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- . The President asked that any matters of urgent importance be brought to his attention at any time, day or night. He designated no inter mediary. 6. At 12:30 I went to the President• s office in the Executive Office Building to tell him of the information
- :45 Wiesner & Chr ASC enter Test ban discussion. Pres. 'Do we have to test in 163? 1 In order to develop 50 megaton weapons in 10,000 lb. size would hove to test in 1 63. Should be done in May . Some could be done underground. Rusk against time I imit
- )' ).-11-Ko By ·1~ , NARS, Date GROUP 4 Do wng raded at 3 year in te rva ls; dec lassified after 12 years [Front] 1964 APR 30 PM 2 3R [Back] 0 v May 4, 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY Mac -It appears reasonable to give NASA a little more time
- delay the more dangerous it is for us, for the South Vietnamese. Every moment will be agony for us until we get the GVN in the talks. Walt Rostow: A report that there are no shells across the DMZ will be more important than the timing of the talks
Folder, "August 22, 1968 - 9 p.m. Cabinet meeting, and staff members," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 3
(Item)
- militarily. It would not be in Czech interests or ours. The ''Cold War'' is not over. Our relations with Soviets are in transition. We would go anywhere at anytime to further interests of peace. We have thought at times we have made Progress. We have
- Will assist the Secretary of' State in exploring problems of · procedure and timing connected with holding discussions with the .Soviet Union and in proposing for my consideration the channels which would be most desirable from our point of view
- to determine what our national interest is. It is one country invading another Communist country. There is danger in aggression anywhere. It is aggression. We need to give immediate thought to timing of meeting with Soviets. The agenda is more full now than
- ,, ss Wo, FOR AMBASSADOR X)JQQOJCXX .,J,. ~ .....:....- LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S As you know President is having press conference on Cuba November 20 at 6 p.m. Washington time. You are requested to make date with Chief of State or Foreign Minister
- crisis, Moscow has appeared to recognize that the present balance of power is relatively unfavorable to it and will remain so for a long time. As a result, Soviet policy has been essentially d:!.rected toward keeping international ten s5.on within bounds
- FOR THE MEETING DID NOT COME AT A TIME .WHEN THE WHITE HOUSE SEEMED TO THINK THE THREAT OF A SOVIET INVASION OF RUMANIA WAS EASING, SAID, "I WOULD ~ NOT COMMENT AT ALL ON THAT." CHRISTIAN SAID THE MEETING WILL BE A "REVIEW SESSION OF A NUMBER OF THINGS." I I I
- be possible, for example to arrange for mo:"e interchange of power through high tens~. cn transmission lines or f 0r West European linkage to cr1:de oil ar:.d r~.rd:.ural. gas pipelines from the East.. Such ac"Gion does no·t·, appear feasible. at; this time
- - scale or acci dental attack. We do not recommend full attack at all times. This would permit a limited response. (2) Instructions on the response to a conventional attack would be conventional, not nuclear as is now in the plan. ( 3) There was only
- and, on the other hand, enable us t o e>consider individually and carefully the many questions of substance, priorities and timing that are involved .in a program as broad and far-reaching as this. The Treasury Department disagrees with the proposal to support East
- in attendance time of the shooting are is continuing in an effort to account for Sirhan 's to the shooting of Senator Kennedy. Individuals at the ballroom in the Ambassador Hotel at the being located and interviewed in detail. Two ASSASSINATIONOF SENATOR
- all air, naval and artillery bombardment, and all other acts involving the use of force against North Vietnam, as of 7 p. m. Ea.stern Standard Time, October 29th. We have agreed that a meeting dealing with the substantive issues will be held in Paris
- DURATIOtl OF COlYJBAT . ON THE ORDEfl OF FIVE TIMES WHAT :iE NOW HA S~·. IF HE SHOULD DEVELOP THIS, IT WOULD, IN. MY JUOG."1ENT9 MAKE OnR POSITIONS ·IN NORTHERN QUANG TRI CTO INCLUDE DONG HA AND THE CUA VIET> UNTENA!LE. I CAm10t AGREE TO PLACE OUR FORCES
- . , Your lette: ~ays - - and I agree - - that we should not complicate the situati.>:: by mir• . c things. ,• . .. . But I assure you that this matter of IL-2.8e, TRANSFtRREQ TQ HAr◄ OWRITINQ FILt . l These facts were all known at the time of our
- concerned about time factors. We should tomorrow stick to opening statement - - not push on to something new. The intervention by Trudeau in Canada is not good. It is like U Thant's -- it asks us to stop bombing; doesn't ask Hanoi to do anything
- information and information given by Ambassador Dobrynin. The Pres i dent instructed Rusk to ask Dobrynin in to discuss this matter, The S ecreta ry could say: (a) Astonished at this news. (b) N ot opportune time to mak e announcement tomorrow. Tell allies we
- . The coordination of programs is very important. Secretary Rusk: At the time of the Asian Development Bank, the Soviets hinted they would participate. Secretary Fowler: The Soviets sat through the initial meetings. They have not done anything. However, it has been
- to restart. 3. Time is on their side, they think. The enemy can fight for 12-18 months. They can control the level of the war. Time is not on our side. Clark's draft is the best way to respond. The President: What does Kosygin's letter say to you
- charts wh ich we re displayed to the Council mem bers are attached . The President asked several times at appropriate points in the brief ing for comparabl e U . S . figures . Secretary McNamara responded each time, giving comparative figures
- their countri es of the Czech liberal reforms . 3 . The Czechs were printing, for the first time, supressed accounts of the horrors of the Stalin regime. The Kremlin leaders were acutely embarred. 4. The Czechs were requesting financial backing from the USSR
- their help, not their advice. The President: Mao has. I cannot tell you how much influence either Kosygin or The President: When we have a pause, we have a difficult time getting back. Nixon: Who talks to the Soviets? Secretary Rusk: We talk
- ·. Since the early 1950' s th'e United States has carried a larger share .of ~he ·· .' . defense burden of the North Atlantic area tar a longer period ot time than was anticipated. Moreover, todo.y this couriti-y has great responsibilities