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  • bring back the 27th Regimental Landing Team and support units, totalling 7,363 Marines in July, and replace them with Army. This would bring the approved South Vietnam deployment to 565,500 U.S. military personnel, including the 10,500 deployed
  • ::-..:ne:n.t 0£ Vietnam is 1-:i.e!."elyactir ..g :o C:e:f~r:tl =~·.;;:c1.!' ,,_..,..., ......, a•:i·":\=... .:}._.,.J...&.L .... s-i· ... - ... Ofi""·~~s1·0'-,;.., .;'1,,00.A. .... .A,4. ':l ..... ,., .....,J.,..,.,_ principles established by th
  • Vietnam War, 1961-1975
  • y 1. 5/8/65 Ltr to Obote frm Pres. re Address to Congress 2. 1/1/66 Msg to Obote frm Pres. re Vietnam 3. 1/21/66 Ltr to Obote frm Pres. re Gov. Williams Visit THE WHITE HOUSE ... ,•,I ...... - j. WASHINGTON January Dear Mr
  • Service Commission and as LBJ's "talent scout;' sets new guidelines for opening the voluminous Macy files in the Library's collections. 3 War Art RecordsImpressionsof Those Who "Profile of a Vietnam Veteran: Old Soldiers Never Die, They Just Fade Away
  • :'fh:HD--~ 3 ~30--- ']J-. All T °I I ----3 S7.f !T-i---;:r-;r"'mi=rr-;:~r-~aT1Tnn-~~"- ~ S 75 memo ~~ 75b cable NL. J 9/- ~ I:./ * , j s()._, /J s~ ~ r,;11/ tid-l tt 7, !J//X 'I1], Rostow to the Pr~s. re Vietnam ~.,,,1-,....,l J l:. lc.. I.M •,f
  • u ld be recog'ai:ged th a t Yugos have ne ve r approved o f o u r S o u th Vietnam ese p o lic y . We have had d is c u s s io n s w it h them fro m tim e to tim e b u t in each case we have found complete la c k o f u n d e rsta n d in g f o r
  • See all scanned items from Vietnam Country Files Box 7
  • Vietnam
  • Folder, "Memos, [Cables, memos, reports, and other material, 11/63-5/67] Vol. XVI, 8/16 - 31/64, 1 of 2," Country Files, Vietnam, NSF, Box 7
  • Country Files, Vietnam
  • than territory gained. In fact, 40 percent of Vietnam is uninhabited and 80 percent of the people live on less than 40 percent of the land. In addition, we must remember that we have not been here for years. Indeed, our first combat troops arrived only
  • than territory gained. In fact, 40 percent of Vietnam is uninhabited and 80 percent of the people live on less than 40 percent of the land. In addition, we must remember that we have not been here for years. Indeed, our first combat troops arrived only
  • with President and others to review covert action program against CUba. 64. 19 April 1964. NSC meeting on ·Laos • 65 . 22 April 1964. Breakfast meeting w1 th President, Rusk, McNamara, DC I, Briefing on Vietnam., SEATO meeting, Soviet nuc1ear autba.ck
  • Vietnam
  • Vietnam War impact on the economy and you really can't break these things apart. By that I mean the period from late 1965 all the way through 1968 and even beyond, but I mean particularly through 1968, when the surcharge was finally passed
  • Vietnam
  • program or the President's Vietnam position. This seemed to be overlooked in some of the domestic travel. Oftentimes a cabinet member would be speaking to some business group and the text of the speech would be appropriate, but he seemed to neglect thrusts
  • and Congress and how being in office affected a party's power; growing opposition to LBJ's Vietnam policy in 1966; O'Brien's report on 1966 election expectations based on his nationwide travels; early opposition to U.S. involvement in Vietnam from Vance Hartke
  • , in open session. his annual review but not be limited 7. Have Secretary Rusk offer to appear in executive to discuss Vietnam or other matters i1?.-open session members still want to. -TOP
  • Vietnam War, 1961-1975
  • , 1982 INTERVIEWEE: CHARLES A. MORRIS INTERVIEWER: Ted Gittinger PLACE: The Hilton Inn, Austin, Texas Tape 1 of 3 G: You [first] came to Vietnam in June 1964? M: June 1964 through June of 1965. My assignments during that period, for about
  • Vietnam
  • First duties and associates in Vietnam; III ARVN Corps; the problem of counterintelligence duty in Hawaii; early buildup of the Vietnam War; background of the war; the Oriental soldier; return to Vietnam in 1967; briefing preparation for McNamara
  • 111un1ni: c,f the EA;,lonar.c OI' hY$UOll pt wlUc:la 1A llll1 maccer \G 1111\IAIIU\Aelr&acl peROll la prohll:lltccl 1>7 law. MATlON Rt::Por.r,, ~9!. ;:'JNAL.LY l60L~20Z :ZVALUATED aTE COUNTRY: ·sourH VIETNAM DoI:. A?~IL SU3JECT: ! COR?S
  • were all concerned, with the so-called Vietnam plank. I remember working with Bill Welsh, Bill Connell, Bob Nathan, and others. We agreed on a domestic issues draft very quickly. By very quickly I mean within a week or ten days; we then came
  • Working with Vice President Hubert Humphrey to develop his campaign platform before the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago; working on a Vietnam speech for Humphrey to give in Chicago; LBJ and Humphrey's views on Vietnam; consulting
  • on men like Mark Clar_k and Admiral McDonald to look at it. We have talked to Senator Smith, Senator Stennis and Senator Russell. A desperate attack is being launched against us in Vietnam. At the same time the number of incidents has changed from 57
  • Vietnam
  • to Laos, but during 1946 you were in town in the State Department concerned with various aspects of Indochina policy, including being the chairman of the Interagency Task Force on Vietnam early in 1964. When did you first have any contact with President
  • Vietnam
  • Informing Vice-President LBJ of international affairs; announcing that the U.S. would be out of Vietnam by 1965; Sullivan’s appointment and work as chairman of Interagency Task Force on Vietnam; contingency planning to get North Vietnamese
  • , the problems with India, the problems with Pakistan to some degree over Vietnam, as well as the India-Pakistan conflict, were evident major factors in his decision. I think he has several times indicated by action what his rationale was. He did not want loans
  • Vietnam
  • Biographical information; AID operations; Far East; additionality; Congress; interagency relationships; Vietnam; diversion and control of AID supplies; intervention; other development programs
  • . ( Pams. 4-18) B. Another major problem for Sato is his identification with gen­ erally unpopular US policies in Vietnam. If extremists who now lead the opposition Socialist Party succeed in exploiting the issue to mount mass demonstrations on the. scale
  • around Hanoi and the 4-10 mile donut around Haiphong for bombing. 10 targets in the buffer zone between Vietnam and China. Secretary McNamara said he had talked with Secretary Rusk on the matter. He said Secretary Rusk had the following opinion: He would
  • Vietnam
  • RUSK: We do not know if we have anything yet. MR. ROSTOW: We are coming to a stage when we can begin to put the war to the American people in a new way . We have achieved self-determination in South Vietnam. We have pushed the North Vietnamese
  • Vietnam
  • independent of Vietnam. "If they are going to operate independently they are not able to do the job with the current equipment:" Secretary McNamara said the wing was ready to go if necessary. General Greene said the wing has only thirty choppers. Secretary
  • going down for the third time. I want to see Wilson and De Gaulle out there with their ships all lined up too . " But all of these things have a way of falling apart. He mentioned, for instance , early Congressional support for his actions in Vietnam
  • Agenda as follows: 1) Report on Latin American Trip and Summit (Rusk) j_ 2) Vietna m Peace Probes (Rusk( | 3) New Steps to cut down on N. Vietnam Infiltration (McNamara) j 4) Cutting U.S. Troops in Europe (The President, Rusk and McNamara) I and talking
  • television program and I was just watching, sitting there, he was being pressed pr.etty hard about Vietnam and at that time the Dominican Republic, and it was fairly obvious that he was not in sympathy with the Administration's approach on either
  • Vietnam
  • during early years as president; complaints from LBJ about Abel’s Vietnam War comments; reactions of press representatives to events in Vietnam; concern of Dean Rusk about British government’s role in SEATO; dissent of State and Defense mid-level people
  • to encourage sympathetic nonaligned nations willing to speak up against those who are blindly critical of the US position in Vietnam. One of the more imminent focal points of this effort should be to prevent the Algiers Chiefs of State Conference in late June
  • Vietnam criticism
  • do I view that? G: Yes. How did you at the time? C: At the time, Vietnam. That was the overriding sentiment around here: that he wasn't running--the sentiment was that he wasn't running because of Vietnam, and secondly that he waited too long
  • Factors that led to Lister Hill's decision to not run for re-election in 1968; Cronin's reaction to LBJ's 1968 announcement that he would not run for re-election; public opinion regarding Vietnam; Hill's support for the administration's actions
  • . The President showed the group a Christian Science Monitor article on the views of various dissenting Senators about Vietnam. "This is the type of thing which the American people are seeing every day. We need to get them more information of a factual nature. 11
  • Vietnam
  • later said that I was a traitor to my country, by the way. Bob Sherrod was going out to Vietnam, I think it was about 1966 or so, and as a lot of people did he went and got briefed in the White House. Lyndon always wanted to know who was going out
  • Vietnam
  • Early contact with LBJ during 1960 campaign; going to Vietnam for the first time; learning about Vietnam and gaining the confidence of the people there; deciphering the motivation of the officers that spoke to him; Homer Bigart; John Vann; John
  • they? No, I'm not sure he was able to help him. I think, you know, that it is quite limited, the kind of help that can be given. And with the problems that this Administration had, on Vietnam Specifically--almost entirely really--because certaiinly
  • Vietnam
  • Lady Bird’s influence on LBJ; preparation for 1968 campaign; 3/31 announcement; work on task forces; task force reports; HHH campaign; transition period; LBJ’s greatest concern; frustration over Vietnam; assessment of history’s judgment on LBJ’s
  • degree of policy control does one maintain. Certainly all the tactical decisions in Vietnam are made by General [Creighton Williams] Abrams and his staff in Vietnam. When it came to those interfaces between military decisions and political decisions
  • Vietnam
  • ; the Defense Department's relationship with Congress; public perception of the Department of Defense's involvement in Vietnam; LBJ's public reputation; LBJ's 3/31/1968 speech announcing he would not seek re-election.
  • p- 1p [DttpHeate of 132a., l"~SF, GawAky liiJ.e, Y.ietnam, "JC(e}, 2{13-20168, tietletai MititMJ Aeti¥it3/"] #64b cable #~n'Pff'tn-t---- Intelligence Cable ~ '+ l&- 9 a- /JL. \,-9/,· ~, s 1p [Duplicate of #32b , NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C(6
  • : A Machinists Union strike has snarled or halted service on a number of railroads from coast to coast. The walkout threatens Vietnam war shipments and promises massive commuter jams tomorrow in some big cities. Some railroads hope to keep war sup plies moving
  • Vietnam
  • and applied. I think we handled the Pentagon problem very well. I am proud of the way our men in Vietnam handled themselves in commenting on the demonstrations here last weekend. I am concerned as to how we handle the draft card burners who are handing
  • Vietnam criticism
  • : NSC Meeting on Your Asia Trip The meeting is scheduled at 2 p. m. today. List of invitees attached (Tab A). The agenda is attached (Tab B). I thought you might want to start off with a brief report from Secretary McNamara on his trip to Vietnam
  • Vietnam
  • . They will stand with the u. s. in Vietnam rlght They do not seek a crushing victory over the North Vietnamese or the VC, but we have set out to fruatratc an effort to enslave a nation. --6ECRt.T We ... '• \ - SEC1'
  • Vietnam
  • are pushing him on this thing of entering into the California primary. He doesn't want to do it if we can get some way of talking about, or some kind of a vehicle of an analysis or a review of this whole Vietnam thing. He says he 1 s not opposed
  • Vietnam
  • DALEY ENCOURAGES LBJ TO APPOINT COMMISSION TO STUDY VIETNAM POLICY, DISCUSSES CALL FROM RFK ABOUT HIS POLITICAL FUTURE; LBJ DISCUSSES HIS MEETING YESTERDAY WITH TED SORENSEN; POSSIBLE TROOP INCREASE; DALEY SUGGESTS LBJ INCLUDE WAR CRITICS
  • they might agree to allow Govern­ ment of Vietnam -- which we had demanded -- to come and stay in the meeting. understand that We told them that they would have to tvN would have to be there and we could not have a productive meeting, as I had outlined
  • Vietnam
  • LBJ REVIEWS RECENT VIETNAM PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, SAYS HE WILL MAKE STATEMENT TONIGHT THAT HE IS STOPPING ALL BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM AND THAT PEACE TALKS THAT INCLUDE SOUTH VIETNAM WILL BEGIN PROMPTLY, DISCUSSES UNAUTHORIZED CONTACTS WITH SOUTH
  • it. he does these things, you know. Although That is, he sees it differently. Let me tell you the way it came back to me was that at the dinner we got to talking about Vietnam or the military or something like this. And we disagreed. I was supposed
  • Vietnam
  • Biographical information; departed government in 1964 over policy in Vietnam; JFK, Harriman, Forrestal and Hilsman were all for a political approach while LBJ was for a military approach; LBJ: “It’s the only war we’ve got;” Rostow and McNamara were
  • of that meeting? Z: Some of it. I don't remember whether I've given you this before or not, but if not, it dealt with the press in Vietnam and the coverage we were getting. Leonard was there as director of USIA, John was there as the new director
  • Vietnam
  • 1965 meeting with LBJ about press coverage in Vietnam; Frank Stanton; Arthur Sylvester; LBJ and the press; Walt Rostow; different interpretations of the situation in Vietnam; Bill Moyers; government response to press criticism; qualifications