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  • PROJECT PLOWSHARE NUCLEAR TEST; CHIANG KAI-SHEK; FRENCH RECOGNITION OF COMMUNIST CHINA; JOSEPH ALSOP COLUMN; STATE DEPT POLICY PLANNING; UPCOMING FOREIGN POLICY SPEECHES; MESSAGES TO KHRUSHCHEV; GEORGE BALL TRIP TO CYPRUS; UK; CUBA; CONGO; GHANA
  • because it's a point--well, it's a little off and I'll let it go right now. Go ahead. G: You talked about the threat of the Communists from the mainland invading Taiwan and being unable to take the island. Was there also a threat that Chiang Kai-shek
  • of Chiang Kai-shek; Judd giving medical treatment to Major General Shozo Motogawa; how Judd left China; the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor; Judd's prediction of war with Japan and the role of the United States in relations with Japan; how Judd came
  • ---s.ta.t.e Conversation Between Cbians Kai Shek ---------3 05/17/f, p--Sacret. GS/'l.0/-{,l A 05/19/61 A 1 p 05/22/61 A 1 p 05/22/61 A 05/22/61 A L-F.mbtel NIACT184 from ian~ -#2-6-eabl tat Embtel-!l-75 2 p State Secret Embtel NIACT
  • to establish some kind of a position on the mainland. And in the election of 1952, this was an election issue. As I remember it, Mr. Dulles' phrase was "unleash Chiang Kai-shek." As it turned out, the moment Mr. Dulles became Secretary of State, he
  • Top Secret Kennedy from Diem State To VP Johnson cd c~,e,-t" -f-'- 7 p r "1'" Conf. from Chiang Kai-shek RESTRICTION ~54 06/09/61 A 4 p 06/09/61 A 4 p 06/09/61 A ID-~~ 7'J £tateffleRt irs #11 Letter DATE CORRESPONDENTSOR TITLE
  • of the visit to the Philippines. G: He went from there to Taiwan and met with Chiang Kai-Shek. Do you have any recollections of that visit? T: Briefly. So much of this kind of trip ;s pro forma, it's protocol, protocolese. I had been there when Nixon had
  • on the SEATO meeting in Manila, his discussion with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and his visit to South Vietnam. Z483. U. S. POLICY TOW ARD LAOS Noted Assistant Secretary of Defense Bundy's report of the recent military revolt in Laos. 2484. CUTBACKS
  • anything in Vietnam. that a lot. I know he used to talk about But all I had to do was mention it to Chiang Ching-kuo and to the old Gimo [Chiang Kai-shek], and, boy, the sky was the limit. They would have deployed their whole army down there, although
  • Nehru, one through Chiang Kai-Shek, and one through officials at lower level who were participating in armistice discussions. The gist of the messages was that if a satisfactory armistice were not signed promptly, we would remove the limits we were
  • freedpm. Freedom, they agi~edp is not for ourselves alone but must be preserved and extended to all who desire ito ·The Vice President. Chiang that: on behalf of President Kenne~ assured President The U.S. means to .~tand with her allies in the Asian
  • for projects. Taiwan (Chiang Kai Shek) We expressed Presid ent .Johnson 1s friendship and explained U. S. peace proposals. Chines e proposals: U. S. should not be using own troops as principal forces in Southeast Asia, but rather Asian troops and American
  • [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh Phillips -- II -- 3 P: That's a whole story in and of itself. It was AID-supported, but if you'll remember, the Gimo [Chiang Kai-shek] had literally
  • there. They've got every right to defend themselves and attack the enemy in their home bases" and so on. So Zorthian unleashed the Vietnamese navy one day. G: It was sort of reminiscent of Chiang Kai-shek being unleashed. (Laughter) Did you get a lot
  • --was that we had an opportunity to learn from our experience dealing with Chiang Kai-shek in the war and post-war years; that the one thing we should have learned is to call the bluff of our clients. Chiang had led us around by the nose; had lost his own
  • for that function. When I mentioned earlier the émigrés--as you may know, on the Taiwan scene, which was recent history, there was the whole third-force phenomenon. Somebody has to talk to the third force, which was neither Chiang Kai-shek nor Mao Tse-tung
  • coming across the straits to take the islands of Quemoy and Matsu. Humphrey was very skeptical about the commitment of American forces in that area and raised questions about the corruption of the Chiang Kai-shek regime in Taiwan. He also was a very
  • their American masters. In October the General Assembiy ot the United Nations voted to ~eat·the'Chinese·Pepple!s·Republic. Before the 1ssne reached the Security Council. Peking angrily rejected the proposition unless the Chiang Kai-shek faction was expelled
  • '.talG with Chiang Kai•,s bek. 34 McNamara then -described ln detail the cutback in e.pe-c ial nuclear :referring to the cha:rt.s which he ha$ used right along, pointing out that even with the cutbacks vie still had a very au.bstantial ~qu.antlty
  • - no comment - President Chiang said he would help as much a s possible, but lacks capacity to do much, c. Thailand - vi'ill be prepared to help, but inquired about U3 assistance to Thai forces. ^ ^ - F rir.e Minister said he would reply as soon as possible
  • ILITIE S THEY KAY HAVE TO INCREASE THEM. I AGREE WITH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ESTIMATE THAT IT I S NOT LIKELY DRV WOULD REACT BY OVERT ' INVASION, BUT THAT THERE IS P O S S I B I L I T Y t h a t THEY WOULD REACT BY EXERCISING WHAT MACV ESTIMATES
  • the future. He 1poke briefly of the Laotian eltuatlon. He dtd not touch on I ·1 hta talks with Chiang Kai•ahek. 1 i 1 \ 3- McNamara then deacirtbed in detail the cutback f.n epocial nucleal' materiale, referring to the chart• which he hae wsed right
  • -Mu was a ttel" of dispute ii\ Kay 1961. b Staley Mia■ion u.bH­ Quently utabllsbed criteria which have pro-Yenworkable tor that portion of cc.mmodit, &id cbann.iled thro\lgh the pri.,ate sector. and equipant procured directl7 tor the In addition, e
  • ...,,..., - . .. . . ~· , ·s::TRAYAL • CO~lPARABLE TO THE U.S. ABANDONMENT OF. • CHI.AN:; "' -. A~ ; ' --·-­ KAI-SHEK A RESULT OF THE YALTA, TEHERAN AND CASABLANCA CONFERENCES. ~ H!: CC~lP'...A!NED THAT THE AMERIC NS HAD SE~T THE AUSTRALIAf\ ANO KoR;AN. - I
  • tragedy for this country that he had the nervous flaw that destroyed him. At any rate, going back to what we were talking about, President Johnson was well aware of this episode. More or less in memory of it, he asked Kay Graham and my wife and me
  • ; the Kennedy staff that stayed to work for LBJ; LBJ’s relationship with the press compared to that of previous presidents; (dis)advantages of getting close to the president; LBJ’s relationship with Phil and Kay Graham; Great Society speech; type of access press
  • to r in h is u s e f u ln e s s tojas. T h en w e d r o v e b y Syphax S c h o o l, to w h ic h Kay h ad m a d e a h a n d so m e d o n a tio n for la n d sc a p in g and p la y g ro u n d eq u ip m e n t, and found it in f a ir , n o t fin e c o n d
  • t~is. abou~ WHEEL.ER: · The kay points are these: The first contact that was· made by a KOr~h Korean vessel . ' w.:.t.h th.s PtJESLO was at 12 noon Kc:ean tL-na. This contact apparently aid not concern the ca?tain . of the PUEBLO. These vessels
  • TO DEPLOY ADDITIONAL NON-VIETNAMESE-COMBAT FORCES INTO VIETNAM U N TIL BOTH UE AND VIETNAMESE HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE, D IG E S T, AND EVALUATE R E S U LTS UHICH KAi?-v:> AE a b l e t o a c h ie v e . I F M.ARINES ARE ABLE TO ''.i/i^'IEVE SUBSTANTIAL
  • IN COMPANY WITH THE T - 3 7 7 KAY ALSO HAVE BEEN ACTIVE BUT UNOBSERVED. E , TRACKINGS XEROX FROM QOTCK cc^;^" Objection To Declassification 2003/05/21 ; NLJ-139-044-8-10-4 COPY LBJ LIBRARY * No Objection To Declassification 2003/05/21 : NLJ-139-044-8-10