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  • to incorporate your de sired changes. I have . reduced the time span covered in the preliminary notification from two years to one year, and have asked that a new schedule be supplied each quarter, instead of merely requesting monthly corrections to the original
  • can do for the time being, unless you feel the matter is worth the President's attention • Perkins is not pressing for this, and only you will know whether it might be a wise thing to do. Samuel E" Belk By ...........-CO~tFIDEf~TIAL v (').S H
  • ample opportunity to make its intentions with respect to cooperation clear to us. I will expect you to assume the initiative in preparing appropriate recommendations for my attention to deal with the situation as it appears to be at that time
  • : Project 'suLKY In view of the delicacy of the balance of US- USSR relationship in other major areas plus the tight schedule for conducti! g SULKY at this time, the President has decided to defer fu:::ther< consideration of SULKY without prejudice until
  • , recommendations which translate this state­ ment of policy into specific action programs for each of the Eastern European countries (with particular reference to sub­ stance and timing) and, at the same time, to examine the possi­ bilities of multilaterallzing
  • alternative ways of dealing with this matter 1 such as limiting the size of any sale, postponing such a sale to a more propitious time, or encouraging and perhaps helping Israel to meet its needs from other suppliers. Finally, it should include an analysis
  • ­ priate time . The timing of this procedure will be determined by this office, in consultation with the U . S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in the light of the prosI>ects for international negotiations. }n ~4v IS-f McGeorge Bundy CO~l FiDEN n
  • in the )bnthly Follow·up Report and have requested the Bureau o't Inter•Acierican Attairs to prepare a :pl'OSreB& report on these directive$·, from timo to time. However, in llsht ot recent developments, and the continuing high-level interest in a much changed
  • to the contrary, I do not wish any American official in any forum to press for a binding agreement at this time. I wish to maintain the position established in our talks with Prime Minister Wilson -- namely, that the U.S. is not seeking to force its own
  • organizations, either directly or through third parties, which would be reasonably likely to facilitate these efforts by significantly affecting timing, quality or costs or would identify the U.S. as a major supplier or collaborator. However
  • of our intentions in Japan, Southeast Asia, Europe--and in Russia and Communist China, and (b) to expTh.in the good sense of the move to the Congress and the U.S. public. 6. As regards timing, I should like two alternatives to be ex­ plored: one
  • ensuring full and timely support of the U.S. Mission in Saigon on matters within his purview. In accordance with established procedures, any instructions to the U.S. Mission in Saigon will be issued through the Secretary of State. In carrying out
  • has no objection to consideration of this item at this time. z. The prohibition against initiating discussion of this subject with Canada contained in NSAM Z48 of June 3, 1963, is accordingly withdrawn. . DECIASmlED 1.0. 12356, Sec. 39' ~ 9.1·S~J
  • to the President in time to allow him to give full consideration thereto before the scheduled events are to take place. The Review Committee is also directed to perform the functions specified in NSAM No. 269 • . DECLASSIFIED . Authoncy NS l
  • at this time, in view of the unsettled conditions in the South Pacific area. The limited programs, however, of economic and MAP assistance which have resulted from the reviews conducted by the Secretaries of State and Defense are essential to the national
  • , and requests a firm recommendation on this matter as soon as feasible. He also approves the Secretary of State's recommendation that no further additions or improvements to the facilities be undertaken at this time. Finally, he asks that the agencies concerned
  • continue to be valid, i.e., that it remains in the U.S. interest to develop alternatives to U.So facilities in Pakistan and that measures toward that end are feasible. 2o The passage of time, however, has necessitated certain changes in specific
  • )' ).-11-Ko By ·1~ , NARS, Date GROUP 4 Do wng raded at 3 year in te rva ls; dec lassified after 12 years [Front] 1964 APR 30 PM 2 3R [Back] 0 v May 4, 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY Mac -It appears reasonable to give NASA a little more time
  • . Division Now Stationed in Korea Attached pursuant to your request in NSAM No. 298 is a coordinated State-AID-Defense study or a possible redeployment of' one or the two U.S. divisions now stationed in Korea. Appended to the study is a time-phased plan f'or
  • , and agrees that it is not feasible to have such plans to cover every case. At the same time, the report leaves unanswered a number of questions. There is enclosed herewith a copy of the principal comments of the representative of the Department of State
  • of the Vietnamese Gover~ment do not fall below the levels sustained .b y the United States in the time of the Diem Government. This does not · exclude arrangements for economy on the MAP acc9unt with respect to accounting for ammunition, or any other readjustments
  • of President Chiari ( CJ,~ ) to the United States o We have been carrying these items in the lvbnthly Follow- up Report and have requested the Bureau of Inter- American Affairs to prepare a progress report on these directives from time to time . However
  • in time to allow him to give full consideration thereto before the scheduled events are to take place. ·The Review Committee is also directed to perform the functions specified in NSAM No. 269. . DECLASSIFIED . Authonty Ns e- . ?'1roPosz. · i. f
  • affecting a Plebiscite. C. District Political Patterns, Problems and People. D. Attitudes toward Affiliation. E. Timing and Terms of a Plebiscite. F. Preparation for a Plebiscite. G. Present and Post-Plebiscite Territorial Government. H
  • of ·this month so that there ·may be time for careful consideration and decision before my meeting with Prime Minister Wilson on December 7 and 8. • " SECBE'iE' .,.
  • in planning for the operation of existing forces and the development of future forces: intelligence, deployment, targeting, considerations affecting use at times of crisis, res.e arch, development, production and budgeting, etc. The primary operational focus
  • to pay for such agreements. c. How far it is in the U .s. interest to go in meeting Indian security concerns, what form such action miSht take, and what the optimum timing might be. d. Whether there are other approaches to the problem which need
  • will be appointed Deputy for Pacification {Revolutionary Development) with personal rank of ambassador. To this end the present functions and personnel of: the Office of Civil Operations of the U. S. Mission will become a part of MACY. For the time being
  • &ft &Dct·a1fJOelated rmde&r woapoo.• to Canadian buea aa aA -a1enda item 111 lhe US.Cana~ MlAl•terf.al Jola& Comnnuee cm Defo.uo on Juae ZS. It la undot'etood that the aovor~t ot Canada ha• no objecUon to CIJ,u lderatlon ot We Uem at thla time. z
  • Will assist the Secretary of' State in exploring problems of · procedure and timing connected with holding discussions with the .Soviet Union and in proposing for my consideration the channels which would be most desirable from our point of view
  • departments on complex overseas problems, and assure that no sector of the foreign front is neglected at a time of preoccupation with some overriding problem. [Department of State Bulletin, March 28, 1966, Vol. LIV, No. 1396] SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK'S
  • ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified
  • of Staff and higher authority turn for an immediate review of the situation and for advice as to the available courses of action in time of emergency. The Deputy Director for Operations (NMCC), a General/flag rank officer, and the NMCC maintain an around
  • such authority in bilateral bargainning. The difference between Commerce and the rest of us is on timing and on the relation of this issue to Vietnam. The matter of timing is minor Jack Connor would like to have further "public education" before ~~~ .. blR in 1
  • time, it is only reasonable to anticipate that pressure from the same sources, and from members of Congress, will be exerted on Government officials to give advance commit­ ments that certain products will be placed on the exceptions list. • v
  • ·each year will depend on continuing Pakistani and Indian performance. 4. Our approaches to India and Pakistan should be timed for opti­ mum impact. For example, I do not believe that we .i:;hould initi­ ally approach Pakistan until we have assessed
  • ; to the extent that the situation permits, such action should precede larger decisions. If such larger decisions are required at any time by a change in the situation, they will be taken. · ~
  • that end at"e feasible. 2. The passage of time, however, has necessitated certain changes in specific recommendations: 3.L/ lb>l 1, (,) a. Recommendation 1 (e) should be deleted. A shipborne test was conducted with unsatisfactory results. (The Department
  • ensuring full and timely support of the U.S. Mission in Saigon on matters within his purview. In accordance with established procedures, any instructions to the U.S. Mission in Saigon will be issued through the Secretary of State. In carrying out
  • crisis, Moscow has appeared to recognize that the present balance of power is relatively unfavorable to it and will remain so for a long time. As a result, Soviet policy has been essentially d:!.rected toward keeping international ten s5.on within bounds