Discover Our Collections


  • Tag > Digital item (remove)
  • Subject > Tet Offensive, 1968 (remove)

Limit your search

Tag Contributor Date Subject Type Collection Series Specific Item Type Time Period

50 results

  • Histories [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh ROBERTS -- I -- 4 There was a local reporter riding on the White House press bus. The only discussion I remember about possible crowd hostility
  • ; the Kennedy staff that stayed to work for LBJ; LBJ’s relationship with the press compared to that of previous presidents; (dis)advantages of getting close to the president; LBJ’s relationship with Phil and Kay Graham; Great Society speech; type of access press
  • on and so on. Z: Right. G: Khe Sanh was coming in for an awful lot of attention about this time, too, and there have been criticisms of that coverage. What was good or bad about the press coverage at Khe Sanh? Z: One, on the impact of Tet on public
  • Impact of the Tet Offensive; dealing with Vietnam information officers; effect in Vietnam of LBJ’s 3/31 announcement; government-press relationship; LBJ’s personality
  • : BARRY ZORTHIAN INTERVIEWER: Ted Gittinger PLACE: Mr. Zorthian's office, Washington, D.C. Tape 1 of 1 G: Mr. Zorthian, what were the state of press relations in Saigon when you arrived in 1964? Z: I will answer these questions, but let me add
  • State of press relations in Saigon in 1964; coordination between various elements of the mission; generation gap and press relations; psychological operations; integration of the press relations efforts; JUSPAO; understanding of the Vietnam
  • . The General said this was true, and General Wheeler added that the losses the enemy has taken are very serious. He said there had been 53, 000 since the beginning of the offensive. The President asked why press reports were so bad. General Abrams said he
  • Press relations
  • in the United States. And I attribute this primarily to the press coverage at that time and to the dissident groups here in the United States, who were following the Hanoi line and had been before that. I went out to Vietnam late in February, about the twenty
  • . m. (These are the first units of the 10, 500 authorized and approved for immediate shipment in response to General Westmoreland's request. The Bunker announcement and press guidance are attached as Appendices A and B.) ~:"'\re~-• MEETl~~G ti>~OTliS
  • a mission in and because for American reporters covering Phnom Penh the war, we rarely went anyplace where there was a North Vietnamese possible contact, just about everybody who went to Phnom Penh least a pass in at and the guy, day, in the press
  • Time limit in dealing with Vietnamese situation; the Tet Offensive; Weyand's role; press reaction; impact of Tet on South Vietnamese forces; intelligence; Cronkite's visit to Vietnam; the pacification programs; decision to write Tet!; subsequent
  • of business in this case? A: Yes, in some degree socially. M: What about his press relations in those days? very good. A: I seem to recall they were Is that your recollection? They were very good in the sense that he was much admired, but he
  • Early acquaintance with LBJ; how LBJ related to the press as a senator; Alsop's interactions with LBJ; Alsop's support of LBJ in 1964 against Goldwater; Alsop's and Philip Graham's role in JFK's selection of LBJ as the vice-presidential nominee
  • activity through computer capability; CIA; Robert Komer and pacification; the Tet Offensive; Westmoreland press briefing after Tet; the media; infiltration; the importance of Cambodia; Sihanouk; problem of interpretation of intelligence; body counts; Sam
  • the question of when we would resume arms aid to the Paks was a quite live orie, wi th the Pentagon--as I recall--and to an extent State pressing for some resumption and the Paks screaming for it because they had lost an incredible amount of resources
  • to hang on. It made it awfully easy for the enemy and It's exaggerated in the press. sion is greater than the actual fact. interests of the United States. M: The impres- This all works against the There's no question about it. I have read
  • know, counterinsurgency was stylish, and Brute [Victor] Krulak, the marine, had a similar position on the Joint Staff. Same one I had much later. So the army was very anxious to get in the act and do the right things, and the Kennedys were pressing hard
  • chiefs of staff Richard Stilwell and William Rosson; working with Allied troops from Korea and Australia; DePuy's work with the First Division; DePuy's reputation for removing incompetent commanders from their posts; DePuy's view of press coverage
  • -- 45th report, President of delay) ----- ---------------------used at Press 3 Apr 68 -- Bunker msg to President, Vietnamese the burdens of the war effort-------------------------------4 Apr 68 - - Bunker's 46th report ---------- con£ #121 --- J
  • and the press humility to his "One war at a time". concerning is brevity, some eighty Sandburg with its Mason and Slidell to the public the circumstances want another on same time." destination outcry While the Secretary was very and wisdom
  • Compilation of Presidential Documents; - Memoran~a Memoranda VOLUME 9 consists for the President on public affairs. of records from of White General House Taylor; Press and Conferences. On Sunday - evening announced it was officially shortly
  • . . .Jee .SECRET - - - . ... , ............. iL.l MHTINO NOi ES COPYRIGHT!!) P\.i~liEQfiOA - 3 ­ aequices.. Per.ffli9!iou of Copy1 ignf Holder· 'A' T~oAlCil& Joboson face press questioning. If Cy Vance goes to Vietnam, he doesn't have to say
  • uprising and many defections. Our press had led the North Vietnamese to think the ARYN army was a pushover. That proved to be untrue. The enemy has laid land lines down the Laotian panhandle. This will permit them to operate on radio silence and give
  • suppress the defensive fire, l\4ajor Dethlefsen ignored the enemy's overwhelming firepower and the damage to his aircraft and pressed his attack. Despite a continuing hail of antiaircraft fire, deadly surface-to-air mis.5iles,and co~nterattacks by MIG
  • testimony before the committee. In light of this, Secretary McNamara said to go ahead and issue his statement.) Secretary McNamara said McCarthy went out and told the press that one of the . U.S. vessels penetrated North Vietnamese waters. "He just did
  • at the time you left Vietnam and came back here, there was discussion in the press about an alleged disagreement between you and, particularly, Army commanders regarding the necessity of concentrating on destroying the Viet Cong infrastructure
  • , particularly political, having to do with South Vietnam. Also, quite frequently George Christian, the press secretary, would be there, and also Tom Johnson or somebody like that to take notes. Occasionally Vice President Humphrey would attend
  • . I discussed why intelligence of this type is so important to us and why we do not escort these vessels. I also told them we are not preparing a way toward apologizing for the incident. The Meet the Press discussion was misinterpreted by many people
  • requests in the past. Now he finds that his campain plan has been pre-empted by enemy action. Secretary Rusk: Can it only be done by additional U.S. forces? press them to brigade U.S. troops with Vietnamese? Can't we General Wheeler: Before I answer
  • , because the minute you do that, they'll change the code. G: Is that the impeccable and highly secret source that Mr. McNamara referred to? M: Sure. G: Okay. It was intercepted radio traffic, is that the nature of the thing? M: Yes. But the press
  • . _ ., ::f:.-.:-'·:·· ...·•····.~ ...~~:-:-_........,_,.....,... .~- -; ..... ... . . ........... ___ ..,.,_,_~~· . .... .... .. ..... , '• .. ~:~-J ·:-:;:a_~~:\·_«._. --"'!!!"";;._,_ ..... pa--~ 14 26. The Foreign Press in Viet-Nam
  • to press and public optnton in the interest oi our common purposes. ·- --- ·- ­ •_ _...............!..•_ . _ • . :·--·· - ·· - ·• • ·---...:.....; :.•. :: .: ~----·--·-- .: . •...... ··.. _ ·-..:..:.-...:,,.,_.·.. s---z...·- · ­ f.-t f'""rr
  • with me, placed great emphasis on the need for helping the people as well as for destroying the Viet Cong. He wanted rural electrification programs in Vietnam; he kept pressing for a whole series of developmental initiatives. Well, out of all
  • and has been occurring ela~wha1·e t·n .and around the capital. Both Tan Son Nnut airfield serving _ 2. smnll fire ...Saigon and nearb1 B1en3ca air base have been under mort_nr fire. There b~s been no report of damage or casualties. Press reports
  • in the United States press. There were setbacks during Tet -- mostly psychological and two military. The most setback was here in the United States, which was one of their objectives. The President: When General Westnloreland was last here, we did not give him
  • : I saw where Senator Kennedy pointed out that the South Vietnamese voted not to call up 18 year olds. General Wheeler: I met last night with this unnamed group chaired by Nick Katzenbach and Paul Nitze. We are pressing for the South Vietnamese
  • th!Delta - - on the whole, Bunker's your and Abrams balanced the press. and responded 3. well- specific took the heartening. suggestions, judgement. i ., .'i I .. .J / 7 • ':ZCQAA775 ., YF.KttDS • ' • t 16 Ot t DE YSNKQA8
  • Ginsburgh 4 NMCC 4 Ginsburgh memo, 4 Ginsburgh memo 5 White 5 to President, Report, authority Viet Cong account msg, in Saigon suburb VN situation, handling on Chau Doc City handling press SEA operational gravel
  • . be emplyyed close to the border and the operations should be conducted in such a \Vay as to have no press exposure. It is important tha.t the targets selected be worthy of the political risks involved. The Commander, US ?v1ACVwill prepare contingency plans
  • , recommendations Wheeler reviewing press memo, 19 -- Ginsburgh communist briefing Clarke's memo, in "Second Wave" of Rusk-Clifford target possibilities ------- target ----------- report------------------------------ talking points deployment N
  • it--the press asked me about Dean Rusk and Bob McNamara--also Bobby Kennedy who had been mentioned. have that they didn't have! What did I I said, "I have the invaluable quality of dispensability." P: Did you see any reasoning behing this? Of course, you
  • in the press afterwards that various LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh Nitze
  • activity through computer capability; CIA; Robert Komer and pacification; the Tet Offensive; Westmoreland press briefing after Tet; the media; infiltration; the importance of Cambodia; Sihanouk; problem of interpretation of intelligence; body counts; Sam