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  • ur ION AS TO THE POWERS or THE PRISlDlNT' AND I'f 1S THE KIND or DEAL THAT COULD EASILY COME UNSTUCK IN A atUNCMe -< BIG MINH A SECOND MAJOR DEVELOPMENT IS THAT PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY PA PERS HAVE BEEN FILED IN BE HALF OF BIG fl lNH t Ii lt H t HE
  • , • •U. PW mll~•r lo ••pport y -ab me ho • at to • .··••lo . --~••ta ( l , k, _ •). -SECRET TENTATIVE SCHEDULE FOR SUMMIT MEETING Monday, April 10 11:00 p. m. .Depart Andrews. DE CI.1 S IFIED E.O. 12356. Sec. 3.4(b) White House Gu.idclincs
  • to the North Vietnamese and sought their views. They did not respond to our suggestions and the exchange culminated in my February letter to Ho-Chi-Minh and his flatly negative response, which Hanoi chose to publish. Since that time, despite additional efforts
  • trouble than we get gains. He said we'd bombed Hanoi within half a mile of Ho Chi Minh 1 s hous e . (The President pointed toward the Washington monument as he said ". "That's as close as those people down there, and him sitting there oil: .' his front
  • government under, let's call it a form of democracy as contrasted to that government offered by Ho Chi Minh, which presumably would be properly classified a communist government. There were, in my judgment, many, many people who didn't just volunteer to go
  • to the conclusion that Ho Chi "Yes, I do," said FitzGerald. _ • . '...,' powerfulspokesmenofwhatDwightEisenhower : Minh and Company should ha\'e "mo,·ro to a "But why?" said _McNamara. ,. • ,· • • • .' • called "the military-industrial complex." •• '·. settlement
  • HUU, NGUYEN HUU CHAU, HO TONG MINH AND T h is Eiaterlal c o n t a i n s I n f o r m a iln n a f fe c tin g th e N a tio n a l D e fe n se o f t h e U n ite d S t a te s w it h in t h e m e a n in g o f t h e E sp io n a g e L a w s, T itle 18, U ^ .C i
  • a person in his division, his name was Colonel Y, spelled just "Y," that he didn't quite know what to do with. The person had been formally, and that was many years ago, with Ho Chi Minh, and [he] was perhaps somewhat concerned about his loyalty
  • )'· I w.p~LD LIK~... j .. HO\{EVE'~,;~f.~i~; -.: . SEE ALL SUCH - CHA~GES REVIEWED· AND ·LA'!D -. ro REST :. .:· lF ... 0: . . ·:·· ' . :~; :· . . -. ·. .. . ..._ - .. ··-~; .. . - .. - ... --· . ·.....;- ~ ~"·:' . . '-'-·.!t-· . . ••'." ':"'7
  • public statements be made. 5. Tiw President then departed and Mr. McNamara requested that the group remain for a general review of the problem. It was pointed out that the balance of forces in Laos generally favored the Pathet Lao with their Viet Minh
  • HO CHI-MINH, AND AN EX•BAO DAI MINISTER WHOSENAME WAS SIMILAR TO !Rid~ VAN DO. CSOUR CE DID NOT RECOC~IZ! THIS NAME). 11. - DISSErt,: CI NCPAC PACFL.T AR?AC PA.CAF. 25X1A NO FOREIG!'iDISSEM .I
  • on January 6 for the first time said he would be willing to meet Ho Chi Minh at any time and at any place. The Government reels that it is now in a position to deal from a far stronger base than at any time in the past, and it also realizes that growing
  • TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh Helms -- II -- 4 G: I think he was one of the ones who parachuted in to Ho Chi Minh. H: I wouldn't
  • .•P~ki-~ ta-~s insistently desire us to do. Ambassador Locke will not escape these frustrations. · We ·will- -help .him all -we .can•·---rwith~n t4~.; ~_cop e ··o,f ·our proade r ·inte re.s ts on.,_.the -Subcontinent -as a .-.w ho!~e. ~c.,.~-... ,ol
  • \'1 WHITE HO USE · :,~, ·MR RUSK ST ATE · _:_J ·r,n HELNs CIA :.-~ 0 300701Z ZYH ZFF-3 ·. : }FM -. GEN ABRAMS COHUS~·:ACV 3·" r" • • •+• i .. t • ... ~ - - (4,)Ci)(:,) , · (, ,I(
  • . PRESIDENT: Linc Gordon reports as follows: l. The Brazilian Ambassador is guest of honor at a dinner tonight. Ho,vever I he plans to take Braniff flight 501 1 arriving San Antonio 4 :Z2. a. m . after dinner. (It would be nice if someone from the White House
  • ~ •~rricea l>y- the· Commbalon and the private ow11e:-.idp ot apecial ~uclear material. . ' The new Agreement alao provide• that the laternatloaal Atomic: Energy Ageacy wll1 ho promptly re4uated to asaume reapoa.alblllty for applylag aafeguard.ia
  • has trav e lled extensively and spoken to a large number of audiences since he took over . But more importantly, as a former (until early fifties) Staff Officer for Ho Chi Minh, he can and does take on the American protest m.ovement with conviction
  • , including North Vietnam, and he was convinced that ir was a bargain Ho Chi Minh couldn't turn down. rn the next room he handed me a pad and hi. own pen. ·'Now, I want to rewrite that preamble so it can be read in the pub­ lic square in Johnson City,'' he
  • . a ---. After adopting this policy, I would renew the effort to talk, making it clear that as the infiltration .diminished, so would the bombing. It rriay be that lifting the bombing of the Hanoi-Haiphong area will take some of the heat off Ho Chi Minh and make
  • impress Ho Chi Minh. We are going to watch this operation very close to see what lessons .we learn for further operations --in heavily populated areas. C. Economic Prices edged up on imported items this week, but the Saigon Retail Index was down two
  • police-type action, and perhaps that's the wrong choice of words, and 10 and behold, here the Vietnamese who were running down that--what did they call that Laos--? G: The Ho Chi Minh Trail? C: --the Ho Chi Minh Trail, claiming they weren't, and we
  • the government, that they were running anything. And that just helped the VC politically. G: You'd known Big [Duong Van] Minh, I presume, hadn't you? P: Yes. G: What was your estimate of his capability? P: I liked Big Minh; he had a lot of political
  • the Vietnamese wanted to accomplish; the Buddhist crisis of 1963; programs involving pigs and fertilizer; progress reports and their depiction of events vs. eye witness accounts; coup in Vietnam; Ed Lansdale; Big [Duong Van] Minh; Diem’s assassination; John Paul
  • a course of action. He indicated he had talked to the Canadian Foreign Mlniater and had presented the question of Canadian approach to Ho Cbi Minh. He questioned whether the threat ehould be as po•ltively atated as Lodse'a cable indicated. The basic
  • Chairman Ho's teaching: !More .diffi.culties. and har_dship~ Jo· .P.e :encounter.ed when reaching victory 11 so that they w·ould harden their standpoint and accomplish th~ir missions under all circumstances . - 2 - In regard to the Paris Peace Talks, A5
  • , to hold elections. The moral indignation· over· that looks odd coming from Commun.lats, who are hardly experts at holding the type of election envisaged by the Geneva Agreement. And laa.t weekend Ho Chi Minh was wrong not to let the Ame~lcans have
  • military would not solve the problem, such as cutting the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Sometimes they were wrong. They were spectacularly wrong on Cambodia, because the analysts said that the supplies coming down the Ho Chi Minh Trail were enough to satisfy the needs
  • . And that was the American policy. But the trouble is we yielded on this and no sooner had Ho Chi Minh and General Giap had defeated the French at Dienbienphu in 1954 that we took on morally and publicly the responsibility for seeing to it that Ho Chi Minh and company did
  • , the VC are in terrible shape." We could read the communications along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and it was perfectly obvious that they were having one terrible time, because people from South Vietnam were going to go back up that trail come hell or high
  • running the Ho Chi Minh Trail, screaming about their inability to keep people under control, going the wrong way up the Ho Chi Minh Trail. They were in terrible shape. But as soon as the President came out and said, "No more bombing north
  • and the Japanese were involved in of bucking up against Vietnamese nationalism. We gave Ho Chi Minh the perfect out, the perfect opportunity, by trying to set up a kind of a unpopular and unrepresentative puppet regime in Saigon--which is exactly what the French
  • . MAURER THEN WAUNCH.ED INTO WHAT .. WAS VIRTUALLY~~,rJ,wo·-:HOUll .,MONO-LOGUE HE SAID HE DID ·o·ur· ·or.~--~A~~~T.HREE~:~Ho•u-:'rt::~b--1scuss"fo:N:: . ~~T-KNOW DIRECTLY WHY SAN ANTONIO OFFER HAO BEEN TURNED DOWN SINCE~' • SPEECH WAS GIVEN ON LAST DAY
  • political ends. The Viet Minh paid careful attention to, drew considerable comfort and encouragement from, not infrequently made good use of these French domestic political factors. (Ho Chi Minh 1 s political and negotiating tactics during the 1945-46 period
  • and with Ho Chi Minh, and that that had never reached the President when it had been sent to the State Department. And the allegations of some people, and frankly some people in very high places and some people that were in Paris that President Johnson sent
  • ,, Freeman y Stewart Udal l (b.2 replacement \ ) re Charle Luce resignatio n his re sCharles Luce resignation his \ Senato Minh r Henr y Jackso n (b . 1) - r e Charle s Luce , releas e o f correspondence b y Ho Chi , Lati n American Resolution , an d