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  • over the phone. In the lett er, cable ·arr ived while Pres ident the President stated that he had no Idea what Lam was Nguyen Van Thieu and Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky talking about and that the were con£erring in Saigon's United States would be Ind
  • I NG TROOPS TO THE SAIGON AREA V/OULD BE A DIFFICULT UNDERTAKING AND RAISES THE QUESTION OF THE AIR FORCE PART IN THE COUP D’ ETAT PLOTTING. ALTHOUGH GENERAL NGUYEN CAO KY, COMMANDER OF THE VIETNAMESE,AlR FORCEj APPEARS TO BE RECONSIDERING, HE
  • unity of effort, and only after [Nguyen Van] Thieu[Nguyen Cao] Ky took over did we know who was really running the country. Unhappiness and perplexity pervaded the whole country, con- tributing to a lack of cohesiveness. The people viewed Saigon
  • arrived at Saigon on that first trip, the day I arrived I went to General [Nguyen Cao] remember hotel Ky's Ky had in his quarters a press conference that at Tan Son Nhut . I don't now how it happened, but I guess I got there and got to the and ran
  • Biographical information; preparation for covering Vietnam; reflections on McNamara; the Caravelle Hotel; recollections of Thich Tri Quang; the Buddhist movement and the Ky government; press policy in Vietnam; opinion of Ky; elections in Vietnam
  • Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh the Vietnamese air force, Nguyen Cao Ky, was going to do the briefing. This was going to be a nice story about joint American-[Vietnamese] air cooperation, a common installation, all
  • ://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh Phillips -- II -- 4 [Ngo Dinh] Diem on down. I saw Diem, I saw Nguyen Dinh Thuan, I saw everybody, and [Ngo Dinh] Nhu. I talked about a kind of a teamwork situation in which we would create a provincial coordinating
  • a charismatic leader have succeeded? depends on the psyche of the Vietnamese. It I personally don't think so. I think that Nguyen Cao Ky had all the charisma needed, and all he evoked among the Vietnamese was plots to gang up against him. The Vietnamese
  • ; the intelligence community; Thieu and Ky; self-immolation; the Tet Offensive; the Phoenix program
  • to hirn., that could address itself to problems across the board in Saigon and the provincial centers affected by the Viet Cong attacks; and tn.at he ~ight. wa-:1t - to consider delegatil1.g supervision to Vice Presid_ent Ky.. On the Government of Vietnam
  • Saigon's encourage­ ment ot a large turn-out. Fraudulent counting and government lies combined to pad the results but the real tacts were apparent to the people. Instead ot the high figure claimed by Ky in the Western press, no more than 30 percent
  • [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh Durbrow -- I -- 26 have shot it all at Diem and knocked him all up, but they stayed loyal to Diem and [Nguyen Van] Thieu and [Nguyen Cao] Ky and the rest
  • . spokesman. At least, he was Then he was [Nguyen Cao] Ky's He was very close to Ky. G: Sounds like he had a talent for survival, too. J: Oh, yes. He was one of the smartest people I ever knew. was in the embassy here and was spokesman for the embassy
  • and problems along the line, and there really wasn't any stability in the government from then until Nguyen Van Thieu and General [Nguyen Cao] Ky came into the government. But these three generals had a great opportunity, and they fluffed it. Everybody's got
  • Party victory and reinforced Labour's efforts to restrict Australian contribution to the war. During December, as the Ky Directorate and the newly elected Assembly sought to cope with mounting problems ot inflation, economic dislocation and an inept
  • 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh think you gave me some examples of [Nguyen] Khanh and [Nguyen Cao] Ky and so forth, so we can skip that. What kind of guidance existed for the individual not high
  • in the towel, so he did something, and to his great surprise, there was one battalion that was loyal to them, and they went up and beat the hell out of the Binh Xuyen. During that whole thing, why, a Cao Dai general--that was one of the religious sects
  • A L I T I E S , SUCH AS I N T E R I O R M I N I S T E R B R I G . GEN. LAM VAN P HA T, J U S T I C E M I N I S T E R NGUYEN VAN MAU, CFN 6 1 6 3 2 7 U 0 0 2 9 RMR PAGE 2 R U M JIR 3 7 E UNCLAS M I N I S T E R OF STATE LE VAN HOACH, SAIGON PREFECT B R
  • sense. That was why it was rejected. I remember it very well. He was working in the most nebulous of areas. I don't think anybody, and this includes everybody from [Va Nguyen] Giap on down, had any idea, within 50 per cent, of the true strength
  • of Vietnam. Big Minh and I vJere very close. I asked him one time, "Hhat was your relation with Vice President [Nguyen Ngoc] Tho?'1 "Where?'1 He said, "We were in prison together." He said,,"Right here. was terrible. I said, The French had us in prison
  • sects; Foreign Legion; French evacuation; President Diem; Nguyen Van Thieu; Nguyen Cao Ky; land reform; relocation; highlands; borders with Cambodia and Laos; hot pursuit; Montagnards; Vietnamese officers and military organizations; Civil Guard; Self
  • --but many elements of the press said, "Ky will never give up office. u Well, he's [Nguyen Cao Ky] given up office. "The Vietnamese will never LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral
  • . In talking with Thieu and Ky, you should make clear that we wish to see it through at their side. If we are to be pe~mitted to do so by American public opinion, they must move fast t~ing their forces back to strength; wherever possible to get the forces ,b'i
  • [Nguyen Van] Thieu, and with Vice President [Nguyen Cao] Ky. Now, the situation I found was this: it being Tet, a substantial number of the South Vietnamese units were only at half strength, because, follm'ling the Vietnamese tradition, they had returned
  • amembassy / s a ig o n TO RUEHCR/SECSrrATE WASHDC[429S INFO RUKLKQ/CINCPAC 25 11 -------STATE GRNC BT ' ' C 0 H F I n F H T—i A L JUNE 2 0 ? 196^ JIW 20 a ,I .r‘ . n . A 7 , CINCPAC’ FOR POLaD PROFILE OF c a b in e t KGUYEN CAO KY’ S "UAR" c a b i n e
  • JO0 7425 ' 1. GENERAL WESTTIORELAND MET AT 1130, 5 AUGUST, WITH GENERAL KHAN'H, general KHia-1, GENERAL THIEU, COLONEL THONQ J3, JOINT' ; GENERAL STAFF, GENERAL KY, CG-IMODORE GANG .AND L _ COLONEL KHAN CG-IMANDERS 0? VMAF, VNN AND VNHC RESPECTIVELY
  • specifically, members these years, South a South North. The epithets used the and the Kim, Xuan, tion. the with ~o~ result, Nguyen the Khanh, advisor, Colonel or Khanh 29th, list "neutralism of Jasper gave char:ges 11 and even
  • CONG QUESTIONED BY BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN OF NATIONAL POLICE. BUT LOAN WAITED THREE OR FOUR DAYS BEFORE RELAYING THE INFORMATION , VICE PRESIDENT KY CKEE> HIS MENTOR. KY RELAYED THE INFORMATION TO PRESIDENT THIEU , WHO REPORTEDLY , S ANGERED
  • been. By the time [Nguyen] Khanh was in office, we were already paying a severe price • for having helped them in the removal of Diem. The last thing that we could tolerate or stand in Vietnam was more turnover, more more chaos. So what
  • Biographical information; reporting from Vietnam; press in the advisory war; Diem regime; correspondents’ activities; networks of sources and information; view of Vietnam; Buddhist-Catholic strife; Hoa My; rural-urban dichotomy; factions; Nguyen
  • ._ ...... ·::, .,· ,:~~·~-~ ....~. ~ ♦ ... ,. ,,. .,, .• • 5 g. The task of organizing to meet the emergency needs of relief • ... and rehabilitation got off to a good start. .! • The special task force continues to function, although the direction and drive provided by Vice President Ky • is no longer
  • “pacification”; comparison of Ky and Thieu; differentiating between ambassadors in Vietnam; working with General William Westmoreland; Bill Moyers; problems with being the only full-time high-ranking government official workingon the Vietnam situation; who
  • • TE M D E N C IE Sj KY I S L IK E L Y TO COr.STINUE TO TA KE IL L -A D V IS E D ACTIONS FROM T IM E TO TIM E SUCH AS H IS BREACH OF R E LA TIO N S W ITH FRANCE ' B U T I T I S J U S T P O S S IB L E THAT HE W IL L B E A BLE TO CREATE A NEW OUTLOOK
  • CONVERSATION PARTICIPAIITS; gVII; >“ ■; US: > > General Thieu General Ky General Chieu General Co General Khang General Thang Tran Van Do Truong Tal Ton Bui Diera Secretary McNamara Ambassador Taylor Ambassador-designate Lodge General Wheeler General
  • of economic and social activities in urban areas, emphasizing sub­ version of key military and civil leaders within the Ky government and exile group. It appeared to the Communists that the Viet Cong could use·weather, terrain and superior intelligence