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  • dip in the desertion rate in the South Vietnamese army. This rate will come down even lower, as certain South Vietnamese generals are replaced. The President said every day, each day, we are offering to negotiate with Ho Chi Minh. Our position is clear
  • military forces and limit the size of U. S . forces. Political fragility continues in South Vietn am. We hope that the political situation is at last settling down. Based on recent local elections, a national election held now would not go to Ho Chi Minh
  • no results. ... , •, .. '.' 3. .The President feels Ho Chi Minh is farther away from negotiations than he ever was; his views seem to be we cannot ,. ; ·• : 'defeat him, he can defeat us, and we will not stay the course. • J ~· : ' 9 • \ ; : 4
  • that we are trying to probe in every way to find some way to get Ho Chi Minh to talk even while they continue to fight. The President read President ' Thieu's peace overtures which were made during the campaign and which included bombing pauses
  • Chi Minh' s objectives are to divide us from our allies and to divide us at home. We should be cautious in making statements about what we expect to come out of the Paris talks. UK Fo r eign Minister Stuart may get something during his coming visit
  • it." The President said the bombing would give protection to our ground troops. The President said that Ho Chi Minh hasn't moved one inch from his statement which was published earlier this year. The President continued, "If you want me to get out of Vietnam
  • York Times - January 29, 1966 Text of Ho Chi Minh's Letter on Pe2ce Speclal lo Tht );rw Yor~ Tin:ts WA.SHINCTON, Ja11. 28-Fol­ lotoill!J is tlle text of the letter of PYeMdcnt Bo Chi Millh. of North. Vietnam to .some 1leads of .state and. otllcr
  • out now," and "try the enclave theory. 11 I have stopped the bombing six times. I did not get any indication of any action on their part. We are in touch with Ho Chi Minh today. The problem is not one of communication. The problem is that Ho wants
  • several hours a secret message from Ho Chi Minh, relS¥ed to the White House by President deGaulle, has announced North Vietnam's unilateral decision to halt hostilities. Ho demands reciprocal action by the United States. In Vietnam, American, RVNand other
  • countries, trade, security matters, or helping build a stable peace. Question: Does the President think there is a serious possibility of productive talks taking place with Ho Chi Minh leading to a peaceful settlement in Vietnam.? Answer: We simply do
  • said was that the Asians believed the ir enemy Wbo is the enemy - - Peking or Ho Chi Minh? The Vice President : The Vietnamese know their enemy is the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese. Wounded South Vietnamese soldiers know who the enemy is . Senat
  • be willing to do. We hear from travelers and from self-appointed spokesmen from time to time this and that. On occasions we have attempted to confirm it, and we have negotiated directly with them. I think the last position stated by Mr. Ho Chi Minh is a safe
  • ) ~he fellowing material is Secret,not for foreign dissemin­ based on an inter.agency., ation. SIG?IA I-66 is-. hypothetical, politica.1-mili~ary game conducted in the Pentagon between 13 and 22 September 1966. (Briefer) SIGMAopened with Ho Chi Minh
  • Lodge -- Bunker should be well publicized when he returns. Robert Murphy - - We need a hate complex directed at Ho Chi Minh similar to Hitler. General Omar Bradley -- Our troubles can be blamed on the communications media. We need patriotic slogans
  • Wheeler said it is not necessary to approve this target tonight. - 2 ­ The President said he should go ahead and approve it. "If we send a McNamara to talk to Ho Chi Minh, we don't want to approve it after he gets there." Wheeler said the weather
  • that that they must 'come to the assistance" of the North E-6 , S- - NOFORN NO YES example of this new means or disguised aggression. Ho Chi Minh has had a long associ­ ation with the communist revo~utionaries in China, . particularly with Mao. He has been
  • and teat thls v:as why the ARV.N had been so success.fa! until recently. 'The President remarked that we all know that it is a bad situation and we wish we were ten years back or even ten months back. Senator Long said that Ho Chi Minh tal!\:s of a twenty
  • to the North Vietnamese and sought their views. They did not respond to our suggestions and the exchange culminated in my February letter to Ho-Chi-Minh and his flatly negative response, which Hanoi chose to publish. Since that time, despite additional efforts
  • trouble than we get gains. He said we'd bombed Hanoi within half a mile of Ho Chi Minh 1 s hous e . (The President pointed toward the Washington monument as he said ". "That's as close as those people down there, and him sitting there oil: .' his front
  • to the conclusion that Ho Chi "Yes, I do," said FitzGerald. _ • . '...,' powerfulspokesmenofwhatDwightEisenhower : Minh and Company should ha\'e "mo,·ro to a "But why?" said _McNamara. ,. • ,· • • • .' • called "the military-industrial complex." •• '·. settlement
  • HUU, NGUYEN HUU CHAU, HO TONG MINH AND T h is Eiaterlal c o n t a i n s I n f o r m a iln n a f fe c tin g th e N a tio n a l D e fe n se o f t h e U n ite d S t a te s w it h in t h e m e a n in g o f t h e E sp io n a g e L a w s, T itle 18, U ^ .C i
  • public statements be made. 5. Tiw President then departed and Mr. McNamara requested that the group remain for a general review of the problem. It was pointed out that the balance of forces in Laos generally favored the Pathet Lao with their Viet Minh
  • a course of action. He indicated he had talked to the Canadian Foreign Mlniater and had presented the question of Canadian approach to Ho Cbi Minh. He questioned whether the threat ehould be as po•ltively atated as Lodse'a cable indicated. The basic
  • for several months, now, that the Communists planned a massive winter-spring offensive. We have detailed information on Ho Chi Minh' s order governing that offensive. Part of it is called a general uprising. "We know the object was to overthrow
  • . so URCE wHo :-HA~_.:-_:·~:··.';-· :p,._FURNISHED ·.RELI ABLE- INFORM AT ION IN THE~ PAST, - AND:_J~HO-1S •CLOSE'.'·TO\:.(i;~:i]:-:--:,::_/~ -·~ ''. ~tr:_ ;~ ;f·sr ANLE.Y· ~EVI SON,· CON~IDENT I_~L ADVI~OR ·T9.:·MAR,!IN/L~HER -~ ~.NG;.A~H/{/,.!~4
  • h is tiiinking on th e introductiou of in te r ­ national f o r c e s . Wc found that ho v/aa fu ll of the su b ject, having d is c u s s e d rci&x)y a s p e c ts of the m ilitary' rsanpovver sh o rta g e with G en era ls T h ieu and Minh o v er
  • TV TO DRAW THEM OUT ON SUBJEC TS SUGGESTED IN LA ST THREE PARAS OF R E F T E L . FRENCH EMBASSY ASSESSMENT OF VIETNAMESE S ITU A TIO N IS THAT I T I S , IN ONE WORD, HO PELESS. FRENCH EMBASSY O FFIC ERS CLAIM TO KNOW FROM FIR ST-H A N D EXPERIENCE
  • conomy is such t hat Rollin~ Thunder can affect directly only a small f racti on of the ponulati on. There is very l ittle hope that the Ho Chi Minh Government ..,ill l ose control of population because of Rolling Thunder. The l essons of t he Korean War
  • greater nurubar of men. wngELEll: J 'l'he more men we have th~ greater the 1 tke: l itwod of smaller loafl,.,B. JlHESIDENT: What makes you think if we put in 100, ono meu Ho Chi Minh won't put in another 10~, 000'? WHEELEH: which will allow
  • FR0~l 1ATIJN OF THE ALLIA~·JCE FO~ ?ZACE AND 3AIGON TELLS O? .TH~ FOR[ DEt•108R::\CYCLIE:t'l MINH CAC LU LUONG DA~-JTOC V.~ HJ.~ BIUH). GP- 1 • 900 1 1 .-:_~y:f' ··t:::z r, 2 a -,tottrt·· ., w · ...... ----~---~---··· ·•••·-;-4~7
  • to g iv e e ffe c t iv e a id to Vietnam b ut th a t t h e ir a s sis ta n c e w i l l be lim it e d by t h e ir c a p a b ilit ie s and t h e i r r e a liz a t io n o f t h e ir own needs at home. - GDGRET/HO F eaf ilCM P1S3BM — COPY LBJ LIBRARY
  • available, but we coulrl continue to operate the Canal. 10. Mr. McI'iamar.::i~ ·u ho had stepped outside the roa:n to converse wi"th. C.eneral O'Meara. by phone, reported that the poszibility of the l~~rnulfista-Commie coup had been passed to Chiari. I t
  • regime aids the Viet Cong in South Viet-Nam with large numbers of m ilitary specialists, vital supplies and equipment, and key commu ­ nications facilities. Much of the personnel and materiel moves into South Viet-Nam over the so-called “ Ho Chi Minh T
  • actions, point~ no man should in the opening in which men were of action, of small-scale The latter to this must recognize problem problem and military of simple Ho Chi Minh trail the H~J.I' effor~ planning those he had done all
  • and on the Conimtmists and the Outc~~es of Present activity there weakened. ftu·ther 13. l'le believe of rnili tary into the poll tical e::1erge from the present the GVU/ARVN will Alternative occu.r, to be contained,; manifest being ho:·rever, hand, US
  • kno'Wil for several months, now, that the Communists ·planned a massive winter-spring offensive. We have detailed information on Ho Chi Minh's order governing that offensive. Part of it is called a general uprising. • We know the object was to overthrow
  • , 11 however, President in ba.1an.ce 11 beginning extremely of resistance the be2.cw to the idea, ' ' .L. migni_ that Ho staif, at him, that adverse his the ?'1.C. was vivid a member enormous 9oss ible believed a serious- a ne