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Folder, "October 17, 1967 - 5:35 p.m. Congressional Leadership," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 1
(Item)
- could see why Republicans wanted to play politics on this issue, but he did not see how Democrats could conceivably make a political issue out of it. President: They obviously do not understand this. reasons why I want this measure: There are two 1
- . DEMOCRATIC CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP BREAKFAST Vice President Speaker McCormack Senator Mansfield Senator Byrd Senator Long Congressm..an Albert Congressman Boggs Mike Manatos Post:Inaster General O'Brien Joe Califano Barefoot Sanders Tom Johnson I
- Folder, "February 6, 1968 - 8:30 a.m. Democratic Congressional Leadership Breakfast," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 2
- estimate the enemy has lost 3, 000 men killed in action in the last two days. This compares with about 300 allied losses, including 100 U.S. We know they are prepared for a major offensive at Khesanh. The President: We still face a big challenge at Khesanh
- MEMORANDUM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON October 25, 196 7 1:15 p. m. TOP SECRE':F ATTACHMENT FOR THE PRESIDENT \Om FROM: Tom Johnson Attached are the notes of your meeting with the Democratic Leadership on October 23, 1967 in the Cabinet Room
- Folder, "October 23, 1967 - 5:36 p.m. Democratic Leadership," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 1
- . This was that while discussion proceeded the U.S. government would assume that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation. This was directly related to prompt and productive discussions without taking military advantage
- folde1. W. TAeMat Jgbn;on - 2There is a necessary preoccupation of our national leadership with this problem. At the same time there is much anxiety and dismay in America over the 'Wlr. Our conviction is that we should contract our operations
- operation. Mr. Rostow: The Vietnamese seem more willing to contemplate offensive actions of their own. The enemy hasn't. Secretary Clifford: The enemy may feel he is doing so well politically that he need not do anything militarily. They see: Debate
Folder, "February 6, 1968 - 10:30 a.m. Senior Foreign Policy Advisors," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 2
(Item)
- of the steam out of him by showing him an "Eyes Only" cable to General Westmoreland expressing my full support for him and his actions. General Wheeler: I talked with General Westmoreland this morning and he said he was deeply appreciative of the message
- if they shell us. THE PRESIDENT: Then we are trading all bombing for talks but we would expect to. take any action necessary if they begin to shell us in the DMZ. How long would it take? What if they re-arm, re-equip, or re-fortify? SECRETARY RUSK: It would
- to the South-Central highlands for flexibility of action. He wants 13, 500 support troops, or might have to cancel the civilianization progress. Westy said he could make progress with the forces. he has. He said he should have a ready element in Hawaii in case