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Oral history transcript, William S. Gaud, interview 1 (I), 11/26/1968, by Paige E. Mulhollan (Item)
  • does he give it his stamp? G: That depends on how interested he is in doing that. I think he can make a very real impression on the agency if he wants. decide, He can for example, the priorities between Latin America, Asia, LBJ Presidential
Oral history transcript, Paul Henry Nitze, interview 3 (III), 12/26/1968, by Dorothy Pierce (McSweeny) (Item)
  • Republic. In your judgment was our action and the size of our commitment justified with the information that was available at that time? LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories
Oral history transcript, Maxwell D. Taylor, interview 1a (I), 1/9/1969, by Dorothy Pierce (McSweeny) (Item)
  • started recommendations to resume consideration of this course of action, which had been considered and rejected in the past. It was only after three terrorist attacks on American installations--one, the Bien Hoa Air Base just before the election; one
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 8, Draft Memo for the President," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 49 (Item)
  • ' I--­ ., CONTENTS I The Prospects I I Alternative in South Vietnam Over the Next Ten Months J ·I Courses of Mil ita·ry Action The Current Strategy Population •I I I Security Negot ia ti ans '-....... c;9..Mct~.A) Re1at i ans
Oral history transcript, Maurice M. Bernbaum, interview 1 (I), 5/10/1972, by Joe B. Frantz (Item)
  • a general concept in Latin America that the U.S. should not intervene. F: How much notice did you have of our action? B: None. F: You mean that you found out from what you learned in the papers It had already happened when I found out. to a certain
  • Foreign service career assignments: 1936 in the Pacific and later in Latin America; effect of Alliance for Progress in Ecuador; effect of Kennedy assassination on the Alliance; assignment as Ambassador to Venezuela; fishing agreement (12 mile limit
Folder, "[NSC Meeting on] Peace offensive re Vietnam, 1/5/1966, Volume 3, Tab 37," National Security Council Meetings Files, NSF, Box 2 (Item)
  • do everything he could to work for a settlement. c. Italian leaders favored the bombing lull. been helpful to the Moro government. They believed our action had T OI SEGRE I /$ENSITIVE -2­ TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE d. De Gaulle was polite
Folder, "McNamara, Robert," Office Files of Fred Panzer, Box 379 (Item)
  • rapidly inhibit a balanced, against aggression the opportunities wars. us free to compete and social These wars are world communism subversion where have often extortion, operates the ambush, at all-. out a land these reform action
Oral history transcript, Paul C. Warnke, interview 2 (II), 1/15/1969, by Dorothy Pierce (McSweeny) (Item)
  • in the defensive capabilities of the country. Now the parts of our program that receive major criticism at the present time involve military aid to such countries as Ethiopia and to countries in Latin America. I think I've explained earlier that our military
Folder, "Cables, [Cables, memos, reports, and other material, 11/63-5/67] Vol. XVI, 8/16 - 31/64, 1 of 2," Country Files, Vietnam, NSF, Box 7 (Item)
  • IDCNT I A-b ? / 5 5 26148 Control: Rec'd: Action PROM: SAIGON ACTION: SECSTATE DATEJ august AUGUST 3 U 9;1 8 am Info 685 , 31 , 8 196^ i P R iO R rT Y PM r EXDJS DE FOR THE secretary DEPTEL 5 5 7 ; EMBTEL 6 8 4 . KHANH'S VFEW
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol 7, Meeting Notes," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 49 (Item)
  • to their international agreements," development in cooperation. ·6. honor Actions. In order to meet the pres sure s against us, and demonstrate the unity and will of the American people at this critical time, I am asking the .Congress to do the following: -- help
Oral history transcript, Maxwell D. Taylor, interview 3 (III), 9/14/1981, by Ted Gittinger (Item)
  • , the Brinks incident occurred--a clear case of terrorist action against an American officers' billet. was very fortunate that the damage was light. It But I recommended retaliation again despite the nearness of Christmas. I was much less sympathetic
Oral history transcript, Chester L. Cooper, interview 1 (I), 7/9/1969, by Paige E. Mulhollan (Item)
  • a policy but to explore various alternative courses of action that could be undertaken. I think the general conclusion was that at least for the time being we ought to do more of the same, which was basically putting Americans in an advisory role
Folder, "November 11, 1968 - 3 p.m. President and President-elect Nixon," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 4 (Item)
  • action before January 20. W. \ tf. Rostow EYES ONLY Vl WRostow:rln '. !" ,_ NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT•s MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT-ELECT RICHARD NIXON November 11, 1968 PRESENT AT THE MEETING WERE: The President President-elect Richard M
Folder, "[NSC Meeting on] Monetary Issues, Vietnam, UN, 11/25/1968, Volume 5, Tab 76," National Security Council Meetings Files, NSF, Box 2 (Item)
  • - French relations. Schiller had said with indignation that he had been summoned to Paris the week before the Bonn meeting. He had instead sent his Deputy, Schoellhorn. The French had then threatened drastic action if the Germans did not revalue
Oral history transcript, Henry D. Owen, interview 1 (I), 12/18/1968, by Paige E. Mulhollan (Item)
  • approach of some kind, how do you get it into the action channel? 0: Send it as a memo to the secretary . M: Is there anyway you can then lobby it forward? 0 : Oh sure . I can go and talk to him about it, or I can ask for a meeting in which other
Folder, "October 14, 1968 - 1:40 p.m. Foreign Policy Advisory Group meeting," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 4 (Item)
  • , to the American people, and to our allies, that such an action was, indeed, a step toward peace. A cessation of bombing which would be followed by abuses of the DMZ, Viet Cong, and North Vietnamese attacks on cities or such populated areas as provincial capitals
Oral history transcript, William J. Jorden, interview 3 (III), 8/13/1985, by Ted Gittinger (Item)
  • work I respect, and I think that very often in their reporting one got an insight into a situation or a mood or an action that one didn't get in the action reports that were coming through official channels, often through eight filters and so on and so
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs a-z," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 47 (Item)
  • · in action? In particular, will he have enough airlift to support and_ supply all of the action~? airstrip b. With respect to Khe Sanh, what will be the supply is kept under artill~ry and rocket fire~ 2. How have the Marines organized of ·supply
Oral history transcript, Henry H. Fowler, interview 3 (III), 7/31/1969, by David G. McComb (Item)
  • had to take the positions and information that came to me from those sources as the benchmark for my own actions. LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781
Oral history transcript, W. DeVier Pierson, interview 1 (I), 3/19/1969, by Dorothy Pierce (McSweeny) (Item)
  • been horrified if he knew how little I knew when I started. Mc: Did you continue in this area? P: Yes--and all the way through, although we did a good deal more in 1967 in thinking through farm programs, programs for rural America up
Folder, "Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965, Volume 6, Tabs 357-383," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 43 (Item)
  • a W'w m k (■ COPY LBJ LIBRARY / m r n m k Department of State CONTROLS- - 2S820 R E C E IV E D :. JUNE 305 FROM; SAIGON ACTION; S E C STA TE P R IO R IT Y 4454 UJ /3 0002 Action Info -S. N 0 D I .j •I T JU KE 30 S Tty
Oral history transcript, C. Robert Perrin, interview 2 (II), 3/17/1969, by Stephen Goodell (Item)
  • was the National Advisory Council? P: The National Advisory Council also was created by the act to bring together, at a high level, citizens simply to serve as an advisory group for the director of OEO. It subsequently, through Congressional action
Folder, "October 3, 1967 - 6:10 p.m. Rusk, McNamara, Rostow, Helms, Christian Robin Olds and Col. Cross," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 1 (Item)
  • , why were they no longer shelled at the Marine site at Conthien. Secretary McNamara said he did not know if this was a result of our action or their decision. The Pre sic.ent asked if we shou1d move our people bad:;:, as ha.s been sugge s·i:e d
Oral history transcript, Lyndon B. Johnson, interview S-IX, 8/12/1969, by William J. Jorden (Item)
  • , even t~io~tgh Nixon had alr1~r1.
Folder, "South Vietnam and U.S. Policies [X-File] [1 of 2], Files of Walt Rostow, NSF, Box 19 (Item)
Folder, "October 14, 1968 - President's Meeting with Joint Chiefs on Vietnam," Meeting Notes Files, Box 3 (Item)
  • could not maintain a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam unless it were very promptly evident to him, to the American people, and to our allies, that such an action was, indeed, a step toward peace. A cessation of bombing which would be followed
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 3, Tabs RR-ZZ and a-d [1 of 2]," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 47 (Item)
  • Dissem :TOD S~ CIi IisE~:::~-- ~~:~:~:_.~] COPY LBJ LIBP,ARY . _ ·_No_Fore~gn Dissern .. .,,. ·Possible Communist . Stra·tegy We believe that the developments described together with the current pattern of major Communist military action
Oral history transcript, Thomas H. (Admiral) Moorer, interview 2 (II), 9/16/1981, by Ted Gittinger (Item)
  • is probably too strong a word, but a program of actions designed to warn the North Vietnamese that something forceful might be in store for them if they didn't lay off supporting operations in the South? LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org
Oral history transcript, Rufus Phillips, interview 1 (I), 3/4/1982, by Ted Gittinger (Item)
  • mosquito netting and soap and blankets and stuff like that, that people needed, because this--I'm trying to recall when this was--this was about October, I guess, in 1954. He also introduced me to a guy named Hanh [?], who ran the Ministry of Social Action
Oral history transcript, Lewis W. Walt, interview 1 (I), 1/24/1969, by Paige E. Mulhollan (Item)
  • a look at that. So you're getting a tele- vision picture, probably, of bits and pieces of about twenty per cent of the war--maybe fifteen per cent of the war. action out of that. And they only pick the dramatic So that's what you're getting on your
Oral history transcript, Edwin O. Reischauer, interview 1 (I), 4/8/1969, by Paige E. Mulhollan (Item)
  • not established contacts with the outside world or been interested in that aspect of America's national interest as much as maybe Mr. Kennedy had. In any case, certainly in a country like Japan and most others he did not have a great image the way Mr. Kennedy
  • reaction to crucial U.S. decisions; exchanging his role as Asian scholar for that of ambassador; importance of early action to avoid later crisis; SEATO; attempts to minimize the bad Japanese-American relations; the Vietnam War and why U.S. methods didn’t
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 3, Tabs A-Z and AA-QQ," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 47 (Item)
  • : • MU~I BOOK MSG ADV CYS. TO NMCC ( 4) SIN:I PRECEDENCE ACTION HiMEDIATE INFO IMMEDIATE . FROM , TO . • •..~ · ..• . INFO: •. ·suaJ: SPECIAL. INSTRUCTIONS OCJCS .·\~ . CINCPAC COMUSMACV . AME MB.SAIGON• •• ••} _J • . ·i V ; • I
Oral history transcript, Leslie H. Gelb, interview 1 (I), 4/30/1984, by Ted Gittinger (Item)
  • ? LG: Oh, there's a trade-off, but I think that a president is able to explain these things and justify them satisfactorily when the cause is justified. For example, take Central America. I think there would be no difficulty whatsoever getting
Oral history transcript, Arthur M. Okun, interview 1 (I), 3/20/1969, by David G. McComb (Item)
  • on . on fiscal policy . But I think some of the basic ideas of the task The task force emphasized the need for prompt action We've had lots of examples of that in recent years, have urged strongly the proposal for giving the President some discretionary
Oral history transcript, Lyman Lemnitzer, interview 1 (I), 3/3/1982, by Ted Gittinger (Item)
  • Department--the third member was the Finance Minister--and they urgently sought from Dean Acheson and General Marshall support for the French forces fighting in Vietnam in the action leading up to Dien Bien Phu. They urged that we have our light bombers
Folder, "September 26, 1967 - 5:46 p.m. Educators from Cambridge, Mass. small colleges and Universities," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 1 (Item)
  • folde1. W. TAeMat Jgbn;on - 2There is a necessary preoccupation of our national leadership with this problem. At the same time there is much anxiety and dismay in America over the 'Wlr. Our conviction is that we should contract our operations
Folder, "March 19, 1968 - 1:01 p.m. Tuesday lunch with Foreign Advisors," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 2 (Item)
  • operation. Mr. Rostow: The Vietnamese seem more willing to contemplate offensive actions of their own. The enemy hasn't. Secretary Clifford: The enemy may feel he is doing so well politically that he need not do anything militarily. They see: Debate
Oral history transcript, William C. Westmoreland, interview 2 (II), 7/25/1985, by Charles B. MacDonald (Item)
  • deteriorated at lower levels during the latter years of the war and became a weak point. Operations put such a load on small-unit action that leadership at that level became strained. tour exacerbated it. The one-year I consider that the marines were used
Oral history transcript, Ray S. Cline, interview 2 (II), 5/31/1983, by Ted Gittinger (Item)
  • that leading eventually to Che Guevara's death was a side of our operational program in Central America and the Caribbean. But Mongoose, as I understood it, was aimed at Cuba proper and it was to prevent the economy from being successful. I know
Folder, "South Vietnam and U.S. Policies [X-File] [2 of 2]," Files of Walt Rostow, NSF, Box 19 (Item)
  • n c:amp. The oth•r veraion ' lege• that e•ide,nt J ohn,•on in1tr cted 't'b F I 't o i ve ,• tigat action by m.e,mber• of the bto camp to •low do n he ace n got atlon• L before t e 196 ml c.tton. •l"i• After tb. election J,. , Cl ar Hoo,v1u