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  • , of the D8fense Depart~~nt Reorganization Cc~21it~ee, Speci2l Assistant to the President for I~~2rnational Affairs. Co~.:nittee Ch~ir:::an SERVICE SET ! ,. v· t) !~·· :\· C> I i> : , • (-' (; ·.' I i1 I; (I) CI Cv J-'· 0 o r: :J tJ p 0 C !·> I
  • in affairs with the Vietnam statement. All except the Communists see it that way. I do not expect a vote on this. Assistant Secretary of State Sisco: see it. That is the way most all nations The President: The President does not know of any plans
  • on this tomorrow. Secretary Clifford: I appear on Friday before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee. They will want to get into sensitive areas. Secretary Rusk: it. I would memorize the March 31 speech and not go beyond T~P 3£61&? SEAVtCr: ~FT - 4 ­ TQF SF
  • that the North Viet­ namese today are much more confident of victory than they were two months ago. Kosygin has asked them twice to negotiate. That is the reason why we asked Ambassador Thompson, our best man in Soviet affairs, to return to Moscow. The problem
  • . It is possible to rr.ake some bad mistakes of timing. No time for a major offer. It will be seen as sign of weakness. 3-) National concern is a question as to whether SVN affairs a are being maturely, competently handled. It is a feeling of insecurity
  • and the DMZ are respected. The President: What will you get today that you won't get three weeks from now. General Taylor: I do not have the same sense of urgency. Secretary Clifford: There comes a time in the tide of men's affairs that it is a time to move
  • the Fortas affair - - to block. He was taking public positions intended to achieve that end. They w 'o uld incite Saigon to be difficult, and Hanoi to wait. Part of his strategy was an expectation that an offensive would break out soon, that we would have