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  • . For a breakdown of the international financial sys­ tem would bring incalculable harm not only to ourselves and free peoples around the world, but even to world peace and progress. I am determined that our economic policies in 1968 will be prudent as wdl
  • .)· ·: . • • • • . ' .. . .. . .... • : . -·=_,_: ..: . . ••f; ·, •• ---~~~ ..'••d. To· what extent. was there·_ a free and rapid exchange of _._. .· ..•••· -information between ·GVNand U .s. ~~gencies ~ .·_ ~ ~ ) •• •__ ::·•; .-. .· e·~-·.-Ha;~:· ,the-: eri~rni\in~~-~- -~·Thich·~ngaged in the attacks now
  • activity through computer capability; CIA; Robert Komer and pacification; the Tet Offensive; Westmoreland press briefing after Tet; the media; infiltration; the importance of Cambodia; Sihanouk; problem of interpretation of intelligence; body counts; Sam
  • of the civilians, should be free to talk to the press. But they should talk only on those subjects on which they're qualified to comment, the areas within their personal experience. Engagement in a battle, dealing with a local village, conducting a particular
  • Impact of the Tet Offensive; dealing with Vietnam information officers; effect in Vietnam of LBJ’s 3/31 announcement; government-press relationship; LBJ’s personality
  • Histories [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh ROBERTS -- I -- 4 There was a local reporter riding on the White House press bus. The only discussion I remember about possible crowd hostility
  • ; the Kennedy staff that stayed to work for LBJ; LBJ’s relationship with the press compared to that of previous presidents; (dis)advantages of getting close to the president; LBJ’s relationship with Phil and Kay Graham; Great Society speech; type of access press
  • Compilation of Presidential Documents; - Memoran~a Memoranda VOLUME 9 consists for the President on public affairs. of records from of White General House Taylor; Press and Conferences. On Sunday - evening announced it was officially shortly
  • troops. This ratio was 1. 7 to 1 in December. It is 1. 4 to 1 today. In the DMZ and I Corps area, there is a 1 to 1 ratio. There are 79 enemy battalions in the 1st Corps area (60 North Vietnamese and 19 Viet Cong). In the same area there are 82 Free
  • . I discussed why intelligence of this type is so important to us and why we do not escort these vessels. I also told them we are not preparing a way toward apologizing for the incident. The Meet the Press discussion was misinterpreted by many people
  • and the press humility to his "One war at a time". concerning is brevity, some eighty Sandburg with its Mason and Slidell to the public the circumstances want another on same time." destination outcry While the Secretary was very and wisdom
  • a mission in and because for American reporters covering Phnom Penh the war, we rarely went anyplace where there was a North Vietnamese possible contact, just about everybody who went to Phnom Penh least a pass in at and the guy, day, in the press
  • Time limit in dealing with Vietnamese situation; the Tet Offensive; Weyand's role; press reaction; impact of Tet on South Vietnamese forces; intelligence; Cronkite's visit to Vietnam; the pacification programs; decision to write Tet!; subsequent
  • : . - - where we obey the laws of the sea, to· behave as pirates; and the other side feels free . -- where to attack; and the other .side feels free Authority ·B~ we defend the 38th parallel, DECLASSIFIED A .3-0~ ~1; NSe, J-.,)., ..al) .+:f
  • . _ ., ::f:.-.:-'·:·· ...·•····.~ ...~~:-:-_........,_,.....,... .~- -; ..... ... . . ........... ___ ..,.,_,_~~· . .... .... .. ..... , '• .. ~:~-J ·:-:;:a_~~:\·_«._. --"'!!!"";;._,_ ..... pa--~ 14 26. The Foreign Press in Viet-Nam
  • testimony before the committee. In light of this, Secretary McNamara said to go ahead and issue his statement.) Secretary McNamara said McCarthy went out and told the press that one of the . U.S. vessels penetrated North Vietnamese waters. "He just did
  • -- 45th report, President of delay) ----- ---------------------used at Press 3 Apr 68 -- Bunker msg to President, Vietnamese the burdens of the war effort-------------------------------4 Apr 68 - - Bunker's 46th report ---------- con£ #121 --- J
  • there is no time for 7 on-the-job training, the press, the Congress 4. he should In so doing, not merely support efforts reach should come from and administer he would ensure co-ordin~ted a master - - were for the war by rallying the· farmers
  • in the United States. And I attribute this primarily to the press coverage at that time and to the dissident groups here in the United States, who were following the Hanoi line and had been before that. I went out to Vietnam late in February, about the twenty
  • against Khe Sanh/Hue-Quang Tri with an offensive in the Highlantis and around Saigon while keeping the pressure on throughout the remainder of the country, MA.CV will be hard pressed to meet adequately all threats. Under these circumstancf~S~ we must
  • overriding priority to his problems. if, by doinu so, banls o! US suppoi\t to the Hepublic of wc-J undermine th~ vor.y Kor~a. All this means (a) YJC ·must malntaln our war eifort in Vietnam (b) we musl use nvaU.able channels at Panrnunjon to free
  • at the time you left Vietnam and came back here, there was discussion in the press about an alleged disagreement between you and, particularly, Army commanders regarding the necessity of concentrating on destroying the Viet Cong infrastructure
  • , particularly political, having to do with South Vietnam. Also, quite frequently George Christian, the press secretary, would be there, and also Tom Johnson or somebody like that to take notes. Occasionally Vice President Humphrey would attend
  • '. ,-Et-;G:'fl!Ri.+E~T~s~iJ.:;;~~ ... ,:~F... J,tJ-ir.:L-w~~z-;:-en4J: ~ ~ Based on these assessments Approve a NSAMstating 1. will our recommendations are: that our political leave the people of South Vietnam free institutions. forces The NSAMshould
  • , recommendations Wheeler reviewing press memo, 19 -- Ginsburgh communist briefing Clarke's memo, in "Second Wave" of Rusk-Clifford target possibilities ------- target ----------- report------------------------------ talking points deployment N
  • . casualties and fewer Vietnamese refugees. s. And it should hasten the end· of the war. 'POP SECRET = .NODf:S TOP OfJCft~T - NODIS I - 5- Our present practice of having virtually everything available to the press is also a loser. The enemy would never
  • a good deal more candor and writing it in a more free and open style when it came over from the State Department, whose interest was primarily in the substance--and which wrote in that peculiar form that I've never been able to comprehend. F: Did
  • McCONNELL -- I -- 15 thought ought to be done without regard to any domestic political reverberations, which, of course, every president has to take into account. McS: I think I was thinking in terms of the Vietnam War really pressing him a great deal
  • Ginsburgh 4 NMCC 4 Ginsburgh memo, 4 Ginsburgh memo 5 White 5 to President, Report, authority Viet Cong account msg, in Saigon suburb VN situation, handling on Chau Doc City handling press SEA operational gravel
  • : BARRY ZORTHIAN INTERVIEWER: Ted Gittinger PLACE: Mr. Zorthian's office, Washington, D.C. Tape 1 of 1 G: Mr. Zorthian, what were the state of press relations in Saigon when you arrived in 1964? Z: I will answer these questions, but let me add
  • State of press relations in Saigon in 1964; coordination between various elements of the mission; generation gap and press relations; psychological operations; integration of the press relations efforts; JUSPAO; understanding of the Vietnam
  • . The General said this was true, and General Wheeler added that the losses the enemy has taken are very serious. He said there had been 53, 000 since the beginning of the offensive. The President asked why press reports were so bad. General Abrams said he
  • Press relations
  • . m. (These are the first units of the 10, 500 authorized and approved for immediate shipment in response to General Westmoreland's request. The Bunker announcement and press guidance are attached as Appendices A and B.) ~:"'\re~-• MEETl~~G ti>~OTliS
  • of business in this case? A: Yes, in some degree socially. M: What about his press relations in those days? very good. A: I seem to recall they were Is that your recollection? They were very good in the sense that he was much admired, but he
  • Early acquaintance with LBJ; how LBJ related to the press as a senator; Alsop's interactions with LBJ; Alsop's support of LBJ in 1964 against Goldwater; Alsop's and Philip Graham's role in JFK's selection of LBJ as the vice-presidential nominee
  • the question of when we would resume arms aid to the Paks was a quite live orie, wi th the Pentagon--as I recall--and to an extent State pressing for some resumption and the Paks screaming for it because they had lost an incredible amount of resources
  • to hang on. It made it awfully easy for the enemy and It's exaggerated in the press. sion is greater than the actual fact. interests of the United States. M: The impres- This all works against the There's no question about it. I have read
  • know, counterinsurgency was stylish, and Brute [Victor] Krulak, the marine, had a similar position on the Joint Staff. Same one I had much later. So the army was very anxious to get in the act and do the right things, and the Kennedys were pressing hard
  • chiefs of staff Richard Stilwell and William Rosson; working with Allied troops from Korea and Australia; DePuy's work with the First Division; DePuy's reputation for removing incompetent commanders from their posts; DePuy's view of press coverage
  • . . .Jee .SECRET - - - . ... , ............. iL.l MHTINO NOi ES COPYRIGHT!!) P\.i~liEQfiOA - 3 ­ aequices.. Per.ffli9!iou of Copy1 ignf Holder· 'A' T~oAlCil& Joboson face press questioning. If Cy Vance goes to Vietnam, he doesn't have to say
  • uprising and many defections. Our press had led the North Vietnamese to think the ARYN army was a pushover. That proved to be untrue. The enemy has laid land lines down the Laotian panhandle. This will permit them to operate on radio silence and give
  • requests in the past. Now he finds that his campain plan has been pre-empted by enemy action. Secretary Rusk: Can it only be done by additional U.S. forces? press them to brigade U.S. troops with Vietnamese? Can't we General Wheeler: Before I answer