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  • Tag > Digital item (remove)
  • Subject > Tet Offensive, 1968 (remove)

21 results

  • was [Commander Herbert L.] Ogier, I believe that's correct--what did they know about the South Vietnamese operations? Were they told, "Don't go near here on such-and-such a day, you may get mixed up in something," something to that effect? M: No, I don't think
  • order of battle, the official MACV order of battle disappeared. There's nobody left. This is reflected, and I now believe quite accurately, in Herbert Schandler's book called The Unmaking of a President. And I'm now going to paraphrase a quote which
  • ". -- precinct by precinct, block by block, house by house, and farm by :farm. It should be as hard to move from one precinct to another or from one village to another in South Viet-Nam as it is ) today in North Viet-Nam. All this should mean fewer U
  • of the combined intelligence staff predicts that this will be abhorrent to the public and will cause a strong reaction against the Viet Cong. Fighting is still going on in Hue as both US and ARVN forces maneuver to block any retreat from the citadel area. The AR
  • province towns could have been overrun. The second surprise I had was that we came very close to losing Tan Son Nhut Air Base. It was touch and go there. This attack was blocked by battalions coming in and hitting the enemy from the rear. It was closeo
  • felt very strongly we should have mined Haiphong harbor at a time when it was not used very often, and therefore ships that would have entered subsequently would have been coming in at their own risk, rather than having them already in and blocking them
  • -- I -- 26 D: That high stuff ~"as a CIA province. They kept me informed and as a matter of fact on one occasion borrowed some specialized equipment to try to pin this guy within a given block. somewhere. They knew he was in there And I've heard
  • at the close of last session), the Administration should anticipate that these maneuvers might be successful. In his opinion, the best chance of blocking the quota bills would be if the Senate loaded on so many amendments that the House conferees would have
  • an "all­ out invasion" of South Vietnam, putting sufficient manpower into the effort to try to ensure that allied forces cannot block Communist occupation of at least the far northern provinces. Hanoi might be acting either from a belief that the allies
  • ~portantly, h~ e.l:10 c-:.m:sidern that its occupation has blocked the route or enemy ativnnee into Qu.!ln~Tri and b:u; k~pt the fl~U.n~ away f~ the populat,ed co.nstal belt of I Corps. Hl'l c~nceda~ tt.at Khe Sanh has n~t had much effect· on in.filtration
  • of cc~ssion, to· Hanoi. 17. trouble on blocking the Canal case., lightering its is 1,foscow's the risk·of lessen Maritime,which would only prevent question in maintaining this at Haiphong would be armed with AAAin these circuastances
  • AND TO RE-ESTABLISH GVN PRESENCE IN OUTLYING AREAS. THE FIRST TASK, EOWEVER, IS TO CLEAR ENEMY FORCES FROM AROUND CI TIES; THEN A GENERAL QfitENSIVE ·TO CLEAR OUT VC BASE AREAS A}lD ·BLOCK INFILT?..ATION AND SU??LY ROUTES FROI1 CAt1BODIA
  • , and the story of how he was prevented from getting off of the plane with the Kennedy casket is known. I was not witness to it because I was in the forward part of the plane at the time, but I do know the aisle was blocked. And, again, this was the Kennedy