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  • was at wit~ end on how to get people to report the war the way it is. He said he took Johnny Apple of the New York Times with him on one all-day excursion. He said they got out of the chopper at one RF post, the re was a province chief and American adviser
  • that Then switched in he was spring, early summer . the late summer I was hired by the Washington Post . I from the Knight newspapers to the Post and covered Nixon's presidential campaign in 1968 . Then when he won the election, I became one of the two
  • Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
  • the problem. But the guys in MACV were even then, I think,leaning to a very conventional point of view of the war. G: There was a common complaint, I think, heard, that the VC would knock off a local force post and then ambush the relieving force
  • Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
  • in Saigon in 1964 was awful. This in effect was the immediate post-Diem period. If you remember, the Diem government was overthrown in November of 1963; the death came a few days afterwards. 1964. I arrived there in February of The country was still
  • Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
  • so, even if it ends up critically, based on accurate information than done in a vacuum or on only partial information. Let me suggest, also, that a very sharp distinction be drawn between information and publicity. A post newspaper, an instrument
  • Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
  • bi tis beb/een 1962 and 1964, and you were Commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Pacific. Do I have the basic command periods and posts essentially correct? M: Yes. Mc: Have you ever participated in any other sort of oral history project
  • Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
  • in the Washington Post on the editorial page, I think it was the Washington Post, they had a list of quotations as long as your arm going back over the years, the so-called optimistic, over-optimistic statements and so on. from any member of the Joint Chiefs
  • Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
  • , ----------------------- Vietnam------------------------------------- memo, 13 morale evaluation 12 -- Aide Memoire, policies S to Westmoreland--------------------- post-TET msg, 12 -- Wheeler Vietnam questions 11 12 -- State Khe Sanh
  • ? Just after his election. And meanwhile, having made this mistake and feeling very strongly about the matter, I concentrated my attention post-election on the Vietnamese problem, which was obviously the biggest problem facing the President. well
  • Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
  • of thing on the basis that you can expect them to keep it quiet? M: In those days only the chairman of the committee was aware of it. G: I see. M: They never told the members of the committee. Now they just print it in the Washington Post
  • Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
  • was given a posting choice of Seoul, Korea; Vientiane, Laos; or Saigon, [South] Vietnam; those were the three [choices]. G: What year was this? P: This was 1959. I chose Saigon, got there in 1960. year the National Liberation Front was formed
  • Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
  • --:as the committee on post-Vietnam adjustment I announced in my Economic Report last year· has been doing-and act boldly, we will have that 3 percent of output to add­ over a year or two-to our normal 4 percent a year of economic growth. If we preserve a healthy
  • criticism, To strengthen the team and also to meet the "Look here, why are you sending a general over to this highly complex diplomatic post?" he then got [U. Alexis] Alex Johnson to agree to go as my deputy, which was a very gallant thing for Alex to do
  • February, reports for 24 February indicate sporadic fire at Khe Sanh. 2. Vietnamese forces have captured the Palace inside the Citadel and the VC flag that was flying over the Palace is now in the First ARVNDivision Command Post. Friendly forces hold all
  • dispute. There was a lot of to-ing and fro-ing, and there was another order of battle conference, post-Tet, began on the tenth of April and lasted LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral
  • Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
  • DETAILEDTHE MISSION OF CAPTURING GENERAL THANHANDHIS HEADQUARTERS FOR THE SAMEPURPOSEAS DESCRIBED ABOVEIN THE CASEOF GENERAL TRI. 5. THE SIGNIFICANTFEATUREI~ ALL OF THE ABOVEINCIDENTSIS THATTHE PRINCIPALS WE~E AT THEIR POSTS OF DUTY WHEN THE ATTACKS WERE
  • SEACOORD posts informed. Embassy Bangkok should be given necessary resources_ to do the job. Saigon will ccntinue to have primary responsibility for reporting and policy recommendations relating to VC/NVA use of Cambodian territory, keeping other SEACOORD
  • , of the Khe Sanh area, on about a one to ten thousand or five thousand [scale], greatly blown up, which is about the same thing, you could see this. had it on the wall and we used to post things on it. And we I saw one of those in the President's office
  • Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
  • chiefs of staff Richard Stilwell and William Rosson; working with Allied troops from Korea and Australia; DePuy's work with the First Division; DePuy's reputation for removing incompetent commanders from their posts; DePuy's view of press coverage
  • Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
  • . FONECON MACV301723 EST. Elements of a US rifle platoon have landad on the US Embassy roof. The situation in the embassy area is slackening. 13. PONECON MACV301730 EST. hRs been evacuated, except have moved to bunkers. for Tan Son Nhut command post
  • , I said, "1 want him on post here three months before I turn it over." I wanted to go thoroughly, a thorough trip, LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781
  • Post-Presidential (Jan. 21, 1969-)
  • directed at US positions the northern provinces including the posts at Khe Sar.h, Dong Ha, Gio Linh, and Chu Lai. The US/ South Vietnamese 36-hour cease-fire began at 5: 00 AM EST this morning. Some 45 minutes before it· began, Saigon announced
  • this duty. At least half of the RD cadres have been with- 9Xawn to assist ;!.n tp.e 9-efepse of towns or cities·. RF and PF posts outside ominous ract .units in itself~- withdrawing In short, of cities are many scattere~ to towns or cities 9ut
  • and broad papers on the key problem appr~isal of Section G is a discussion of possible options in the area of our negotiating post~~e> discussing possible actions that might be taken in co~~unc~ion with the at~our.cement of whatever actions may