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  • . _ ., ::f:.-.:-'·:·· ...·•····.~ ...~~:-:-_........,_,.....,... .~- -; ..... ... . . ........... ___ ..,.,_,_~~· . .... .... .. ..... , '• .. ~:~-J ·:-:;:a_~~:\·_«._. --"'!!!"";;._,_ ..... pa--~ 14 26. The Foreign Press in Viet-Nam
  • testimony before the committee. In light of this, Secretary McNamara said to go ahead and issue his statement.) Secretary McNamara said McCarthy went out and told the press that one of the . U.S. vessels penetrated North Vietnamese waters. "He just did
  • of the POL and transportation most of the rema i nder ) . Sixty per cent of the -bottoms are Free World under charte r mainly to Chi na, but almost all POL is carried by Coninunlst tankers. Practically all of the seabo rne traffic moves through four ports. Mi
  • was in the first car and I was about three or four cars-because whenever there was an official ceremony like this the press people had to be up forward. Liz Carpenter was up forward, etc., and I always stayed out of the way. Oh, about eight miles out we began
  • : This is common in politics. But now there I was---I don't know why, and maybe it has been to my advantage, but the press has always written more about me than I deserved or warranted, and a lot of times I didn't understand why. That dinner attracted too much
  • in their mind they already knew what you were going to answer, and I think still did in later years . If you gave them a different answer you really got pressed on why . [than what they expected], then They both were tremendous egotists . They both were very
  • Head Start; domestic program; War on Poverty; contrast between John Connally and LBJ types; LBJ's frustrating life as VP; sale of Weslaco radio and TV station; death of Sam Rayburn; LBJ's problems with the press; LBJ's temper; Walter Jenkins; Bobby
  • with Russell Long. I know that after I got on the Committee I found it at once easier to gain a sounding board in many segments of the press, particularly the very creditable newspaper and television outlets that treated with foreign policy on a high level
  • -- 45th report, President of delay) ----- ---------------------used at Press 3 Apr 68 -- Bunker msg to President, Vietnamese the burdens of the war effort-------------------------------4 Apr 68 - - Bunker's 46th report ---------- con£ #121 --- J
  • there is no time for 7 on-the-job training, the press, the Congress 4. he should In so doing, not merely support efforts reach should come from and administer he would ensure co-ordin~ted a master - - were for the war by rallying the· farmers
  • it, and it looked as though we were home free. And in the ninth week, or tenth week, of this particular--what was for me an ordeal, because I was very much afraid it was going to pop out in the press and be a really embarrassing thing for the Secretary
  • on and so on. It just developed in a very natural way to the point where we forecast that there would be a Chinese nuclear explosion within a reasonable period of time. This was covered very fairly, accurately, honestly by the press, and by the time
  • to contradict that impression . At the time that you went to Saigon with Mr. Rostow, there were rumors that there was trouble in the country team. carrying stories. The press was There were beginning to be hints that all was not well between Ambassador
  • States. The Soviets began pressing both the United States and Hanoi toward discussions, fearing United over the deteriorating political States f'rustration position in South Vietnam might es·calate the conf'lict. China was concerned about how it might
  • of needs, com.~itted who had the defense strate·gy" Vietnamese were total hold plan ,_7'_'.~!..!})_::_·_0 . . South deployments to "enclave already Koreans active the of ;,.s.e.v.erz....i_critical free an· ~ustralian force
  • and a strong-willed man, was too hard a sell from a political viewpoint, too much pressing. I was too naive, green, I guess insecure, and 1et IS say I was overwhelmed, but I was not overwhelmed sold. I was sort of overwhelmed wanting to say to pull back
  • Biographical information; Stevenson campaign; Pat Brown campaign; Washington in 1959-1960; Statler Hotel party to impress Dutton; LBJ, Rayburn Bobby Baker all for California votes; Brown on “Meet the Press” in 1959 said LBJ was too conservative
  • pretty much today. But even when he was Vice President, of course, we weren't pressing him on legislative matters. We did have a number of contacts with him. Mu: Did Mr. Kennedy use him for anything that involved organized labor--? Me: Not directly
  • in the press. My experience has been that after every war the underachievers come up with something related to the war, whether it's shell shock or whether it's gassed in World War II or whether it's battle fatigue in World War II or whether it's Agent Orange
  • in the United States. And I attribute this primarily to the press coverage at that time and to the dissident groups here in the United States, who were following the Hanoi line and had been before that. I went out to Vietnam late in February, about the twenty
  • . This was in the fall of 1963, shortly before President Kennedy was killed. And curiously enough, I had been pressing for several weeks for that kind of a proposal and my senior colleague from South Dakota led the opposition to it --Senator Mundt. M: GM: M: GM: I
  • This was absolute anathema to all those on high, with the possible exception of George Ball. When Lyndon Johnson in his John Mr. Rusk was the worst offender. Ho~kins speech spoke of'~nconditional discussions," Mr. Rusk took the press aside afterwards, I
  • Biographical information; contact with LBJ; briefing LBJ while VP; Indochina; Vietnam; Diem; Roger Hilsman; William Bundy; Mac Bundy; John McNaughton; Interagency Planning Staff; Tonkin Gulf Resolution; peace negotiations; press leaks; bombing; "Why
  • against Khe Sanh/Hue-Quang Tri with an offensive in the Highlantis and around Saigon while keeping the pressure on throughout the remainder of the country, MA.CV will be hard pressed to meet adequately all threats. Under these circumstancf~S~ we must
  • by either urged a political solution-and the Administration a neutral As of late interference. was that And he had in hand a strong Phnom Penh to talk for La:;;"s, free though, and, moreover, rapidly the first attempt he did. the strategic
  • . of South American Affairs at the time . F: Well, I won't pursue that . I was Director of the Office I must say it came as quite a shock . That's not part of this project . It did, incidently, get me a free trip to Chile, which I always appre­ ciated
  • Economic Issues: Mr. Robert Komer .,·· · 6. Guidance on Further Discussions and Press Handling of Ambassador Lodge's Visit I I_ .. t. I~ I '' ) I I: i•II f f1 ,. BECl'tS'i' ( r t ~·~~·~~~~~~~~~!'. .. . _... •1• i ,.-. 1,4 , i tJllili
  • cases. R: Well, I suppose I'm one of the few people who has been appointed to a job Some months after the appointment had been signaled in the press. M: You mean that didn't mean that you didn't get it after the press leaked it? R: Evans and Novak
  • of your providing for the President even an approximate estimate of the additional casualties we would take if we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam? New subject: President also believes you should make sure that TV ~ cameras and press cover
  • with Lyndon and with Lynda or Luci. Of all of us .. Luci is the/most independent and free-spirited, although the most fragile looking. ! MEMORANDUM TH E W H IT E HOUSE - F r id a y , Ju n e 2 1 , 1968 WASHINGTON Page 7 It w as 10:00 w hen L yndon
  • Press relations
  • Lyn Nugent's first birthday; LBJ & Lady Bird have breakfast; desk work; Lady Bird swims 30 laps; Lady Bird to Council on Recreation and Natural Beauty meeting; press conference & photos with Lyn Nugent in the Rose Garden; visit with Andre Meyer
  • overriding priority to his problems. if, by doinu so, banls o! US suppoi\t to the Hepublic of wc-J undermine th~ vor.y Kor~a. All this means (a) YJC ·must malntaln our war eifort in Vietnam (b) we musl use nvaU.able channels at Panrnunjon to free
  • in all these. You had precisely the problem we have, to free your local capital. F: It freed our local capital to do auxiliary things that couldn't have been done otherwise. W: I'm often asked by various American businessmen who are thinking about
  • her morality but I obviously get indignant the same way. And to hear, for instance, that at the end of World War II the French government first promised Ho Chi Minh that they would stay out and allow the country to be free, and then they secretly
  • trust. They treated him as a usurper. Now I understand that the Honorable--wait a minute now, I'm getting old--who's the press secretary to-­ F: [Pierre] Salinger. C: No, the press secretary to Lady Bird. F: Oh. Liz Carpenter. C: Liz's book
  • - Discussion on Vietnam, Robert Kennedy, Eisenhower, Alliance for Progress, role of ror. 42. 9 December 1963 - Briefing. General revi·ew. Press, McNamara, Vietnam. I 43. 13 December 1963 - Introduced DDCI, Peer de Silva., reviewed checklist. Discussed
  • with ARVN in most cases. There were free drop zones and you could go into those at any time, but if you were close to populated areas, close to ARVN troop concentrations, things of that nature, you had to clear those target areas with ARVN in advance. G
  • and comprehensive steps to solve the reserve problem. b. Press hard for a change of the DOD P 80/$ official exchange rate to the personal purchase rate of P 118/$ no later than January 1, 1968. This alone would cut GVN dollar earnings on US account by almost one
  • by going to Jack Valenti and work something out. But it was much harder because he'd be late, and you'd wait there an hour or so when he was supposedly free and he wouldn't be. be immediate. You knew it wouldn't He didn't have a system like President
  • to be tied in \lIJith what Nixon's doing now. It's going to be that. I notice that the press has a habit of calling it now the "era of Vietnam." in Vietnam. it. They don't call it the \'/ar I don't know whether that's a way of trying to soften LBJ
  • systems. Prior to the time the decision is made, I think the Director has felt free to voice his own opinion from an arms control point of view, whether we should deploy ABM's or whether we shouldn't. Generally speaking Mr. Foster, the head
  • , or seldom sat in I should say. L: Yes, he did I think. Quite frequently at the start, but to a lesser extent later on. F: Were they fairly free discussions? L: Yes, initially. F: They gradually got a little tired. Everybody has his own say? Were
  • landslide victory; attributes LBJ’s benevolence to political bribery; LeMay’s disdain for press; LeMay’s support for “conservative” leadership; fear that U.S. might be close to becoming a socialist or communist republic; Republican Party’s interest in LeMay
  • and was in Moyers' office, which then \'/asn't the press office, if I remember it, it was in fact where Larry Temple later was. next to the Oval Office. M: I don't think he was press secretary by that time, was he? R: I don't know. He was running the campaign