Discover Our Collections
Limit your search
Tag- Digital item (52)
- 1968-10-29 (4)
- 1967-11-08 (2)
- 1968-10-14 (2)
- 1968-10-22 (2)
- 1968-10-30 (2)
- 1968-11-26 (2)
- 1967-07-12 (1)
- 1967-08-05 (1)
- 1967-08-16 (1)
- 1967-09-26 (1)
- 1967-10-03 (1)
- 1967-10-05 (1)
- 1967-10-18 (1)
- 1967-11-15 (1)
- 1967-11-21 (1)
- Vietnam (51)
- Peace negotiations (31)
- Public relations (10)
- LBJ speeches and statements (6)
- Aerial bombing (5)
- Bombing, Aerial (5)
- Elections - 1968 Presidential (5)
- Khe Sanh (Huong H (5)
- Major force deployment (5)
- Tet Offensive, 1968 (5)
- USSR and Eastern Europe (5)
- Congressional relations (4)
- Draft (4)
- Press relations (4)
- Vietnam criticism (4)
- Text (52)
- Meeting Notes (52)
- Folder (52)
- Meeting notes (52)
52 results
- saw Phan Van Dong. He saw them within an hour after they returned to Pariso At that point they knew nothing of the history of negotiations. He took down notes of our meeting and sent them to the department. I have some indication of Bo's eagerness
- put . ~ I: We need to get Ellsworth back in touch with Thieu. It. is a very unhappy situation. One possibility is November 4. They will try to hold up until after our elections. My own preference: try for the 4th, or say arrangements have been
Folder, "[November 20, 1968 Meeting with Tuesday Luncheon Group]," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 4
(Item)
- recommends it. The President: Let's do it. Secretary Clifford: Welll send out an order today. DIPLOMA TIC SITUATION Secretary Rusk: Congress would murder us with Thieu acting like he's acting now. vVe are short of measures. 2 of 4 M!!Tir~o NOTES c6'ViiOHT
- : It is a pure question of when you all are agreed on statement. Thieu plans to talk at 7 :00 p. m. Washington time. What does Bus say? General Wheeler: midnight. The President: We can is sue orders at midday - - stop bombing by Can we agree on how
Folder, "November 8, 1967 - 9:42 a.m. Vice President and Walt Rostow," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 1
(Item)
- . The Vice President has had a chance to go and spend some time and has returned to has returned to meet with the bipa.rt~san leadership and with _ t he National Security Council. The President said that it would be useful to point out that Thieu is ageeable
Folder, "November 8, 1967 - 10:03 a.m. National Security Council," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 1
(Item)
- 1966. Those conclusions we re: 1. The U. S. Team is exceptional. Ambassador Bunker, Ambassador Locke, Ambassador Komer and General Westmoreland's military leaders are excellent. 2. Ambassador Bunker enjoys the full confidence of Thieu. Thieu and Bunker
Folder, "June 4, 1968 - 1:45 p.m. President's Tuesday Luncheon," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 3
(Item)
- . There were 83.. defectors to ARVN last night. Heavy men and material flow contimi~s into the South. There have been no MIG flights below 20th. We found 100 mm weapons around DMZ. Thieu disagrees on general mobilization in the House. Walt Rostow: General
- of the bombing.'' Meanwhile, we received through the Soviet Embassy in Paris a side message from the Hanoi delegation that they would agree to the participation of the GVN after bombing stopped. On this basis, we went to President Thieu. He said "so long
- Rusk: A new peace plan. Thieu won't see Bunker until tomorrow. We should see how Nixon can get out of this as soon as possible. Bill Bundy or I could go down to Key Biscane. I would be opposed to Nixon going to Saigon. emmis sary like William
- ? . NARA, Date (;. -.:;J.1)_!'1 ct=l? , MEETING NOTES COPYRIGHTED Publication Requir" Permiuion of Copyri_ght Hofdw: W. Thomas Johnson Secretary Clifford: I thought final clearance with Thieu was mere formality. I thought we said -- now, here's the time
- are interested in what Secretary Rusk has to aay. Why are you ao worr'ied al:out Saigon. The President: There ii instability between Ky and Thieu. He doesn't like sitting in the back row after all of the command positions he has held. CIA Director Helms
- counts show. It was agreed that the infiltration rate give the most fuzzy figures. retary Nitze said we just do not know what the precise figures are. Sec Mr. Clifford made the following points: (1) There were valuable visits with Ky and Thieu. (2
- . WALT ROSTOW: With the ambiguity in Thieu's statement, Ambassador Bunker should ask Thieu whether we could live through it. THE PRESIDENT: I worry about the morale. SECRETARY CLIFFORD: There is a missing factor here. what happened since last week
- . Clifford and Rusk) Staff work on support for Thieu 1 s proposition: to provide between 100, 000 and 125, 000 additional men in six months. How to nail it down? Will there be conflicts between build-up of Vietnamese and U.S. forces? (See Tab A) 4. Pueblo
- was talked over with Thieu. By the end of June Thieu and Ky had agreed that this was the best practical way to proceed. In July, Vance spelled out the your-side, our-side formula to Lau. Nothing came of it, however, at that time. In mid-September
- for peace. Last weekend the essential understanding we had been seeking with the North Vietnamese on the critical is sues between us was reached. And today -- jointly with President Thieu of the Republic of Vietnam -- I have ordered that all air, naval
- . operations had been reduced from 800 on his last trip to 30-40 on this trip •. i . On the political front, the Secretary reported: ·- The "greate_st . ~angertt I I is facing us. t A possible split betwee·n Ky and Thieu. 1· i The r.e is "no· real
- announcement between you and Thieu. Secretary Rusk: (Statement, Insert B) 9:00 p. m. Friday, 9:30 Television Statement. Thieu will go on too. The President: When do we stop? Secretary Rusk: Noon our time Friday. George Christian: It will leak
- Pern1issie" ef (Qpyr~ht HlS"fder: W. Ihomas Jahnsen 11 -e=;;, '-.. - 4 RF and PF fought well except in 4th Corps. Enemy made maximum use of weapons. ARVN weapons. Only 2% did not. They were superior to ·r As for government, Thieu is gaining statue
- and unbending. We will stop bombing under right conditions. PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS: We have tried to come up with formula to let us stop the bombing with no public Vance: They have refused to suggest anything at this point. will not permit the Thieu-Ky
- of the senior U.S. commanders. I also talked with Ambassador Bunker, President Thieu and Vice President Ky. There were a number of factors which surprised me. I certainly learned things I did not know before: The TET attack was very powerful and nationwideo
- to the South Vietnamese and their determination~ I don't appreciate Thieu saying he needed more A~erican troops. I would think he would be looking for more ways to get more of his own men. But i f six battalions will help him exp~oit this opportunity, I am
- . Thieu is concerned about the NLF being separate entity. This might leak out of Sai.gon. ~ecretary Rusk: It might leak out on basis of the orders issued. General Wheeler: Yes, it might. They will pick up the fact that the planes are flying
- . GENERAL TAY LOR: He should say he hasn 1 t settled the war. is just another step. It WALT ROST OW: Should Bunker inform Thieu alone that you might make a decision tomorrow? THE PRESIDE);T: How does this differ from before when he leaked
- overseeing group thought the Thieu-Ky election was a fraud. The President asked Director Helms to check this and if it is not true, get the information to the Senator. Secretary Katzenbach: Reported on tre Rusk-Gromyko talks which were underway in New York
- in Vietnam this year. We should talk about Honolulu when we asked them to draft a constitution; we should talk about Manila, when we asked them to elect a President; we should talk about Guam, when Ky and Thieu gave us their constitution; we should talk about
- '1t1i~£.ion cJ Copy tight Holder· w TAetflas Jolmson -ECLABSrFIED I! E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 N LJ '19 · ;) yo Hy~ NA.RA Date J - ' ~ 7- Dl> --.._ Director Helms: Read proposed letter from the President to Kiy and Thieu on the Vietnamese elections
- of the Politburo. We need to stir Thieu and Ky up to probe around more with the NLFo Bunker should ask Thieu and Ky to get something going. This one is purely our thing" We need to get them going on somethingo Mr. Ro stow: It would be excellent for Thieu to say
- are serious. The key is the establishment of confidence with Thieu about this type of dialogue. The President said there are four areas for immediate attention. The first is the expediting of additional troops to Vietnam. The second is the equipping
- conditions of a total bombing cessation. General Westmoreland: We need a better company level- battalion level radio. Want recommendations on this. On general offensive operations, I have talked to Thieu and Vien to get South Vietnamese moving on all
- on the call to the Vice President? Secretary Clifford: He called me about his statement on troop withdrawal. I told him I had not predicted any U. S. tr oops would come home next year. Thieu has. Also, he asked if it were true a Marine unit was coming home now
- Thieu making speech? The President: Make it the day after tomorrow if possible. Secretary Rusk: What about the timing? The President: Announce it at 7 p. m. tomorrow. Clark Clifford and Dean Rusk background, perhaps even appear on television
Folder, "November 26, 1968 1:45-2:25 p.m. Foreign Policy Meeting," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 4
(Item)
- interesting that issue was never raised of bombing during the talks there except hitting the bridges over the Yalu River. Walt Rostow: The report says they want peace, but they won't come on their knees to Thieu. .' ... .. . ' . •' - 4 Secretary
- said if I Thieu concurred in instructions given Harriman and Vance. There is a later cable. He is ready to go along to try to see if they are serious about stopping the war. A message was sent to Bunker to examine loop-holes and.contingencies
- in urban areas to protect against a second wave of attacks. I told President Thieu that the South Vietnam forces had to go on the offensive. Thieu said South Vietnam could not take another Tet offensive. General Westmoreland has turned this around. sive
- . Secretary Rusk: We should have an executive committee to notify our allies: Gorton, Thieu, Pak~ and the Prime Minister of Thailand. I still am concerned about the details one puts out publicly. to give exact figures. · I don't want .So, ooo Secretary
- be Critics) of our pos~~ition believe we're inte~t on creating a constitutional and democratic gover!".ment by pursuing last VC until he is dead. They see capacity of VC to bit the cities. I do not think we can move Thieu to a Greek solution
- in the government - - most improved. There has been a change in the political situation for the better. There now are local people getting involved in local government at the village level. We are urging Ky and Thieu to put land control in the hands of the local
- 3. The matter of reconnaissance. South and have their intelligence. We must have this. They are in the 4. Important political issues. Go ahead and get their views on more formal talks and views on terms for settlement. Thieu and Ky suggested "our
- (8-85) April 30, 1968 Sec. Rusk wants to add: 1. Bunker's present plans: hoping to go to Katmandu May 9-140 2. Further modifications and enlargement of Barrell Roll area in Laos. 30 Mr. Rostow's idea: Possible Thieu initiative with NLF