Rusk: They said that too. The President: Let's do everything possible to nlake sure that this thing is held tightly. I hope all of you will just close up
  • reasonably hope for GVN to be recognized by sitting at talks." George Christian: I will send the Press home now. Clark Clifford: If orders go out at 12 noon tomorrow to stop bombing at 12 midnight, what is the possibility of a leak? General Wheeler
  • in a room next to Secretary Rusk's office for immediate liaison purposes. Mr. Nixon said that, despite observations in the pres$, he had made no decisions on his Cabinet. He hopes to have his Cabinet appointed by December 5. He would naturally like to have
  • willing­ ness to go anywhere at any time. I have said that we would draw a 10mile circle around Hanoi and permit no bombing inside that circle. We did that last August. There is no way I can justify this except the very bare hope that they will talk. We
  • . ~. Johnaon I . • What is the situation in Ashan Valley? General Westmoreland: It is an unusual piece of terrain 20 kilometers long and 1. kilometer wide. The enemy has dominated and developed in the Valley. I hope to go in during May. Enemy moves by truck
  • would do just what Nixon proposes. General Wheeler: General Abrams can do it. Secretary Clifford: I would hope you could put a limitation on it. M'f ETING ~~OTES COPYRl6HTEO :~ '°blicorio11 Rwquirn -PePMiuioA ol Copyright Hol~--W.--lhomas
  • ~NITT"L°ZiY~- - 2 ME-ETIMG NOUS COP'f1UGRTED E 'i ES ONL i :PQE SEGRE'!' PtJbMgtiQA Re"'~ires Plrmlulon of Copyright Hoide1. \\'. TheMcu •a!mson 5. I hope we can avoid argument about an agenda. If there is no agreed agenda we should be able to add
  • of our discussions we believe this. I am not sure it is more than a hope. . ~:r !. - 3 - MiiU~~G .,~OTES 'QPYRIGHTED Publication R9Q1Jire1 PlrmllSibn of eopyright H61dir: W. lhe..-es J.t\nson Seer etary Clifford: We misled the President
  • us at thfs hour is the chance to save human lives -- the lives of men on both sides of the conflict. That chance -- that hope -- we cannot forego. We could be misled - - and we are prepared for that contingency. We pray God it does not occur
  • burning our We could say we know you are acting in good faith, but that we know what happened on the 37-day pause before. Say if we do it again, and we are all wrong again, we electrify the world with hope and get nothing. Walt Rostow~ I do not see how
  • (8-85) April 30, 1968 Sec. Rusk wants to add: 1. Bunker's present plans: hoping to go to Katmandu May 9-140 2. Further modifications and enlargement of Barrell Roll area in Laos. 30 Mr. Rostow's idea: Possible Thieu initiative with NLF
  • a peaceful settlement, North Vietnam had a serious intent and that he hoped we also had a serious intent. He said North Vietn~m knows how to look at the problem r~alistically and so sp.ould we. And only in this way could the matter be settled peacefully. He
  • to see the NPT approved -- but I would hate to see the Senate in town. I hope they will do it the first of the year. I have misgivings a bout a special session. The President: My general inclination is "no. 11 We have: Budget problems
  • : What is the sentiment in your country? Prime Minister Gorton: The morale is first class by men in the front lines. The support is good. The R&R program is excellent. We hope U.S. men will return and live in Australia. Families have taken R&R boys
  • the strategic arms race. We would hope to announce some principles with Soviets to get it moving toward a peaceful settlement. In Southeast Asia, we are in a position to demand a lot from the Soviets. We did what they asked us to do - - stop the bombing
  • , 000. We can expect the enemy will maintain a tough military posture during the time of negotiations. RUSK: We took major step of de-escalation has been 70% of land and 90% of the population. They have done nothing. RAMSEY CLARK: We hope
  • Rusk: I would not think so. Secretary Clifford: What reaction did we get from Averill Harriman on your Press Conference? Secretary Rusk: statement. '' The President: Norway thing? Secretary Rusk: publicized . ,, I hope w _e would not undermine
  • revanchism", Viet-Nam, and the Middle East) and generally will try to place Czech events in a cold war context in hopes of silencing the non­ aligned countries that have so far been willing to criticize Soviet intervention. In determining what actions
  • by results of the September 1966 elections in SVN, US hopes for resolution of the conflict began to rise. Despite VC terror and Buddhist opposition, the 80% turn-out exceeded most predictions and provided a wide spectrura of representation in the Constituent
  • to nirn ana -2­ to Hanoi, but we are going to act in the best interests of South Vietnam. We should tell him that we have got to go to the meeting Saturday and we hope that they will be there • We should tell him that before he and Ky tell us what
  • tions, but they should have provided,al~o,for rapid·response 1n event hostilities were renewed. The US team's proposals for a massive New Society were well conceived to meet the hopes and aspirations sectors of the SVN society but some players considered
  • should have another meeting. "Our side, your side" approach is a good one. We should not pull our punches. We should not understate our own case. I hope Averill will start off with a firm position. We ought to press for more than the Clifford
  • ,,, r- ,..... -J. , 0.I,.J..· ·. u~.'a ·,;,r :v. TD . ~. Jtl, . .. .. .- . PAGE 32 Co THE SAIGON 37d2~ . lJ.rl2'+0Z HOPES TO MAINTAIN A CERTAIN MILITARY ~NEMY '! ·: ~ ~ i_;_,.;·· :~ . : . ·­ I : P~~SSURE DUR! NG .. :-.~T nE
  • -day pause well. It was undertaken on the basis of pious hope. This is undertaken on the basis of three points. The President: The Soviets said they needed at least 12 days and no more than 20 to get serious talks going. What about the Soviets
  • hope • tod•y~Headquarters_ol""_the ...Jfaflonal Liberation Front (NLF) more than has been felt tor months. 'l'boae who ·kept the faith may nowl)e vindicated but there is no time to philosophize. In the early hours this morning an emissary, the brother