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- disposit ion of Soviet troops in Cen tral Europe.
'/ •
·'
Director Helms and Secretary Rusk will give us their views on the German
reaction t o the c risis. The press has already p rinted that the State Department
was recommending additional reassurances
- on the
press. They did not.
The Pres i dent: Wasn't this hard to swallow?
CIA Director Helms: Yes .
the troops could move in.
Military exercises were designed to s ee how
The President:Should the Secretary talk to Dobrynin tonighti
CIA Director Helms: Yes
- of governmental experts, in a joint East-West study
of problems
SECRET
• I
-3of problems of reciprocity in East-West trade relations.
meeting of experts is scheduled for late 1964.
The next
In the UNCTAD, the Soviets did not press as hard as originally
- designed to cope
with pressing economic problems; and (4) progress in reassociation with
the West.
Our basic purpose in building bridges to East Europe is to facili
tate and sustain these changes. We seek thereby progress toward the
realization of our
- and
it is our task to see that it does not happen .
NOTE: There is attached a copy of the transcript of Press Secretary
Salinger 1s press briefing which was author ized by the President
following the meeting.
'i!OP S EE R 8 'f
GODJ; N OllD J\:'f T J'LC WM E
- of a certain degree of national inde
pendence from Soviet cont rol; (3) pragmatic innovations designed to cope
with pressing economic problems; and (4) progress in reassociation with
the West .
Our basic purpose in building bridges to East Europe is to facili
- , President Kennedy stated, " ••• we must not put
forward proposals merely for propaganda purposes;").
(2)
In order to achieve real gains, we should press for
- euNfi9ENTiAl
3
substantive rather.than token cooperation.
(3) Cooperation with the Soviet
- press for
flBENflAl ~---
3
substantive rather than token cooperation.
(3) Cooperation with the Soviet Union should be well
defined and the obligations of both sides made clear and
comparable.
(This will facilitate implementation as well
as clarify