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Folder, "Kennedy, Robert F.," Aides Files of Mildred Stegall, Box 31A (Item)

Agents of the Los Angeles Office of the FBI on June 13, 1968, at which time they advised Sirhan has never left the United States since his arrival in 1957 . .They pointed out that the word Abu Kha tar, meaning "is the father of Khatar," is a term not used

Folder, "NSAM # 285: Cooperation with the USSR on Outer Space Matters, 3/3/1964," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 3 (Item)

A· " ONAU'TICS AND SP · Cle IJ)MJNISTaAi'ION , .... Jene. ot ..April so.... 'b u ~Jal rour •caoate4 detenel ot A&»dler l'ec«Nmrl..-tion• to Mm hiUCUns wltb 6o. ussa la ome. .,ace matMr· Gatll the· J.atte• pan of, lmte .t a ¥1ew of lbe 4l•cu•lo&I be&weea

Folder, "October 14, 1968 - 1:40 p.m. Foreign Policy Advisory Group meeting," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 4 (Item)

- scale or acci dental attack. We do not recommend full attack at all times. This would permit a limited response. (2) Instructions on the response to a conventional attack would be conventional, not nuclear as is now in the plan. ( 3) There was only

Folder, "Policy Papers and Background Studies on Cuba Affair (V)," VP Papers, VP Security Files, Box 8 (Item)

:45 Wiesner & Chr ASC enter Test ban discussion. Pres. 'Do we have to test in 163? 1 In order to develop 50 megaton weapons in 10,000 lb. size would hove to test in 1 63. Should be done in May . Some could be done underground. Rusk against time I imit

Folder, "August 10, 1968 - 12:25 p.m. President's briefing of Former Vice President Nixon and Gov. Agnew," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 3 (Item)

? Secretary Rusk: The most difficult problem is the Jerusalem problem. CIA Director Helms: is not bard to explain. -•• --- ... VIETNAM -- The war is at the tensest point. Lo•t 128, 000 men Needed to fill out unit a Units now coming back Attack could

Folder, "May 14, 1968 - 1:10 p.m. Tuesday lunch with Foreign Policy Advisors," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 3 (Item)

concerned about time factors. We should tomorrow stick to opening statement - - not push on to something new. The intervention by Trudeau in Canada is not good. It is like U Thant's -- it asks us to stop bombing; doesn't ask Hanoi to do anything

Folder, "Policy Papers and Background Studies on Cuba Affair (III)," VP Papers, VP Security Files, Box 8 (Item)

,, ss Wo, FOR AMBASSADOR X)JQQOJCXX .,J,. ~ .....:....- LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S As you know President is having press conference on Cuba November 20 at 6 p.m. Washington time. You are requested to make date with Chief of State or Foreign Minister

Folder, "[NSC Meeting on] U. S., Europe and the Czech Crisis, 9/4/1968, Volume 5, Tab 72," National Security Council Meetings Files, NSF, Box 2 (Item)

µJ 4-j.6a.,- t - -fJ9'I o4/ 6M---t--.i"' CAP 82318 to Presiaant from Walt Rostow top secret ~rf' ~ -#3j RES TR ICT ION N'-j J.J l,J 13 " )~ 8'f- 31.3 A 1 p SA11'l f'j,.,·_ ..,t,J C/£ -cc·l.·lo • 'PO eountries .,..,.1t>C> • -.~ •• ,e 11

Folder, "Policy Papers and Background Studies on Cuba Affair (VI)," VP Papers, VP Security Files, Box 8 (Item)

. , Your lette: ~ays - - and I agree - - that we should not complicate the situati.>:: by mir• . c things. ,• . .. . But I assure you that this matter of IL-2.8e, TRANSFtRREQ TQ HAr◄ OWRITINQ FILt . l These facts were all known at the time of our

Folder, "NSAM # 304: U.S. Relations with Eastern Europe, 6/10/1964 [2 of 3]," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 4 (Item)

crisis, Moscow has appeared to recognize that the present balance of power is relatively unfavorable to it and will remain so for a long time. As a result, Soviet policy has been essentially d:!.rected toward keeping international ten s5.on within bounds

Folder, "Meetings With the President -- 23 November 1963 - 27 December 1963," McCone Memoranda, Box 1 (Item)

. The President asked that any matters of urgent importance be brought to his attention at any time, day or night. He designated no inter mediary. 6. At 12:30 I went to the President• s office in the Executive Office Building to tell him of the information

Folder, "October 29, 1968 - 2:30 a.m. Meeting with the President's Foreign Policy Advisors," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 4 (Item)

all air, naval and artillery bombardment, and all other acts involving the use of force against North Vietnam, as of 7 p. m. Ea.stern Standard Time, October 29th. We have agreed that a meeting dealing with the substantive issues will be held in Paris

Folder, "NSAM # 304: U.S. Relations with Eastern Europe, 6/10/1964 [1 of 3]," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 4 (Item)

and, on the other hand, enable us t o e>consider individually and carefully the many questions of substance, priorities and timing that are involved .in a program as broad and far-reaching as this. The Treasury Department disagrees with the proposal to support East

Folder, "[NSC Meeting on] Soviet Military Capabilities, 12/5/1963, Volume 1, Tab 2," National Security Council Meetings Files, NSF, Box 1 (Item)

, Special Ass istant to the Pres ident for National Security Affairs Dr. Jerome Wiesner, Special Assistant LO Lhe President for Science and Technology Theodore C . Sorensen, Special Counsel to the President Walter J enk ins Bill D . Moyers Maj . Gen

Folder, "October 27, 1968 - 7:45 p.m. Meeting with Foreign Policy Advisors," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 4 (Item)

delay the more dangerous it is for us, for the South Vietnamese. Every moment will be agony for us until we get the GVN in the talks. Walt Rostow: A report that there are no shells across the DMZ will be more important than the timing of the talks

Folder, "August 22, 1968 - 9 p.m. Cabinet meeting, and staff members," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 3 (Item)

militarily. It would not be in Czech interests or ours. The ''Cold War'' is not over. Our relations with Soviets are in transition. We would go anywhere at anytime to further interests of peace. We have thought at times we have made Progress. We have

Folder, "NSAM # 271: Cooperation with the USSR on Outer Space Matters, 11/12/1963," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 2 (Item)

Will assist the Secretary of' State in exploring problems of · procedure and timing connected with holding discussions with the .Soviet Union and in proposing for my consideration the channels which would be most desirable from our point of view

Folder, "August 20, 1968 - 2:05 p.m. Tuesday luncheon with Foreign Policy Advisors," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 3 (Item)

to determine what our national interest is. It is one country invading another Communist country. There is danger in aggression anywhere. It is aggression. We need to give immediate thought to timing of meeting with Soviets. The agenda is more full now than

Folder, "[Briefing Papers for] September 4, 1968 National Security Council Mtg," Meeting Notes Files, Box 3 (Item)

FOR THE MEETING DID NOT COME AT A TIME .WHEN THE WHITE HOUSE SEEMED TO THINK THE THREAT OF A SOVIET INVASION OF RUMANIA WAS EASING, SAID, "I WOULD ~ NOT COMMENT AT ALL ON THAT." CHRISTIAN SAID THE MEETING WILL BE A "REVIEW SESSION OF A NUMBER OF THINGS." I I I

Folder, "NSAM # 304: U.S. Relations with Eastern Europe, 6/10/1964 [3 of 3]," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 4 (Item)

be possible, for example to arrange for mo:"e interchange of power through high tens~. cn transmission lines or f 0r West European linkage to cr1:de oil ar:.d r~.rd:.ural. gas pipelines from the East.. Such ac"Gion does no·t·, appear feasible. at; this time

Folder, "[Briefing Papers for Congressional Leadership Meeting, August 23, 1968]," Meeting Notes Files, Box 3 (Item)

DURATIOtl OF COlYJBAT . ON THE ORDEfl OF FIVE TIMES WHAT :iE NOW HA S~·. IF HE SHOULD DEVELOP THIS, IT WOULD, IN. MY JUOG."1ENT9 MAKE OnR POSITIONS ·IN NORTHERN QUANG TRI CTO INCLUDE DONG HA AND THE CUA VIET> UNTENA!LE. I CAm10t AGREE TO PLACE OUR FORCES

Folder, "[NSC Meeting on] Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 8/20/1968, Volume 5, Tab 71," National Security Council Meetings Files, NSF, Box 2 (Item)

information and information given by Ambassador Dobrynin. The Pres i dent instructed Rusk to ask Dobrynin in to discuss this matter, The S ecreta ry could say: (a) Astonished at this news. (b) N ot opportune time to mak e announcement tomorrow. Tell allies we

Folder, "April 24, 1968 - 12:15 p.m. National Security Council Meeting, and certain foreign policy advisors," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 3 (Item)

. The coordination of programs is very important. Secretary Rusk: At the time of the Asian Development Bank, the Soviets hinted they would participate. Secretary Fowler: The Soviets sat through the initial meetings. They have not done anything. However, it has been

Folder, "June 9, 1968 - 2:30 p.m. Meeting with Foreign Policy Advisors in Cabinet Room," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 3 (Item)

to restart. 3. Time is on their side, they think. The enemy can fight for 12-18 months. They can control the level of the war. Time is not on our side. Clark's draft is the best way to respond. The President: What does Kosygin's letter say to you

Folder, "July 24, 1968 - 1:30 p.m. Tuesday lunch with Foreign Policy Advisors," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 3 (Item)

·. Since the early 1950' s th'e United States has carried a larger share .of ~he ·· .' . defense burden of the North Atlantic area tar a longer period ot time than was anticipated. Moreover, todo.y this couriti-y has great responsibilities