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  • was at wit~ end on how to get people to report the war the way it is. He said he took Johnny Apple of the New York Times with him on one all-day excursion. He said they got out of the chopper at one RF post, the re was a province chief and American adviser
  • , but one of particular relevance here, which was a conference in New York sponsored by an organization called Peace Without War. November I believe. It was last And there then that was all on the record. I gave a talk on the issues of press relations
  • Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
  • /oh or maybe it was Bowdoin [College] up in New England, and had had one summer as a copy boy at the New York Times and so on. He was a very active, very energetic Vietnamese whose family or wife ran a big English school. He understood the press
  • Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
  • . wanted after a it was time for me to do a little magazine And I got in touch with my agent in New York ; I began to think about some articles that this question, Of And after the campaign and after I got started covering the White House, writing
  • Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
  • crisis was of course involved in that era. T: I might say that my first involvement with President Kennedy was as a result of the Bay of Pigs. I was in private life in New York at the time and was called down two days after the Cuban Brigade
  • . Here we were in Dallas and some reporters called New York, their home offices, to find out what they knew. I ran out into the parking lot and a cop was sitting there on a three-wheel motorcycle listening to all the traffic on the police radio. Maybe
  • Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
  • , and labor. Our economic statistics are the best and most compre­ hensive in the world. But they can be and need to be further improved. The costs will be exceedingly small relative to the benefits. To this end, my 1969 budget provides for several new
  • , ----------------------- Vietnam------------------------------------- memo, 13 morale evaluation 12 -- Aide Memoire, policies S to Westmoreland--------------------- post-TET msg, 12 -- Wheeler Vietnam questions 11 12 -- State Khe Sanh
  • never really told him what I thought about it, which is very simple. The trouble with Johnson and Viet Nam was that he was too clever by half. He had 150,000 troops on the ground before the New York Times admitted we were in a major war, literally
  • Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
  • a discussion Deliver our new strategy support civilians purge corrupt administration of negotiations to be provided a Presidential address strategy stated and force re~ in the NSAM. to Saigon with General it must broaden their and move
  • of thing on the basis that you can expect them to keep it quiet? M: In those days only the chairman of the committee was aware of it. G: I see. M: They never told the members of the committee. Now they just print it in the Washington Post
  • Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
  • B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh Pike I -~ 7 up in New York City you are probably going to be a somewhat different kind of a person than if you
  • Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
  • , but that was a pro forma exercise in all likelihood. So, as long as Idris was in charge in a very conservative monarchial government in Libya, it was really a separate account. That has all changed, of course, since the ouster of Idris and the advent of this new
  • Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
  • that there was some time ago an article in I believe it was the New York Times which indicated that he asked for a lot more troops than he was given. He had plans as to how he would use those troops, in the event they were made available to him, but he said he
  • Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
  • that certain individuals right here in the Pentagon, at a very early date, leaked all the details of this to the New York Times, as you probably recall. This generated the usual reaction that you get here in the United States, generated by people who
  • Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
  • -- including his own aides -- to stand up,· firmly .rec'ite their name, what part of the country they came from, and their job. The men did .. · MORE - 2 It was a very well scattered group -- New York to California, and from Texas to Massachusetts, as I
  • . also be covered in new tasking for CIA collection efforts. 1. 2. We should do more to exploit the intelligence as sets of other countries. The Australians, for example, should be encouraged to add at least one officer to-their :.Wlilitary Attache
  • out and seeing what was actually happening in the countryside. And my report recommended a very radical overhaul of AID, with the creation of a new rural affairs division, but at the level of assistant to the director so that it took its authority
  • Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
  • ..,,_ has been considerable, .. ~ inflated_by civilians.·. .. ; ~ .... _ ,,,._ incltli¼io~ ~~ To some extent .... by measures already taken. 2 - Heavy S•E•C ft•E•'f infiltration of both new units is continuing. made prior A strenuous
  • , for it would be folly to undertake i. I I I a brand new effort without realizing that a large number of people have spent •1 I extensive little time and effort effort persons to tell the story has been spent trying working with veterans
  • is the.earliest the new provis~ons for drafting • be thoroughly conunanders, clea~ed divisional up? conunanders, possible date when they can get through of 18 and 19 year olds? In the light of the changed situation, does some rede ... ~oyment ~ or example
  • against us here in the United States. Unfortunately, many of our news media--some of them unwittingly, some of them to make headlines--have picked up this propaganda and promulgated it all over the country--all over the world! And people have believed
  • Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
  • Adams -- I -- 9 thirtieth of January 1968, I sort of went back to my hole with my captured documents and POW reports and continued working on Viet Cong and NVA strength and found, incidentally, that there was an enormous number of new units popping up
  • Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
  • and broad papers on the key problem appr~isal of Section G is a discussion of possible options in the area of our negotiating post~~e> discussing possible actions that might be taken in co~~unc~ion with the at~our.cement of whatever actions may
  • to this day. It continued in These are largely cosmetic changes, and OCB was abolished. I was unhappy over the fact that here I not only had won my spurs with the New Frontier, hut that I was clearly not only known to, but favorably regarded by President
  • Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
  • AND TACTICS OF THIS Ef\\E~'(o F~ENS\VE AR.cBfC()/'4\.N&CLEARER•BEGINNINGON 31 .:ANlJAR.i 1t-\E '4c PRoPAt\ OR6ANSANNOUNCED THE EXISTENCEOF A NEW ''R.E\JCL\Yt( ONPrft'I 4~M~O FOR.CE
  • forces commander, oh, engineer detachments and some psyops people, and medics. They were called Special Action Forces, and that's when counterinsurgency was brand new. We were all very naive. We did all the things that Americans know how to do, like build
  • chiefs of staff Richard Stilwell and William Rosson; working with Allied troops from Korea and Australia; DePuy's work with the First Division; DePuy's reputation for removing incompetent commanders from their posts; DePuy's view of press coverage
  • Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
  • the infiltration thing. And I have no doubt that in the subsequent programs a new phase will pop up, or in his book a new phase will pop up. He spins off of this central core of the guerrilla strength and whether these odds and sods, as the British would call
  • Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
  • aircraft and _JOPSECRET : replacements are urgently needed to maintain our observation and surveillance capability over our newly opened LOC, new areas urider pacification, enemy routes of infiltration and enemy base areas. The northern I Corps Tactical
  • with this reasoning, be sent in numbers sufficient only to enable us to keep faith with our troops in exposed positions, as in the northern end of South ·viet-Nam -- and not to continue the past emphasis on "search and destroy." The new emphasis should
  • February, reports for 24 February indicate sporadic fire at Khe Sanh. 2. Vietnamese forces have captured the Palace inside the Citadel and the VC flag that was flying over the Palace is now in the First ARVNDivision Command Post. Friendly forces hold all
  • kind of a guy have we got to work with here? They knew McChristian, they knew his good points and his bad points, but here's a new fellow. And I didn't know any of them. Joe and I would have very informal conferences. We lived together in a house
  • Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
  • directed at US positions the northern provinces including the posts at Khe Sar.h, Dong Ha, Gio Linh, and Chu Lai. The US/ South Vietnamese 36-hour cease-fire began at 5: 00 AM EST this morning. Some 45 minutes before it· began, Saigon announced
  • . FONECON MACV301723 EST. Elements of a US rifle platoon have landad on the US Embassy roof. The situation in the embassy area is slackening. 13. PONECON MACV301730 EST. hRs been evacuated, except have moved to bunkers. for Tan Son Nhut command post
  • bi tis beb/een 1962 and 1964, and you were Commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Pacific. Do I have the basic command periods and posts essentially correct? M: Yes. Mc: Have you ever participated in any other sort of oral history project
  • Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
  • in the Washington Post on the editorial page, I think it was the Washington Post, they had a list of quotations as long as your arm going back over the years, the so-called optimistic, over-optimistic statements and so on. from any member of the Joint Chiefs
  • Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)