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Folder, "National Security Council - 1961 [1 of 3]," VP Papers, VP Security Files, Box 4 (Item)

in the donor's deed of gift, GENERALSERVICES ADMINISTRATION GSA DC 73-495 GSA FORM 7122 (7-72) NATIONALARCHIVESANO RECORDSSERVICE WITHDRAWAL SHEET(PRESIDENTIALLIBRARIES) FORMOF DOCUMENT -ll,.).bJ~-3::01r---r CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE NSC Actions n-0

Oral history transcript, James C. Hagerty, interview 1 (I), 11/16/1971, by Joe B. Frantz (Item)

. Not at that time. I don't think I'm getting ahead of myself here, but there was a--I'm sure we will talk about this a little later--very warm and close feeling between the leaders of the Congress, or the Democratic leaders of the Congress and President Eisenhower

Oral history transcript, George Meany, interview 1 (I), 8/4/1969, by Paige E. Mulhollan (Item)

a filibuster, and that stopped us because the Democratic leader Mansfield would not try to break the filibuster. You see, the way you break the filibuster is by meeting around the clock, just keep on meeting, and Mansfield absolutely refused to do

of U.S. tobacco. STATUS: 3. The Vice President taken together Philippines The Philippine Congress (Unclassified) adjourned May 18 without taking action on thia legislation. A special aes1ion may be called later in June and action is possible

action or in an effort to shoot down our B-52 1 s. They may also attempt to attack an air base, like the one at Danang. I sent a mes sage to all field commanders alerting them to these possibilities. Secretary Rusk: a carrier? What about the possibility

Oral history transcript, William S. Gaud, interview 1 (I), 11/26/1968, by Paige E. Mulhollan (Item)

does he give it his stamp? G: That depends on how interested he is in doing that. I think he can make a very real impression on the agency if he wants. decide, He can for example, the priorities between Latin America, Asia, LBJ Presidential

Oral history transcript, C. Douglas Dillon, interview 1 (I), 6/29/1969, by Paige E. Mulhollan (Item)

of the suggestions of Mr. Stevenson that were not taken. But I think he agreed with the final action, so I don't think there was any real decision that way. But during this thing, as it was going along, there were clearly differences of views put forth. I think

Memorandum # 329, Task Force on Southeast Asian Economic and Social Development, 4/9/1965 (Item)

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHIN GTO N .CONFIDENTIAL - April 9, 1965 NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM TO: No.· 329 Secretary of State Secretary of the Treasury Secretary of Agriculture Secretary of C ommerce Administrator, Agency
National Security Action Memorandums

TIIE WlIJTE IIOl . S E \VA S I IINGTO"-\ {;6NFIDENTIAL April 9, 1965 NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. , 329 MEMORANDUM TO: SUBJECT: Secretary of State Secretary of the Treasury Secretary of Agriculture Secretary of Commerce
Folder, "NSAM # 329: Task Force on Southeast Asian Economic and Social Development, 4/9/1965," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 6
National Security Action Memorandums

Folder, "[Briefing Papers for Tuesday Luncheon, February 6, 1968]," Meeting Notes Files, Box 2 (Item)

AMMAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4557 STATE GRNC BT -S E e ft E T AMM.AN 3270 NOD IS FEB 3, 1968 8 :14 ;p .M. , FOR YOUR INFORMATION . SUBJECT: ACTIONS NEEDED FORESTALL FURTHER JORDANIAN MOVES TOWARD SOVIETS \ t. AFTER SENDING KING'S MESSAGE

prepared). III. Under Secretary Katzenbach will ask Bill Bundy to amplify and define major action problems now before us. IV. You may then wish to go round the table and get comments from: Gaud on the development picture and prospects in Indonesia; Freeman

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