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  • the.n wholehearted •. . ' · The stJ.'ikine; time lag between the President's armou~ceraent and your official action strone;J.y suggests that the offer began e.s an off-hand . politiqal gesttu·e and now is being followed through in !m).Ch the scJile
  • AUGUST 9, 196 7 - 9 :02 a.m. Democratic Congressmen J, ··\ l. W?
  • Folder, "August 9, 1967 - 9:02 a.m. Democratic Congressmen," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 1
  • WITHDRAWAL SHEET -(PRESIDENTIAL .L IB·R_ARIES) -- JANUARY 23, 1968 - 8:30 a.m. DEMOCRATIC CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP Speaker John McCormack Congressman Hale Boggs Senator Robert Byrd Joseph Califano Barefoot Sanders Postmaster General 0 ·1Brien
  • Folder, "January 23, 1968 - 8:30 a.m. Democratic Congressional Leadership," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 2
  • CRIMINAL ACT AS MY SHI? INTRUDED DEE? INTO THE TERRITORI.t;L WATERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE•s REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND \~AS CAPTURED BY THE NAVAL PATROL CRAFTS OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY 1N THEIR SELF-DEFENE ACTION WHILE CONDUCTING THE CRIMINAL ESPIONAGE
  • they are seven miles away -­ that 1 s rude -- hit them when they are two miles away. If there is one shred of interest in peace on the other side, we are ready to talk. Hanoi is rigid in its stance. LATIN AMERICA Loss of Ambassador Main was tragic. He was shot
  • OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH THE DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP January 30, 1968 In the Mansion The President: I want to tell all that we know about the Pueblo incident. We are spending days and nights on the situation. I want you to treat this as a very confidential
  • estimate the enemy has lost 3, 000 men killed in action in the last two days. This compares with about 300 allied losses, including 100 U.S. We know they are prepared for a major offensive at Khesanh. The President: We still face a big challenge at Khesanh
  • of action we should follow about additional requests for aid to India. Mr. Rostow said he was forwarding to the President a set of alternatives for his consideration. The President said it would appeal to him if some other nation would recognize
  • Congo (Democratic Republic)
  • during lunch on the status of the Paris talks today. The President: Fine, let's go on. Walt Rostow: Ambassador Bunker has a good report on Vietnam. shows action in land reform and other areas. The President: Huong has a good image with our press. before
  • WERE: Secretary Rusk Secretary McNamara Clark Clifford General Wheeler CIA Director Helms Walt Rostow George Christian Tom Johnson The President: I met this morning with Senator Gore of Tenness~e. He gave me a goal report on Latin America. Do we have
  • ., .' December 5, 1967 In the Mansion The President congratulated Mr. Vance for an excellent job and an excellent report. Secretary Rusk said a case study should be made of this. Vance's actions an example of diplomatic excellence. He called Cyrus
  • like this. We have the following courses of action: First, go back to RP 6 for 48 hours including Hanoi and Haiphong. Second, Third, Executing attacks selectively in Haiphong Executing attacks selectively in Hanoi. -:: TOP SECRET 0
  • . strike. The country is being plunged headlong into a disastrous We are beginning to feel the pinch already. 4. It is now up to the Congress to act - - and it is imperative and crucial that it take action. 5. The best, most responsible and fairest action
  • Helms: No antisemitism in Czechoslovakia. Nixon: The Czech government goes to great pains to show Jewish cemetery. It is no problem. It is a problem in Poland. Secretary Rusk: Don't give the Russians a pretext for action. tough on the USSR
  • MEMORANDUM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON October 25, 196 7 1:15 p. m. TOP SECRE':F ATTACHMENT FOR THE PRESIDENT \Om FROM: Tom Johnson Attached are the notes of your meeting with the Democratic Leadership on October 23, 1967 in the Cabinet Room
  • Folder, "October 23, 1967 - 5:36 p.m. Democratic Leadership," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 1
  • . This was that while discussion proceeded the U.S. government would assume that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation. This was directly related to prompt and productive discussions without taking military advantage
  • action or in an effort to shoot down our B-52 1 s. They may also attempt to attack an air base, like the one at Danang. I sent a mes sage to all field commanders alerting them to these possibilities. Secretary Rusk: a carrier? What about the possibility
  • previous war in which America has been involved. " The President said there is a need to in battle casualties. remove the emphasis on statistics Ambassador Bunker pointed out we report not only men killed in action and hospital cases, but casualties
  • that this is a holding action at Will they seriously negotiate before the convention ? MEETIU8 t~eT!S COP~
  • Democratic National Convention.
  • action before January 20. W. \ tf. Rostow EYES ONLY Vl WRostow:rln '. !" ,_ NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT•s MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT-ELECT RICHARD NIXON November 11, 1968 PRESENT AT THE MEETING WERE: The President President-elect Richard M
  • , to the American people, and to our allies, that such an action was, indeed, a step toward peace. A cessation of bombing which would be followed by abuses of the DMZ, Viet Cong, and North Vietnamese attacks on cities or such populated areas as provincial capitals
  • , why were they no longer shelled at the Marine site at Conthien. Secretary McNamara said he did not know if this was a result of our action or their decision. The Pre sic.ent asked if we shou1d move our people bad:;:, as ha.s been sugge s·i:e d
  • folde1. W. TAeMat Jgbn;on - 2There is a necessary preoccupation of our national leadership with this problem. At the same time there is much anxiety and dismay in America over the 'Wlr. Our conviction is that we should contract our operations
  • operation. Mr. Rostow: The Vietnamese seem more willing to contemplate offensive actions of their own. The enemy hasn't. Secretary Clifford: The enemy may feel he is doing so well politically that he need not do anything militarily. They see: Debate
  • of other steps the other side should take for this suspension of bombing? The President: Just almost any step. have not taken any yet. As far as we can see, they And we would be glad to explore any reciprocal action that they or any of their spokesmen
  • : Because we did not permit any retaliatory action on the attack on Blue House. The depth of feeling over that is. very deep. It was con­ sidered a personal affront and a loss of face. They considered it very serious that the raiders got within 300 yards
  • all along to limit this war. "The action which General Westmoreland is proposing would be a significant act of war against Cambodia. This would change the entire character of the war. If Cambodia is attacked, they may ask the Chinese to side with them
  • two voted against it. They were the Soviet Union and Hungary. There would be 80 - 90 votes on this issue in the General Assembly. This action has created violent world reaction. The National Assembly can speak. Minister can also
  • waters the action which the North Koreans took is not a very appropriate one. Secretary Katzenbach: The evidence is quite good and quite strong that the detention was made in territorial waters. We have a fix on the Pueblo at 8:30 when he was 25 miles out
  • Clifford and Symington ought to confer. they should go to him to see what ways we can cut. Walt Rostow: Our financial people are talking with the head oi the International Monetary Fund to see if we should take any actions tETIP~C t•S:t:tS CGP!RIGtiTED M
  • . The President: What is the nature of the enemy forces in Saigon? General Wheeler: The forces in the Saigon area are decreasing. is still the build-up and the threat across the Cambodian border. There At Khesanh we got that C-130 out. a very gallant action
  • , that it is the right long-term course to take. We are not sure under the circumstances which exist that a conventional military victory, as conunonly defined, can be had. After this study is made---if there is no clear resolution in the actions of the next 3-4 months
  • to the 19th.. They may have to ask for total cessation or no more conversations. There is a question of face involved. 4. Curious oriental approach -- this action could give them reason to break off negotiations. It is small chance, but I do not like
  • to reasonable peace negotiations. !r! · On the military front·, Westmoreland feels that he has the initiative. j In the pacification program, the re is a forward movement and action is being taken to eliminate corruption. I Walt Rostow said that Ambassador
  • missing, or wounded, or killed in action. General Wheeler: I have here a paper which was written on 31 January by the Military Affairs Committee and the Current Affairs Committee of the Liberation Army. We believe this document to be authentic. In ihth'e
  • of the steam out of him by showing him an "Eyes Only" cable to General Westmoreland expressing my full support for him and his actions. General Wheeler: I talked with General Westmoreland this morning and he said he was deeply appreciative of the message
  • . Somebody should talk with Walt Rostow: {To General Wheeler). Nobody is advising the President, to my knowledge who has been trigger-happy. General Wheeler: Personally, I find none of the military courses of action particularly attractive. Walt Rostow: We
  • : Next Steps. (Sect. Rusk) 5. Time Scenario for Troop Decisions. (The President) Specific matters you wish presented to you for decision and action. 6. Other. / lJ}.~ TOP SECRE7 attachment (Tab A) Rostow TAB A {para. 7 from Ambassador
  • to "grab" for immediate success. I think the enemy overestimates the degree of support in the Vietnamese populace and underestimates our strength. General Wheeler: He is taking both actions concurrently. He is attacking the cities and also launching
  • will adjourn without action and throw the matter back into the Security Council. There are two questions raised by the resolutions -­ whether there should be withdrawal back to the situation of June 4 or simply a statement eliminating the state of belligerence