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  • dip in the desertion rate in the South Vietnamese army. This rate will come down even lower, as certain South Vietnamese generals are replaced. The President said every day, each day, we are offering to negotiate with Ho Chi Minh. Our position is clear
  • military forces and limit the size of U. S . forces. Political fragility continues in South Vietn am. We hope that the political situation is at last settling down. Based on recent local elections, a national election held now would not go to Ho Chi Minh
  • ':ie following information was received from interrogation of a Viet Cong Summary -- Plans for the VC Tet attack on Danang City were outlined to a group of select cadres on 22 January by Ho Phuoc, Secretary of the Quang Da-Danang Spec i al Zone
  • there's only one road coming south, and there are a whole bunch of bridges, and it'd be damned hard to get any kind of regular army force through there in any significant numbers. The Ho Chi Minh Trail did not exist at this point; there were
  • Biographical information; Phillip’s work in Vietnam; Ed Lansdale; Phillips psywar experience; trip to the Philippines; Vietnamese pacification program; mosquitoes in the Philippines; Colonel Le Van Kim; the Viet Minh; the Binh Xuyen in Saigon; Kieu
  • no results. ... , •, .. '.' 3. .The President feels Ho Chi Minh is farther away from negotiations than he ever was; his views seem to be we cannot ,. ; ·• : 'defeat him, he can defeat us, and we will not stay the course. • J ~· : ' 9 • \ ; : 4
  • that we are trying to probe in every way to find some way to get Ho Chi Minh to talk even while they continue to fight. The President read President ' Thieu's peace overtures which were made during the campaign and which included bombing pauses
  • it took the Japanese fascist troops and gave them arms and had them fight to suppress the forces of Ho Chi Minh. But I didn't know any of that until after 1962 or 1963. G: Well, it's a blank spot for very many people. D: Of course now we know
  • Personal opposition to official policy in Vietnam; National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam; SANE; MOBE; NCAC; role of television; counterculture; assignation attempt of Dellinger; travels to Vietnam; meeting with Ho Chi Minh
  • -revolutionary strategy. f •. This strategy, used by Mao in China and by Ho Chi Minh in Southeast Asia, starts with a peasant base and gradually encircles, throttles and cap­ tures the cities. Marshal Lin likened underdevel­ oped countries such as South Vietnam
  • -revolutionary strategy. f •. This strategy, used by Mao in China and by Ho Chi Minh in Southeast Asia, starts with a peasant base and gradually encircles, throttles and cap­ tures the cities. Marshal Lin likened underdevel­ oped countries such as South Vietnam
  • wouldn't receive an American. So we wrote an invitatio'n to Ho Chi Minh to send a delegation to this upcoming convocation to take place some time later, with the understanding we, wer.e also inviting the South Vietnamese and everybody else. The Russians
  • and peace negotiation talks with Ho Chi Minh
  • . You have to bear in mind that Ho Chi Minh and his crowd fought the French before World War II, then the Japanese came in and they fought the Japanese, then the French came back and they fought the French again, and then the Americans came
  • Chi Minh' s objectives are to divide us from our allies and to divide us at home. We should be cautious in making statements about what we expect to come out of the Paris talks. UK Fo r eign Minister Stuart may get something during his coming visit
  • it." The President said the bombing would give protection to our ground troops. The President said that Ho Chi Minh hasn't moved one inch from his statement which was published earlier this year. The President continued, "If you want me to get out of Vietnam
  • Chi Minh. Ho Chi Minh bought nothing. I do honestly think that he believed if he took himself out of the picture, Ho Chi Minh might be willing to negotiate with a fresh party. G: What did he say that night? R: Well, he was talking--there were so
  • JFK and Vietnam; events leading up to Gulf of Tonkin Resolution; Congress and Vietnam; personal observations on Vietnam; bombing and bombing halts; various peace missions and conferences; letter to Ho Chi Minh; the “Wise Men;” plans for peace talks
  • York Times - January 29, 1966 Text of Ho Chi Minh's Letter on Pe2ce Speclal lo Tht );rw Yor~ Tin:ts WA.SHINCTON, Ja11. 28-Fol­ lotoill!J is tlle text of the letter of PYeMdcnt Bo Chi Millh. of North. Vietnam to .some 1leads of .state and. otllcr
  • )>25Vrs Conditions in Hanoi ED 12958 3.4(bl[1)>25Vrs (CJ ED 12958 3A[b)[1]>25Yrs -Z- (CJ I 4. H•> Chi Minh, President of the I;>RV, did not appear for the May Day celebratia.s, nor did he appear for the 19 May celebration of his own birthday
  • , necessarily, to capture--they wanted to get medical supplies and guns and ammunition. The Ho Chi Minh Trail had not been reopened again. there was Tay Ninh in January of 1960 or February of 1960. So And then in October-November 1960, they hit a bunch
  • ; infiltration; executive order making the ambassador the principal representative of the U.S. government; acquiring more helicopters; Viet Cong step up effort in 1959-1960; opening up the Ho Chi Minh Trail; Sihanouk; 1960 counterinsurgency plan; JFK taking
  • out now," and "try the enclave theory. 11 I have stopped the bombing six times. I did not get any indication of any action on their part. We are in touch with Ho Chi Minh today. The problem is not one of communication. The problem is that Ho wants
  • is so serious that it calls for more inmediate and positive action than I have proposed. His reasons are: . "(l) General Minh is discontented and his attitude will be a drag on K~anh's efforts to activate the military and civilian establishments. (2
  • several hours a secret message from Ho Chi Minh, relS¥ed to the White House by President deGaulle, has announced North Vietnam's unilateral decision to halt hostilities. Ho demands reciprocal action by the United States. In Vietnam, American, RVNand other
  • policy is wrong. Where do they get us? Nowhere. The popular thing now is to stress the mis-management in Vietnam. there has been very little. I think I wish Mike (Senator Mansfield) would make a speech on Ho Chi Minh. Nothing is as dirty as to violate
  • countries, trade, security matters, or helping build a stable peace. Question: Does the President think there is a serious possibility of productive talks taking place with Ho Chi Minh leading to a peaceful settlement in Vietnam.? Answer: We simply do
  • particularly of Ho Chi Minh, which they in turn had gotten from the French. So I was able to learn something of the background of the communist movement in Indochina, of the infrastructure which had been built there, and also of the very extensive control
  • with religious images from Southeas,t Asian currency. Superimposed over it all: a portrait of Ho Chi Minh. 10 Research Grants A warded to Thirteen Scholars Considering the applications for grants-in-aid are Tina Houston, Library Supervisory Archivist; Bruce
  • said was that the Asians believed the ir enemy Wbo is the enemy - - Peking or Ho Chi Minh? The Vice President : The Vietnamese know their enemy is the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese. Wounded South Vietnamese soldiers know who the enemy is . Senat
  • frustration. I think a lot of people in the South were still recovering from the aftermath of French colonialism. I think there were a great many southerners who, in an emotional and idealistic way, felt that Ho Chi Minh and his followers and the Viet Minh
  • to do something as a broker to help develop a more effective indigenous non-communist apparatus to work in conjunction with the French against the Ho Chi Minh forces. The French were not all that interested in our support, I suppose suspicious that we
  • to understand the magnitude of the problems in Vietnam; the 1963 Vietnamese coup, Ngo Dinh Diem's death, and the upheaval that resulted; Stilwell's relationship with John Richardson; Stilwell's activities during the coup; Stilwell's opinion of Duong Van Minh
  • as a "French" city, a symbol of colonialism; that had a powerful psychological effect. Many people were not emotionally supportive of a govern- ment with a colonial image. And they had no hero to look to. only visible hero was Ho Chi Minh, and the people
  • Histories [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh Lemnitzer -- I -- 24 gummed up the other day in his press conference, that Ho Chi Minh and Diem did not agree in merging the states. It wasn't
  • histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh Davis -- IV -- 13 development program for Southeast Asia if Ho Chi Minh would just stop the war." I said I would lead with the relaxation of the bombing--I went for the military side of it. One
  • be willing to do. We hear from travelers and from self-appointed spokesmen from time to time this and that. On occasions we have attempted to confirm it, and we have negotiated directly with them. I think the last position stated by Mr. Ho Chi Minh is a safe
  • Christian Discussing D March 21, 1967 the release by Ho Chi Minh of the correspondence between the President and him. Joined in the State Room by ————— General Maxwell Taylor Hon. Ellsworth Bunker Hon. Eugene Locke Hon. David Lilienthal j Hon. Averel l
  • ) ~he fellowing material is Secret,not for foreign dissemin­ based on an inter.agency., ation. SIG?IA I-66 is-. hypothetical, politica.1-mili~ary game conducted in the Pentagon between 13 and 22 September 1966. (Briefer) SIGMAopened with Ho Chi Minh
  • that was presented. And he tried to offer the middle course between doing nothing and doing too much. And the middle course was a reasoned response and they were hoping that Ho Chi Minh would say, "Okay, we'll stop." And Lyndon Johnson was trying to find out what
  • together in Moscow. Mao made only his second trip out of the country. He only made two, both to Moscow. He came. They were all there, including Ho Chi Minh--I don't know whether Ho Chi Minh himself came; I don't think he did. But in any case, they decided
  • that bring up any memories? H: No. G: That's what certain people I know called the Ho Chi Minh.Trail. H: Oh. That's a new one. I hadn't beard that before. a good name for it. G: Do you think it's a good name? (Laughter) It's LBJ Presidential
  • y (includ e visited by) crowd, and they would drown them out by saying, "We want Johnson. " One protestor held a sign -- very large -- that bore Ho Chi Minh's picture. Just before the President came on the balcony, boy scouts on the second level
  • Secretary of State, Pope Paul VI, and Ho Chi Minh Top Secret 1 p. FPesiaeBt to Oh8:fl:eelloP Kiesingap___; 'Possible ela~sified informa_tion--. ©fis:I1callor Kiesiriger to PresideR-t Possible classified inrormatlon Rostow for the President 8/Jl/68 Top
  • Lodge -- Bunker should be well publicized when he returns. Robert Murphy - - We need a hate complex directed at Ho Chi Minh similar to Hitler. General Omar Bradley -- Our troubles can be blamed on the communications media. We need patriotic slogans