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  • a m~st, remarkable photograph 1n colour of the renaezvous :>f the United States spacecrafts Gemini VII and Gemini VI, which I was most glad to get a da3 or so ago, It was most thoughtful of you to have sent this to me. With all good wishes to you
  • Party to this Treaty so desiring may, pursuant to a special agreement or agreements, obtain any such benefits on a bilateral basis or through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. f ARTICLE VI Each
  • . (_ .. -·... ·································-····-································ ························;m························..··················· . ,_. ., ( · ·.,, . · ···-···~:!.~.!.i...-~··-····· ...... ····-··- ~······· · ...:. . .... .t.d~/.!~vi:.d '
  • a specially appointed com.11ittee which did have the time and ~ bro2d ly representative. This comniittee, then, would make its recorn­ ! mendations to the board, which in turn would represent the interests vis-'"a-vis the Federal Government. ~~ate's Our
  • Attachments: Tab A - Letter from Prime Tab B - Proposed Minister Shastri. Reply to Prime Minister Tab C - Draft Cable to New Delhi. Shastri. .. t ----a19""{rv-~a qr ~~ ',t 'vi ir / I '•' ' I ,,. I• j r ' ; ~ .._::;:J-l . _Y 65
  • for t- il 11 fi ld d do . . Vi ' C el . : l e jo . G C dul ( d - .) SECRET EXDlS - 4 - September 5: Meeting with General Westmoreland and other senior Mission Officers. Classified Mission briefing and field trips (Military
  • \ 16. ✓ ✓lV v!"4~ Jt 17. v ' / 18. V V ✓ ~ ] v'L ✓ ✓ . ✓i 1 ✓ ✓I I 19. ,/ vi-71 :;;--~-; 20. I 21. l 22. ! / 23.1 ✓ ✓ ✓ V v• 24. ✓ ✓ ...-1~ .r~ 25. _J 26. I _L ✓1 ✓i • _j_ _t 27. 1 28. f_ t :·, 29. i 30. ! t J l l ,. I 31. I~ _l:__ _ i 1 ~ 32. \ f j 4 j
  • SAIGON (SECTION ONE OF TVJO) VIOLENCEo IF. NOT, THE STRUGGLE MIGHT BE BLOOIJY AND EXTENDED.· , UNDER LATTER CIRCU~✓.STAt~CES., ESTIMATE HERE IS THAT THE GENERALS,WO!JLD , RESORT TO STRATAGEM TO NEUTRALIZE VI EN., RATHER THAN ASSAULT FORCES HC COMMANDS
  • !Iml THAT MRS. IJANDHI HERSELF SHARES TKE UNCERTAINTY OF" HER ASSOCIATES. INDEED ON [1Y LAST VIS IT WITK KER SHE SEEMED RENARK.A3L Y CONFIDENT AND ASSURED. , S. PRESER JIONCOPY Mr. Bill Moyers Press Secretary The White House 1600 Pennsylvania
  • of i nterest and impo rtance des p i ~e t he strains of Vietnam. This at.ti tu de wa s:; ~vident in Premier Kosygin's add r ess to the Supreme So vi @t on t he day following the "straf ing" incident. Kosygin blamed the. US f or the s t r a in in Soviet­
  • it. Is there anything else vis a vis KVET in the campaign that you recall? J: I don't remember that. It seems to me like Hollers or somebody, I'm not sure, tried to charge that Mr. Johnson was trying to control all the radio in Austin. I guess that's one
  • , and I happened to be the fellow moving into that area vis-a-vis 2 LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories: http
  • , the rapprochement [?] with China. M: In any event, there are all these domestic points that you make. And in history, whatever he did or didn't with respect to Vietnam will begin to pale vis-a-vis what he did in some of these domestic issues, particularly civil
  • THAT 7~5: WAR CAN BS ENDED' .SOLEY THROUGH IMPLEME NTATION OF THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM . THEY FEEL THAT A~ 4TTACK ON NORTH vI :T~ 4M MUST TAKE PL ACE. TH:: CO?tPS COMMA~lDEP. BELIEVES TH '1T HE NO '. '.-. 3 " .J.- 5±6:\e. By \) SERVIDESET VM= ~E
  • -2­ VI. (FYI: The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, as well as a nwnber of private enterprises, will be examining Indonesian develop­ ment possibilities in the months ahead.) You may wish to conclude by asking that a development program
  • - be feaalble. w• the•• I•••~ Ffqj 5 '-Vit '~JL., # .3'YJ t-2 ...1'JS- a. W • .Kom.e• J J-uly . u~ 1964 . MEMORANDUM. FOB. BILL BUNDY Her••·a aaoaapmgfor J) Marshall Clnen'• idea that we •hoot for a lim~ &OK/ J.ap SMn'm.allaatloa. so long aa
  • • crc1 :.· i c Nati "'na I C11111111i t rl ' t' :.' h: '1 ., Vi r )!. i 11 i. a ,\ \:t.. ~H 1 (' : ~~ • tJ . 1 ~,:· ~..:!1 j ' ll't i•ll. ( :} I : I. !.•. c. I '.," ·: ' RECEIVED OCTl 61967 CENTRAL FILES What the conventional · Republicans have
  • the whole city down if they could. With the introduction of National Guard troops, anq removal of restraints on the use of weapons, vi olence escalated on the side of both rioters and authorities . Firebombing and looting escalated, reaching a peak
  • unwittingly give lnfcrlt'~a ~ tio,n durin_g __ the4 -interview without realiz·i ng that ,he is · pro~ ·vi~ing such informa1:ionQ .-. - . · .__ ···~ . .: ....,..___ .. - ... .. · • ~>l\ . -~- . \_i ' ·. . ~J - BH . 105~560 ' · On_,j, rov~mber 22
  • President Kennedy did that also to some degree; how much I don't know. In the Johnson Administration there was never a guy in quite the same position, vis-a-vis the President, as Sorensen was to Kennedy in that administration. M: As close to the President
  • various angles. policy and Treasury policy? E: Oh, very definitely, I think. Vis-à-vis, right now we don't happen to have a one bank holding company; but those who have one bank holding companies have been caught right in the middle of this thing
  • as such are going to long survive in Taiwan or go back to the mainland. I very much do agree with MacArthur's analysis about the fortress of Taiwan in terms of China and its workability. now vis-à-vis Okinawa. We are saying it But all you've got to do is look
  • to have control of a vast range of social services, there was potential there. process itself had potential. The election These people who were being brought into the fold in this manner would be the same people who would be more aware of the issues vis
  • the White House--from the President? H: I don't always know where things begin. the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The policy began in Title VI of The efforts made to enforce it were made by men in HEW and in Justice, and they were backed up by the White
  • constituency, the poor, to oppose the war in Vietnam. H: Well of course this has been a very serious problem in the civil rights area and in the poverty area. There has been a great deal of confusion and conflict about the role of such groups vis-à-vis
  • ? I'm thinking about Kilmer vis-a-vis Gary. S: It helped. The appearance of the place, there's no question, had something to do with it, although I can think of some very beautiful conservation centers where things didn't go too well. It's hard
  • on Germany. M: That might be a good place to ask about the difference in access. Did your position as ambassador vis-a-vis the President change with the administrations? Did you have greater or less access to Mr. Johnson than you had had to President
  • effort against North Vi etnam, I suppose we have to say that something short of what he did do would have been more effective. But I feel that South Vietnam would have been lost to the Free World if he had done any less than he did. I don't think
  • , and for that reason practically the entire legal professional in Austin was for Avery, because they were opposed to the Supreme Court packing. Had that come up at that time? VI~: Yes. W: They were opposed to that bitterly. G: The story has been told that LBJ
  • ? C: That's right. B: Had you not served prior to this on the McCone [John A. McCone, former head of CIA] Commission investiga the Hatts riots? C: Yes. B: I know Mr. Clark also made a trip out to Watts after the riots. become associated \vi th
  • : Do you have any insights into the problems of land reform vis-a-vis Viet Nam, for example? B: Well, I'll answer that question by a for instance, rather than going into the philosophy of it. In South Korea there were a group of grape producers near
  • , which never took place, I would think that Barry Goldwater would have taken positions vis-à-vis the war that would have driven President Johnson into taking positions that would have been in the direction of shortening the war, rather than prolonging
  • of the willingness of ~em.t ors to denounce in this day, when we are fighting shoulder to sh~ulder, Joseph Stalin as a great enemy? Why do great newspapers ) still disseminate vi~ious and false propaganda against the Soviet Union and strive to fan the flames
  • of Mrs. Johnson's enterprises in ···.the radi·o and television fields. It detracts··. nothing from her astute management of ,those properties to say :that she looked to her hushand ·for advice. It is my strong con\ vi~Uon that the economic con­ servatism
  • , it would have been a dreadful politica:L mistake. It would have served as clear evidence to other satellite leaders th:it su~vi val was possible for them only in complete submission to Moscow - tha.t aey attempt to follow Tito's example would only
  • Export-Import Bank coordi­ nation. A country by country resume of prospects for financing ·of each of the selected countries is attached at Annex VI. ..C QNFT D RN TI '..'f:, 1 - 4 Recommendations In view of the above conclusions we recommend: 1
  • that that would happen, in part because the aluminum industry had made a wage settlement that was substantially above the guidelines, 4 per cent or more. Secondly, there was great concern about how much spine the administration would have, vis-à-vis labor; part