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  • President Tubman o "PCI 1p # e tr • nt ~__!S:l.----l~p Or- ,t-i?tflu ~ 11-2,r, 7 s o to President .PCI 5p # a rp _ --PresrdenCtoKosygm c., 1 TS. 4 f) ~ t:7"" '5°" ...-/ [Duplicate of #41a, NSF, Files of W. Rostow, "Kosygin"] A 1 Rostow to Pres1 en
  • would call on the President of the Security Council, give him a letter, and release the letter. The President: What do we do from there? Secretary Rusk: We've gone to Kosygin. We've gone to Sato. This will get the Secretary General in it. Indonesia, also
  • this week by the Communists and Kosygin who are beginning to draw the line between Hanoi and the NLF. Rusk admitted however, that he does not think Moscow, nor for that matter Peking, has enough horsepower to deliver Hanoi. The President asked if someone
  • was constantly groping to try to understand a man like Kosygin, or a woman like the Prime Minister of India. He was trying to find out where our own policy came into conflict with the policy of others, and one of the ways to do that is to try to figure out just
  • to Kosygin. b. Next steps c. Israeli and prospects. McNamara) ln New York. response to sinking of dest-roy-,r. DECLASSIFIED Other. E.O. 12356, Sec.3.4(b) White HouseGuide.lines. Feb. 24. 1983 Bv-11--, W. W. Rostow WWRostow:rln •TOP SECRET- NARA
  • to suggest this 1n the drafting of the proposed message to Kosygin. To make this more crediblet we might this week open some kind of conversation on Viet Nam with the Russians, either through a note from you to Kos.ygln, Secretary Rusk meeting Gromyko
  • HAND I GOT lN A GOOD REFERENCE GE~:-EVA AGREEMENTS AND THE CO-CHAIRMANSHIP. I WAS ALSO DETERMINED DESPITE KOSYGINS STRONG OPPOSITION TO COMMIT HIM TO ACTING WITH US IN SUPPORT OF A NEGOTIATED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, AND, IN RETURN FOR SECURING THIS, WE
  • importance",. and an elment that no goverrment can overloo:-c. He said the program had to be "acCE?pt:ed". 'lhel \"as inpress~ by ·the am:unt of tirre Kosygin davof.ed to Vietnam~,1111!afi~a-@~e~enp!!!11!!!. ~na~s~J.!"'!S~~ he placed on the Front ~am. • f
  • I came Sitting in the living mainly about room to Glassboro to meet of President with Chairman Robinson's house, Kosygin. we talked four matters: The Non-Proliferation Treaty; The need for U.S. -Soviet the nuclear ·arms The Middle
  • to references to I . Wllson--Kosygin talks. ,.,.. 6. · State and Defense to prepare a position. in response to Kosygin's ABM letter; Sec. Rusk to prepare for Thursday releasEt a -·simple ·· ...,...,,...,_,-:. statement along the lines of Thompson's telegram fa
  • received at my home a telephone call from Tcherniakov, his DCM. Tcherniakov reported that a message to the President from Kosygin had just arrived, on Vietnam. We consulted together as to where the message should be delivered. We decided to minimize
  • A 6/26/68 A ~\\l~ #15a memo epjnlot~~,~ t\-\6'\ Intelligence Memorandum e"-'-"""+ S 3p PeF ~ r-1c.. 'i/ I\ loo °'f4":"- 7-8-93 1 I' "''-.) 5~.-;i. ~t) [Duplicate of #69, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Kosygin"] -S [Duplicate of #69a, NSF
  • HAS ·ARISEN FROMTHE MEMBEl'lSHIP 0F THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT AFRICAN AND ASIAN COUNTNIES." 'COMMUNIQUECLOSED WITH SOVIET· APPRECIATION OF iAFGHAN NEUTRALITY AND "NON-ADHERENCETO ALIGNMENT." ,-RIME MINISTER KOSYGIN INVITED BY·YUSUF VISIT AF~HANISTAN
  • and Kosygin. At no time did I ever hear him suggest either specifically or indirectly that we should be prepared to send American troops to the Middle East, and I might tell you it was a great comfort to me that he never did. F: There was also some pullback
  • ; not involved in policy making; Fulbright letter and the ruckus McCarthy made; February 1967, the National Student Association problem; Pueblo Mission; Tuesday lunches in 1967; halt of bombing in Vietnam; 3/31 speech; Six Day War; Kosygin on hot line; LBJ’s
  • v i e t structure is built that way, there's not much point in trying to do business, say, with [Andrei] Gromyko, whereas you can occasionally with Kosygin. This was truer in the days of S t a l i n than I think it is now when you really have
  • Biographical information; Vietnam War; Clark Clifford; Paul Nitze; Dick Helms; DeGaulle; Phil Farley; Henry Kuss; morale problems; Wriston Report; McGeorge Bundy; Christian Herter; Walt Rostow; Dean Rusk; McCarthyism; Yalta; Andrei Gomyko; Kosygin
  • - ~S~~Al.t.J '1f/,-I~~ (duplicate, #92c, NSF, Files of Wal~ Rostow, "Kosygin") #35b cable Bangkok 20876 2p S 09/27/68 A FILE LOCATION National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow , Volume 96, 9/26-30/68, Box 40 RESTRICTION CODES
  • wish to read what I had just finished dictating before you put me to work on the Friday message. I shall drop the Kosygin draft letter; although you might wish to send a letter to him simultaneously with your message to Congress. \)Y~Rostow -SECR:El
  • ALSO MADEHALT;AT MOScOW, WHERE I HADDISCUSSIONS WITH CHAIRMAN KOSYGIN. \ PAGE2 RUDSND409 IN PARIS, I WASRECEIVEDWITH~UCHWARMTH ANDCORDIALITY. PROBLEMS PRESIDENTDE GAULLESH01ED DEEP INTERESTOURECONOMIC ANDPEOPLE ANDfiS~UREDME OF EARN~STDESIRE
  • . apparently, has smoothed out ted against us. Besides, its misgivings. The decision they were also provid- • to supply ·su-7 aircraft to India and .Mr. Kosygin's re­ ing arms aid to us. Af­ cent official visit to Delhi ter the September'War, are indicative
  • ,sec. 3.5 .NlJ/,fA-c 1)7_, BY. &; ,NARA,Date l,~.;>8,I) 7 • ; 2 U, SJlMMABY A. Although a formal Indo•Pak rapprochement is not now in the cards,, tensions between the two nations have recently diminished; Kosygin's visit to Pakistan and India
  • as a little region all it·s own. GLOBAL 4. U.S. --Soviet relations. You'd like to tell him a little about your meeting with Kosygin -- your reflections on how far the thaw goes. 5. Iran-USSR. You'd like to hear his experience with the Russians. (He has moved
  • wanted an appmt to get additional background on && the Summit meeting Pres. had w/Kosygin. Mr Sidey is doing a column in Life on this, with a deadline today and is als o doing anothe r piece for Time. His approach is to be "The President as a Diplomat
  • : Hanoi might object to public meetings. Secretarv Clifford: We might have leverage to meet bilaterally with Hanoi - - not suck up to Saigon. Kosygin might help. General Taylor: We can't sit 70 days and let Saigon hold us up. We should start
  • comments from officials Soviet Embassy here that Kosygin taken completely by surprise at Pleiku attacks. He thought Sovs would confine their reactions to 'noise' and a bit more ink on American Embassy walls throughout the world. He thought Soviet hard
  • , two newspapermen, would just have to see him at a later date Charles President to Oval Room Office -then to Lounge Ofc George Christian ^ Roberts 'Chuck' - of Newsweek Rostow joined (w/Kosygin letters Pres. asked for) i """ i I '_ 8:27p | f
  • th e pres s speculatio n about a Sovie t dele gation comin g to th e U . N. tha t migh t includ e Gromyko or Kosygin . He sai d h e kne w nothin g more than what he ha d read fro m new s services . 4) Secretar y Katzenbach als o briefed th e Cabine t
  • to believe. was similar to one used in a letter he had received from Chairman Kosygin earlier. Mr. Rostow said the full sentence in the Kosygin letter read: 11 "My colleagues and I think--and we have grounds to do so--that complete cessation by the United
  • --in February, I believe it was, right after the Pleiku incident--took place while [Soviet Union Premier Alexey] Kosygin was in Hanoi. Seems to me that might have generated some kind of change in the situation. K: Right. Yes. G: Do you think the North
  • , then know it was going to be surface-to-air missiles and all that it turned out to be . And we associated Kosygin's visit in early February, with sort of refo rmalizing good relations, good Communist-bloc relations, between Moscow and Hanoi . So