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Folder, "October 17, 1967 - 5:35 p.m. Congressional Leadership," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 1 (Item)

could see why Republicans wanted to play politics on this issue, but he did not see how Democrats could conceivably make a political issue out of it. President: They obviously do not understand this. reasons why I want this measure: There are two 1

. DEMOCRATIC CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP BREAKFAST Vice President Speaker McCormack Senator Mansfield Senator Byrd Senator Long Congressm..an Albert Congressman Boggs Mike Manatos Post:Inaster General O'Brien Joe Califano Barefoot Sanders Tom Johnson I
Folder, "February 6, 1968 - 8:30 a.m. Democratic Congressional Leadership Breakfast," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 2

estimate the enemy has lost 3, 000 men killed in action in the last two days. This compares with about 300 allied losses, including 100 U.S. We know they are prepared for a major offensive at Khesanh. The President: We still face a big challenge at Khesanh

Folder, "October 23, 1967 - 5:36 p.m. Democratic Leadership," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 1 (Item)

MEMORANDUM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON October 25, 196 7 1:15 p. m. TOP SECRE':F ATTACHMENT FOR THE PRESIDENT \Om FROM: Tom Johnson Attached are the notes of your meeting with the Democratic Leadership on October 23, 1967 in the Cabinet Room
Folder, "October 23, 1967 - 5:36 p.m. Democratic Leadership," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 1

. This was that while discussion proceeded the U.S. government would assume that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation. This was directly related to prompt and productive discussions without taking military advantage

Folder, "[January-March 1968 Meetings with Correspondents]," Meeting Notes Files, Box 3 (Item)

the pressure so calmly. His first question referred to the President's statement in the State of the Union message about restlessness in the country. The President: We live in a world clouded with uncertainty. It directly affects the action of people in many

folde1. W. TAeMat Jgbn;on - 2There is a necessary preoccupation of our national leadership with this problem. At the same time there is much anxiety and dismay in America over the 'Wlr. Our conviction is that we should contract our operations

operation. Mr. Rostow: The Vietnamese seem more willing to contemplate offensive actions of their own. The enemy hasn't. Secretary Clifford: The enemy may feel he is doing so well politically that he need not do anything militarily. They see: Debate

of the steam out of him by showing him an "Eyes Only" cable to General Westmoreland expressing my full support for him and his actions. General Wheeler: I talked with General Westmoreland this morning and he said he was deeply appreciative of the message

Folder, "[March 22, 1968 - Luncheon Meeting with Advisors]," Meeting Notes Files, Box 2 (Item)

the 20th parallel, with reciprocal action by the enemy by stopping shelling from the DMZ or just north of the DMZ. ;:. . Secretary Rusk said this would be alright if there were no hard conditions on the enemy. He did not believe Hanoi would reciprocate

then asked Secretary McNamara what can he do to solve crime in the District of Columbia. The President said he asked Wirtz the same thing. "Crime will be the principal problem, even more so than Vietnam. We've got to show some progress and action. Perhaps

Folder, "October 5, 1967 - 6:55 p.m. McNamara, Rusk, Rostow," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 1 (Item)

if they shell us. THE PRESIDENT: Then we are trading all bombing for talks but we would expect to. take any action necessary if they begin to shell us in the DMZ. How long would it take? What if they re-arm, re-equip, or re-fortify? SECRETARY RUSK: It would

to the South-Central highlands for flexibility of action. He wants 13, 500 support troops, or might have to cancel the civilianization progress. Westy said he could make progress with the forces. he has. He said he should have a ready element in Hawaii in case

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