Discover Our Collections


  • Tag > Digital item (remove)
  • Subject > USSR and Eastern Europe (remove)
  • Collection > National Security Files (remove)

8 results

  • disposit ion of Soviet troops in Cen tral Europe. '/ • ·' Director Helms and Secretary Rusk will give us their views on the German reaction t o the c risis. The press has already p rinted that the State Department was recommending additional reassurances
  • on the press. They did not. The Pres i dent: Wasn't this hard to swallow? CIA Director Helms: Yes . the troops could move in. Military exercises were designed to s ee how The President:Should the Secretary talk to Dobrynin tonighti CIA Director Helms: Yes
  • of governmental experts, in a joint East-West study of problems SECRET • I -3of problems of reciprocity in East-West trade relations. meeting of experts is scheduled for late 1964. The next In the UNCTAD, the Soviets did not press as hard as originally
  • designed to cope with pressing economic problems; and (4) progress in reassociation with the West. Our basic purpose in building bridges to East Europe is to facili­ tate and sustain these changes. We seek thereby progress toward the realization of our
  • and it is our task to see that it does not happen . NOTE: There is attached a copy of the transcript of Press Secretary Salinger 1s press briefing which was author ized by the President following the meeting. 'i!OP S EE R 8 'f GODJ; N OllD J\:'f T J'LC WM E
  • of a certain degree of national inde­ pendence from Soviet cont rol; (3) pragmatic innovations designed to cope with pressing economic problems; and (4) progress in reassociation with the West . Our basic purpose in building bridges to East Europe is to facili­
  • , President Kennedy stated, " ••• we must not put forward proposals merely for propaganda purposes;"). (2) In order to achieve real gains, we should press for - euNfi9ENTiAl ­ 3 substantive rather.than token cooperation. (3) Cooperation with the Soviet
  • press for flBENflAl ~--- 3 substantive rather than token cooperation. (3) Cooperation with the Soviet Union should be well defined and the obligations of both sides made clear and comparable. (This will facilitate implementation as well as clarify