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  • A R C H IV ES PRO C ESSIN G N O TE You w ill find two versions o f the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many o f the documents have been
  • ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE You will find two versions o f the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many o f the documents have been declassified
  • ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE You will find two versions o f the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many o f the documents have been declassified
  • ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE You will find two versions o f the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many o f the documents have been declassified
  • ( A ) C lo s e d by E x e c u t iv e O d e r 1 1 6 5 2 g o v e rn in g a c c e s s to n a t io n a l s e c u r it y in fo r m a t io n . ( B ) C lo s e d b y s t a t u t e o r b y th e a g e n c y w h ic h o rig in a te d th e d o c u m e n t. (C ) C lo s
  • . CINCPAC 270215 Z FEB D. COMUSMACV MAC 1985/1105 4 5 Z lo TH E M ISSIO N YOU HAVE ASSIGNED TH E MEB IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF REF A EMPHASIZES TH E SEC URITY M ISSIO N. I DID NOT INTEND THAT TH E DIREC TIVE IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF R EF B BE INTERPRETED AS PRIM ARILY
  • ELSEWHERE THAT WE SHOULD RESTRICT OU^SSSL^IS FOR THE TIME BEING TO A SIMPLE STATEMENT THAT I T I S PREMATURE FOR US TO COMMENT ON THESE EVENTS UNTIL WE SEE MORE CLEARLY THEIR I M P L I C A T I O N . , . • T1 • • , u n t i l we emerge , I I KNOW t h a t t h
  • 0 8 4 5 Z 0 120838Z 375JJ READD WH Fi'i COi-iUSKACV •5>s ® TO RUHLHQ CINCPAC I la INFO RUEKDA JCS RUEHC S T A T E D EPA RTM EN T BT - ^ E G R E - T 19912 FROM N A C J 3 S U B J ; T A C T I C A L E IP LO Y M E N T OF US j A L L I E D GROUND FORCES
  • ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified
  • _ _ _ .- ■ . ........ ^ 2 ^ ? . 1965 JUL 13 A.^.i lO - 0 - .. - ^ L I M D I S. . DECLASSIFIED • : . STATE letter NOV 7.1978 , ■ Authority — ^ i Py NARS.Date-^-^^.ZlZ/ P a ris fo r b a ll P A R IS EM BTEL^ e S REGARDING SECOND PARAGRAPH R E F T E L , FOLLOWING I S L
  • BATTALIONS OF MARINNES to strengthen th e SECURITY OF THE DA NANG AREA UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THEY CAN BE RELIEVED BY GVN FORCES. THE FIRST BLT COULD THEN LAND AT ONCE AND THE SECOND ON CALL FROM MACV. I STRONGLY URGE A DEFERMENT OF DECISION ON LANDING THE of MEB
  • , ' ' I MENTIONED MATTER OF ARMY BRIGADE WHIcH IS TO (jLOSE IN QUI i NHON-NHA TRANG area ABOUT 12 JULY (REF A). AS HE HAD PREVIOUSLY GIVEN PERMISSmN TO INTRODUCTION OF THIS BRIGADE, IT UAS ONLY , >; NECESSARY TO TELL HIM GENERAL TIMING A^JD MEOTION
  • not a w ar a g a in st change. It i s d esign ed to p e r m it rad ical s o c ia l change by the p eop le of South V ietnam a s they w ish. 1) We a r e not figh tin g to gain co lo n ia l te r r ito r y fo r the US o r to g iv e us m ilita r y b a s e s
  • the .capability of providing in this time period. I recommend that we send him these men as soon as we can. Of course, it will be necessary to call up the reserves to do this. The President: Can we relate this 30, 000 to a specific request from General
  • , as ha Ind net had time to discuss ccnt-ents with colleagues. COPY LBJ LIBRARY COPY LBJ LIBRARY ACT\CM / ;PARTM FNT - IT ' OF STATE ' 5T, p ( f ) k -5 - 7 RM/ R REF AF AR A EUR FE N EA CU I NR e P io L. FBO AI D (U iJ C i A- 66
  • FOR TME R E P U B L IC CF V IE T N al-I AR^:ED FORCES Q 3 E R ' AUTHOR I T Y g r a n t e d GEN UEiT^lORELAND P R EV IO U SLY BY P R ESID E^ rf .J0H^JS0^3. D3QU0TE» TA Y LO R . 5T N O TE: ADVANCE D E L IV E R Y TO S / S - 0 6 / 3 0 / 6 5 A T 7 :3 4 AM PA
  • r o v i n c e s . [ 3 ] To c r e a t e a l 6 + ° s e a - T h a l l a n d I n f i l t r a t i o n wal TTT ‘I . important m iscellan y : Program s h o u l d a p p e a r t o be r e l e n t l e s s ( I . e . , p o s s i b i l ­ i t y o f e m p lo y
  • E D IA T E 4074 1 S E C TIO N ONE O F T H R E E DEC LA SSIFIED - lO ^ - ^ & e R S f- 'J U N E N 0 D I 5 A u th o rity Bv S ' ! - s - -?s ' i t f e r ■NARSi Datfi T H E F O L O U I N G I S AN E S T I M A T E O F T H E P O L I T I C A L - M
  • ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE You will find two versions o f the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many o f the documents have been declassified
  • t in g a c tio n s reconmended a re : a. D ? p lo y : O A T ( 1 ) N ine a d d itio n a l T a c tic a l P lg iit c r Squadrons T I y/ 'rr 1 v»0>4T H ' from CCOTS to WESIPAC. P-'SB P A . I n :> , r L' 1965 so, or 1 L t . C o l. E . J . D
  • n g Vietnam you s a i d , "We a r e w i l l i n g t o go anyw her e, any t i m e , t a l k t o anyone and t r y t o r e a s o n t o g e t h e r f o r p e a c e . V/e would r a t h e r t a l k t h a n f i g h t . " On O c to b e r 2 8 , 1964, i n Los
  • questions concerrdng i d e n t i t y , ndssions, dep'i-oyrient times, and lo c a tio n of a d d it i o n a l tvxo brigades i-'hich i n e f f e c t i s r e t e n ti o n o f the 173rd Airborne Brigade, you should explain t h i s re t e n t i o n s t i l l
  • conventional attacks for the first time. Clark Clifford: In his cable, General Westmoreland also points out that it is national policy to keep the enemy from seizing and holding the two northerr. provinces. Hasn't that been the situation all along? General
  • on these questions in conjunction with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Walt Rostow: That is correct. Clark Clifford: Paul Nitze and I started to work on this Friday night. As you could understand, with the time pressure we placed upon ourselves there still may need
  • want you to consider and get answers to me. Those questions are: 1. Why is it necessary to call up reserve units at this time? a. To be ready for further reinforcement of Vietnam? b. To be ready for other contingencies outside Vietnam? c
  • Vietnam . W e have asked many times what the North Vietnamese would do if we stopped the bombing. We have hea rd nothing to date in reply. c. There appear to be elements of caution on the other s ide -- in Hanoi as we 11 as in Moscow. Our purpose
  • as of the time I lefto The RF and PF situation c1 ·- -/is not entirely clear. l -- The regular troops did take more casualties than the RF and PF forceso - 4 ­ -- We believe about 40, 000 enemy were killedo cormt the number wounded and missing. We cannot
  • ; and to ask for authority to extend enlistments. That Monday session ciid moderate my judgment some. I' do think we should evaluate our strategy. It is a good idea fro.m time to time to have a good, sound review. I f.:EfWIGE·SQ.P.ly hope we don't get over-run