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  • and Berlin. (Sec. Rusk) Situation report. Sec. Rusk wishes to discuss tripartite Berlin statement, earlier raised with you. (Tab A) 4. Abra::J.s 1 Backgrounder. (Sec. Clifford) Bus and Clark oelieve reporting from Saigon is now so good -- and G.:;:..'1
  • Nixon, Richard M. (Richard Milhous), 1913-1994
  • . in the Cabinet Room today to hear Secretary McNamara report on his mission to Vietnam. Attending the meeting: The President Secretary Dean Rusk Secretary Robert McNamara Under Secretary Nicholas Katzenbach Mr. Richard Helms General Maxwell Taylor Mr
  • Christian Tom Johnson UEClASSIFIED E.O. 12356. Sec. 3.4 NlJ 8 '7- 3.3 8v k-(; NARA. Dare S-lf-i'f General Wheeler: German military are working hard to improve their armed forces. in face of the Czech crisis. The visit to Berlin by Secretary Clifford
  • Nixon, Richard M. (Richard Milhous), 1913-1994
  • with six columnists and commentators on the White House balcony on August 11, 1967. Those attending were: The President Bill White Richard Wilson Roscoe Drummond John Chancellor Bill Lawrence Dan Rather George Christian Walt Rostow Bob Fleming The President
  • ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 1429 (6-85) FOREIGN POLICY GROUP MEETffiG \~' ~ .:·· October 29, 1968 THOSE ATTENDING: The President Secretary Rusk Secretary Clifford General Abrams General Wheeler Richard Helms Walt Rostow Harry McPherson George Christian Tom Johnson
  • . Crawford of a report he had that Richard Goodwin, Arthur Schlesinger and Blair Clark have undertaken an effort to get Secretary McNamara to resign in protest to the handling of the Vietnam War. The President said the Congo has cooled off considerably. "We
  • and to Berlin. Draft messages to each are attached at Tab B for your approval. The Germans are nervous. These messages would be an effective public gesture of support. I concur in Secretary Rusk 1 s recommendation. CXJ.~ostow Approve messages_
  • there was action. He believed that the Czech crisis had saved a dangerous situation which was almost lost on the Hill. Now there is a little time if the Germans and the others act. Secretary Clifford reportad that his trip to Berlin had been very valuable. He
  • asked Under Secretary Katzenbach to introduce the discussion. Under Secretary Katzenbach said the Ministerial Meeting was taking place against unhappy backg1· ound - - the difficulties in France, the lack of a government in Belgium, and the Berlin crisis
  • Wheeler Undersecretary Nitze Ed Freid Bromley Smith CIA Director Helms Walt Rostow Leonard Marks John Leddy Tom Johnson Mr. Katzenbach: The Ministerial meeting is being held against an unhappy background: Paris problems, tension in Berlin. Mr. Leddy
  • with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift, GENERALSERVICES ADMINISTRATION GSA OC 73.495 GSA FORM 7122 (7-72) Jet statements out on Secy. Rusk - Spain 4 hours time - Yugoslav, Poland - How to handle negotiations at Berlin. 14-1 some discussions
  • impact of our military expenditures in NATO countries. Three questions you may wish to ask if not covered in the discussion: 1. How will the current Berlin situation affect NATO? 2. Will the prospective military budget cuts affect the level of our
  • then read again the Thompson cable . He stressed the sentence "They (the Communists) always react negatively to a show of force." Mr. President, this was not the lesson of the Cuban Walt Rostow: missile crisis or the Berlin crisis. Secretary McNarnra
  • support the Czechs in the United Nations and through USIA. If we do they can put pressure on the West, particularly Berlin. Kruschev called Berlin the testicles of the West and when he wanted to create pressure he squeezed there. Secretary Rusk: Draft
  • are trying to wage the war without enlarging it and without causing the Soviets or the Chinese to give us problems in Berlin or Korea. I lave no reservations except on these targets. The President: Let us find the least dangerous and the most productive
  • : We have no problem except public relations one. 3. Berlin Crisis: Undersecretary Katzenbach: You were briefed on this at the NSC. 5. NPT Scheduling Undersecretary Katzenbach: There is a statement you would make on this and we need to know
  • they will not move against Berlin or Romania from Dobrynin. Bi-lateral relations with the USSR have been deeply affected. Czechoslovakia does not necessarily block the ABM discussions. Vietnam remains with us. the Middle East is still there. The world still has big
  • Germans are dealing from weakness . They are concerned about political developments in the Eastern European bloc. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Stoessel: The major German problems su1n­ marized in the State paper are: Berlin, relations with the USSR
  • not affect e d by the Sovie t action. In respon :;c.: he w a s told that U.S . i n t erests are involved i n Berlin where we are cornrnitte d to prevent the city being over run by th e Russians. Although th e ::>uviet military effort went smoothly
  • that it takes only 1 1/2 minutes for an F-4 to cross the border zone and three minutes for subsonic aircraft. The President asked Mr. Rostow to look into the matter of sanctuaries. Secretary Rusk said the Russians rave every reason to blockade Berlin now
  • that this incident is related to the whole picture. He said he would not be surprised if something happened in Berlin to coincide with what is going on in Vietnam and in Korea. The President asked if we were confident of our situation around Khesanh. The President
  • we should investigate the possibility of THE PRESIDENT: Let's also look at the fixed wing plane proposal. That proposal will run $2. 29 billion. What is the Berlin situation? ' ., ' . -TOP SEB;:ET - 7 ­ SECRETARY RUSK: There may be some
  • that tanker shoot back? General Wheeler: Is is unarmed. - 3 ­ The President: Will there be retaliatory pressure from the USSR ? General Wheeler: They could stop duty trains in Germany . they ran maneuvers in the air corridors in West Berlin
  • on the West, pa:-ti.ct.:.la:rty Berlin. K:-usc~ev callee 5e:-E:i .:.~testicles of the \Vest anci. whe:l he wanted to c :r eate presso.::re !-le sc:_ueez~C: the r e . S..=c:-e:a:-•1 .Rt:sk: Drait ::-e?l Y to Doo:;-yni n read. it'( e ::~vc a pti'blic proble:n
  • many international problems the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Berlin -- which we refer to as crises. But relatively speaking, in light of what our country has gone through in other times, these crises don't necessarily mean disaster or un­ avoidable danger
  • . Discussions have been held on the use of military facilities in France in t he event of war or of NATO alert , or in circ llii\stances such as another Berlin crisis . France has now made clear that no re- entry by the US into a irfie lds or depots in France
  • the Russians. To a question by The President as to whether the Russians might put pressure on Berlin, 9 General Eisenhower felt that, in a matter so serious, they would choose their own course rather than be influenced by what we do. He said he would
  • by deliberately provoking a major crisis in some other area of the world, e.g., Berlin or Cuba. - 8 ­ ggg_p S-fc9s 8 F II LIMITED DISTRIBUTION SERVICE SET 2 ,,.. .. ~ R a E %8 aw ·... LIMITED DISTRIBUTION ' . . '. . DRV Ree.ctions Initiation
  • Vietnam. 9. There is no reason why we cannot insist that the North Vietnamese be specific as to what they will do. In the negotiations involving Soviet miss il e s in Cuba, the Korean Armistice negotiations, and even in the Berlin crisis , TOP SEGRET
  • did it for a period during Vietnam. The Congress took this authority away last year to put it on an equal basis with the other services. General Wheeler: We did it at the same time of the Berlin airlift. Also during the Cuban missile crisis, I believe
  • parts of the world, the effect would also be very serious, even to the extent of affecting the morale in Berlin. Senator Dirksen asked Director McCone what the reaction of the Ch inese Communists would be . Mr. McCone said we did not know as yet, but he
  • dirAction chnng~~ ev~ry month. George, and make your oth~r pointn. The costs, aR well as our western Europ~an a.J lies, is not relevant to their situa~ion. Wh~t . th~y ar~ concerned about is their own security -- troopP in Berlin have reai meaning, none
  • weapons is deterred. How ­ ever, the nuclear situation does not dete r other uses of lnilitary force, such as halting convoys on the Berlin autobahn. Neither side now has a deployed anti - ballistic missile system. It would cost $15 billi on to g ive 3 0
  • no doubt utter threats against the Turks , it would not engage its own forces in any Cyprus crisis. We: cannot, however, ignore the possibility that Moscow might see~ to exploit this crisiu of NATO through moves elsewhere in the world, i . e.: Cuba, Berlin