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Oral history transcript, Samuel T. Williams, interview 2 (II), 3/16/1981, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

. W: They were the top-ranking, yes. For instance, Big [Duong Van] Minh who later became the instigator of the coup d'état--the man who had Diem murdered--he'd been a first lieutenant in the French army, colonial army. Don, who was next to Minh-G

Oral history transcript, Samuel T. Williams, interview 1 (I), 3/2/1981, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

into South Vietnam to escape the to escape the communist government of North Vietnam. Now, you seldom hear or read about that, but right after the Geneva accords, Ho Chi Minh said he'd let those people go south that wanted to go south. Well, they didn't

Oral history transcript, William DePuy, interview 1 (I), 10/28/1985, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

, but they weren't very good. They weren't good, dedicated communist fighters. But then later, of course, the larger issue was not the Pathet Lao but was to protect the Ho Chi Minh Trail. So they kept their troops in there, and they did protect the Ho Chi Minh Trail

Oral history transcript, Keyes Beech, interview 1 (I), 3/22/1983, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

was the South Vietnamese chargé, I think that's what they called and at that time, Khoi really belonged on . hadn't The real it at the time, in Bangkok, really made up his mind which side he heroes--Ho Chi Minh and [Vo Nguyen] Giap, you know

Oral history transcript, Phillip B. Davidson, interview 1 (I), 3/30/1982, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

, of course, in the triple canopy [jungle], forget it. can't penetrate that canopy. You Aerial photographs, which had been a very excellent source in World War II, and a very usable source in Korea, were virtually useless, except out in Laos in the Ho Chi

Folder, "[July 27, 1965 National Security Council Meeting; Joint Leadership Meeting]," Meeting Notes Files, Box 1 (Item)

and teat thls v:as why the ARV.N had been so success.fa! until recently. 'The President remarked that we all know that it is a bad situation and we wish we were ten years back or even ten months back. Senator Long said that Ho Chi Minh tal!\:s of a twenty

Oral history transcript, Phillip B. Davidson, interview 2 (II), 6/30/1982, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

would have been near the end of November 1967, we had noticed some unusual activity in North Vietnam. I don't think it had any relationship to the trail, that is, the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos. We went to see General Westmoreland and told him

Oral history transcript, Stanley Karnow, interview 1 (I), 4/30/1984, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

at the moment in Manila. I think he was probably the last American journalist to interview Ho Chi Minh, in 1946. And he was in and out of there; he based in Hong Kong. And also in and out about that time, but I'm not sure of the dates, was Tillman Durdin

Folder, "October 23, 1967 - 5:36 p.m. Democratic Leadership," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 1 (Item)

to the North Vietnamese and sought their views. They did not respond to our suggestions and the exchange culminated in my February letter to Ho-Chi-Minh and his flatly negative response, which Hanoi chose to publish. Since that time, despite additional efforts

Folder, "[July-August 1967 Meetings with Correspondents]," Meeting Notes Files, Box 3 (Item)

trouble than we get gains. He said we'd bombed Hanoi within half a mile of Ho Chi Minh 1 s hous e . (The President pointed toward the Washington monument as he said ". "That's as close as those people down there, and him sitting there oil: .' his front

Oral history transcript, Samuel A. Adams, interview 1 (I), 9/20/1984, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

Oral history transcript, Charles A. Morris, interview 1 (I), 11/19/1982, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

government under, let's call it a form of democracy as contrasted to that government offered by Ho Chi Minh, which presumably would be properly classified a communist government. There were, in my judgment, many, many people who didn't just volunteer to go

Folder, "McNamara, Robert," Office Files of Fred Panzer, Box 379 (Item)

to the conclusion that Ho Chi "Yes, I do," said FitzGerald. _ • . '...,' powerfulspokesmenofwhatDwightEisenhower : Minh and Company should ha\'e "mo,·ro to a "But why?" said _McNamara. ,. • ,· • • • .' • called "the military-industrial complex." •• '·. settlement

Folder, "Cables, [Cables, memos, reports, and other material, 11/63-5/67] Vol. XVI, 8/16 - 31/64, 2 of 2," Country Files, Vietnam, NSF, Box 7 (Item)

HUU, NGUYEN HUU CHAU, HO TONG MINH AND T h is Eiaterlal c o n t a i n s I n f o r m a iln n a f fe c tin g th e N a tio n a l D e fe n se o f t h e U n ite d S t a te s w it h in t h e m e a n in g o f t h e E sp io n a g e L a w s, T itle 18, U ^ .C i

Folder, "Meetings With the President -- 3 April 1964 - 20 May 1964," McCone Memoranda, Box 1 (Item)

public statements be made. 5. Tiw President then departed and Mr. McNamara requested that the group remain for a general review of the problem. It was pointed out that the balance of forces in Laos generally favored the Pathet Lao with their Viet Minh

Oral history transcript, Richard M. Helms, interview 2 (II), 9/16/1981, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh Helms -- II -- 4 G: I think he was one of the ones who parachuted in to Ho Chi Minh. H: I wouldn't

Oral history transcript, James U. Cross, interview 2 (II), 2/11/1981, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

police-type action, and perhaps that's the wrong choice of words, and 10 and behold, here the Vietnamese who were running down that--what did they call that Laos--? G: The Ho Chi Minh Trail? C: --the Ho Chi Minh Trail, claiming they weren't, and we

Oral history transcript, Rufus Phillips, interview 2 (II), 5/27/1982, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

the government, that they were running anything. And that just helped the VC politically. G: You'd known Big [Duong Van] Minh, I presume, hadn't you? P: Yes. G: What was your estimate of his capability? P: I liked Big Minh; he had a lot of political
the Vietnamese wanted to accomplish; the Buddhist crisis of 1963; programs involving pigs and fertilizer; progress reports and their depiction of events vs. eye witness accounts; coup in Vietnam; Ed Lansdale; Big [Duong Van] Minh; Diem’s assassination; John Paul

Folder, "Meetings With the President -- 4 January 1964 - 28 April 1965," McCone Memoranda, Box 1 (Item)

a course of action. He indicated he had talked to the Canadian Foreign Mlniater and had presented the question of Canadian approach to Ho Cbi Minh. He questioned whether the threat ehould be as po•ltively atated as Lodse'a cable indicated. The basic

Oral history transcript, Clark Kerr, interview 1 (I), 8/12/1985, by Janet Kerr-Tener (Item)

Oral history transcript, Thomas K. Finletter, interview 1 (I), 10/29/1968, by Paige E. Mulhollan (Item)

. And that was the American policy. But the trouble is we yielded on this and no sooner had Ho Chi Minh and General Giap had defeated the French at Dienbienphu in 1954 that we took on morally and publicly the responsibility for seeing to it that Ho Chi Minh and company did

Oral history transcript, Daniel O. Graham, interview 1 (I), 5/24/1982, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

, the VC are in terrible shape." We could read the communications along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and it was perfectly obvious that they were having one terrible time, because people from South Vietnam were going to go back up that trail come hell or high

Oral history transcript, George McGovern, interview 1 (I), 4/30/1969, by Paige E. Mulhollan (Item)

and the Japanese were involved in of bucking up against Vietnamese nationalism. We gave Ho Chi Minh the perfect out, the perfect opportunity, by trying to set up a kind of a unpopular and unrepresentative puppet regime in Saigon--which is exactly what the French

Oral history transcript, Leslie H. Gelb, interview 1 (I), 4/30/1984, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

was Ho Chi Minh an Asian Tito or could he have been made into an Asian Tito, all LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories

Oral history transcript, Maxwell D. Taylor, interview 1a (I), 1/9/1969, by Dorothy Pierce (McSweeny) (Item)

their lives miserable for twelve to fourteen. Second, to restrict and make more difficult the infiltration of men and supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. political. The third reason was both psychological and It was to remind Ho Chi Minh and his

Oral history transcript, Frank F. Mankiewicz, interview 2 (II), 5/1/1969, by Stephen Goodell (Item)

had an interpreter from the State Department, a man whowas more than an interpreter probably, a responsible fellow at the Embassy in charge of Far Eas~tern rna tters. And apparen tly ~1a.nac 'h told them that in his opinion something that Ho Chi

Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 1," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 47 (Item)

for several months, now, that the Communists planned a massive winter-spring offensive. We have detailed information on Ho Chi Minh' s order governing that offensive. Part of it is called a general uprising. "We know the object was to overthrow

Folder, "The Bertrand Russell 'Trial'," Country Files, Vietnam, NSF, Box 191 (Item)

. so URCE wHo :-HA~_.:-_:·~:··.';-· :p,._FURNISHED ·.RELI ABLE- INFORM AT ION IN THE~ PAST, - AND:_J~HO-1S •CLOSE'.'·TO\:.(i;~:i]:-:--:,::_/~ -·~ ''. ~tr:_ ;~ ;f·sr ANLE.Y· ~EVI SON,· CON~IDENT I_~L ADVI~OR ·T9.:·MAR,!IN/L~HER -~ ~.NG;.A~H/{/,.!~4

Oral history transcript, John Peter Flynn, interview 1 (I), 12/19/1984, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

Folder, "Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965, Volume 3, Tabs 200-220," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 41 (Item)

h is tiiinking on th e introductiou of in te r national f o r c e s . Wc found that ho v/aa fu ll of the su b ject, having d is c u s s e d rci&x)y a s p e c ts of the m ilitary' rsanpovver sh o rta g e with G en era ls T h ieu and Minh o v er

Folder, "Cables, [Cables, memos, reports, and other material, 11/63-5/67] Vol. XV, 8/1964," Country Files, Vietnam, NSF, Box 7 (Item)

TV TO DRAW THEM OUT ON SUBJEC TS SUGGESTED IN LA ST THREE PARAS OF R E F T E L . FRENCH EMBASSY ASSESSMENT OF VIETNAMESE S ITU A TIO N IS THAT I T I S , IN ONE WORD, HO PELESS. FRENCH EMBASSY O FFIC ERS CLAIM TO KNOW FROM FIR ST-H A N D EXPERIENCE

Oral history transcript, Chester L. Cooper, interview 3 (III), 8/7/1969, by Paige E. Mulhollan (Item)

started about your second trip at the time that Kosygin was supposed to arrive in London. Had you seen, when you went back over there, any kind of draft of what became president Johnson's letter to Ho Chi Minh? C: Yes, I did. letter. I saw, as well

Folder, "[NSC Meeting on] Manila Conference, 10/15/1966, Volume 4, Tab 47," National Security Council Meetings Files, NSF, Box 2 (Item)

conomy is such t hat Rollin~ Thunder can affect directly only a small f racti on of the ponulati on. There is very l ittle hope that the Ho Chi Minh Government ..,ill l ose control of population because of Rolling Thunder. The l essons of t he Korean War

Folder, "[July 21-27, 1965 Meetings on Vietnam] [ADDED TO FILE, 6/28/85]," Meeting Notes Files, Box 1 (Item)

greater nurubar of men. wngELEll: J 'l'he more men we have th~ greater the 1 tke: l itwod of smaller loafl,.,B. JlHESIDENT: What makes you think if we put in 100, ono meu Ho Chi Minh won't put in another 10~, 000'? WHEELEH: which will allow

Oral history transcript, John A. McCone, interview 1 (I), 8/19/1970, by Joe B. Frantz (Item)

Oral history transcript, Don Oberdorfer, interview 2 (II), 9/17/1981, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

he felt that he was going to have to recommend, probably, to Washington, cutting the [Ho Chi Minh] Trail in Laos. G: That would mean invading, of course. � LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B

Oral history transcript, Frederick Nolting, interview 1 (I), 11/11/1982, by Ted Gittinger (Item)

Folder, "JCS - War Games, Vol. 3, 1/65-11/65 [2 of 2]," Agency Files, NSF, Box 31 (Item)

Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs aa-vv," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 47 (Item)

FR0~l 1ATIJN OF THE ALLIA~·JCE FO~ ?ZACE AND 3AIGON TELLS O? .TH~ FOR[ DEt•108R::\CYCLIE:t'l MINH CAC LU LUONG DA~-JTOC V.~ HJ.~ BIUH). GP- 1 • 900 1 1 .-:_~y:f' ··t:::z r, 2 a -,tottrt·· ., w · ...... ----~---~---··· ·•••·-;-4~7

Oral history transcript, Michael V. Forrestal, interview 1 (I), 11/3/1969, by Paige E. Mulhollan (Item)

. Just after Diem died, we had the [Duong Van] Minh government. M: Right. F: Which didn't do too badly. Then we got ourselves--and I don't know how this ever into this. thrown. happened--well.~ it's perhaps not worthwhile going Something went wrong

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