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45 results
- the backs of our men who are defendil)g our ·nyes. • WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL· DOCUMENTS Until we have some better signs than what we have had these last few days-that I hope any American can see and read loud and clear-that he will not step up
- B. FRANTZ PLACE: Mr. Komer's office, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California Tape 1 of 1, Side 1 F: Bob, let's talk about what we were talking about at the end last time. We were talking a bit about Libya, and I wanted to get Libya sort
- in the Citadel area. We hope to clean this up within a couple of days. The outskirts of the city are clear. --- In Da Nang, .there has been a hell of a scrap. are leaving. --- At Dalat there is continued sniping. Units of the NVA The situation is in hand
Oral history transcript, Maxwell D. Taylor, interview 1a (I), 1/9/1969, by Dorothy Pierce (McSweeny)
(Item)
- : No, not in the slightest. I came down first hoping to get back to Lin- coln Center, where I was trying to build buildings for the Performing Arts in New York; and deliberately set up a very tight schedule for the investigation of the Bay of Pigs So that within a month
- answers to them before a situation deveJ.ops and we didn't have them. I hope all of you see what has happened during the last two weeks. Westy said he could use troops one day last week. Today he comes in with an urgent request for them. I want to look
- dumb. Kennedy never used this I'm sure that Eisenhower didn't. But LBJ frequently "Now, you know, you got me into this last time, Bob, but now what about this time?" Perhaps the most notable occasion of his forcing us to constantly revalidate
- FOR WAL~ROSTOW REGRETDELAYIN SENDINGWEEKLY MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT,~UT HOPE TO GET THIS OF'F TOMORROW. CIRCUiiiSTANCES HERE LAST F~W DAYS HAV~ MA~EIT NECkSSARY TO CONCENTRATE ON EM~RGENCIES.AS WITHYOU, - IT HAS MEANT BEDlG ON THE JOB 24 RE I VIA
- cannot roam at will in the countryside. The worse situation on pacification is in I Corps north. The next worse is in I Corps southo The best pacification now is in II Corps. -- None of the pacification programs is satisfactory to us. Bob Komer said
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 4, Tabs C-M," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 48
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- present expect the war to end in some form of negotiations. military effort be decisive 1dll and ARVN,they are not likely to negotiations until this for its results to be fairly Since they hope the the GVN in destroying to give any serious
- ~ES, . -. • • · 4. 1t-tt: (
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol 7, Meeting Notes," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 49
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- too concerned for a public fel:ld between the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Secretary of State. I think the people are hopeful that we would be working together at times like these. I think it unwise to write a formal letter turning
- there working in the army as part of a psywar company-G: Can I get these names from you later? P: Yes, sure. Bob Burns [?] is the guy who was the psywar guy. interesting guy to talk to. He's an He's out in California. I got John O'Donnell, who had also
- came back. The next tweaking of the eagle's tail was just before Christmas when they blew up the Brink. That was that hotel Bob Hope said was coming in the other way when he was coming into town. deaths and so on, right in the heart of Saigon
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs aa-vv," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 47
(Item)
- days" dates had high hopes the Khe the document in Hue and Saigon; They appear to be advocating (marked passage, page 5) a second wave of attacks, to be timed with the big cffens ive in the DMZ, Khe Sanh, Western highlands areas at the frontiers
- ? There was wild confusion on the I heard two of the shots. bus~ as there was every place else. I was sitting next to Bob Pierpoint of CBS. F: It came in clearly over the noise of the crowd? R: Well, not so clearly. point. There was not a lot of crowd noise
- p. m. Mr. . - .- .. February 17, 1968 flJ_p •& ~ •.S oti---, President: Herewith answers to the three questions you put to Bob Ginsburgh last night. S:ECRE'f I (~- -
- ~- Bob Glass, and I wrote a book called Intelligence Is for Commanders. It sold pretty well; it's long since out of print now, but it sold pretty well. It was conceived to be a classic textbook on the rudi- ments of intelligence. From there, I went
- determined attempts to gain a spectacular victory, and is now preparing for another attempt in northern First Corps. I believe that the enemy sees a similarity between ·our base at Khe Sanh and Dien Bien Phu and hopes, by following a pattern 0£ activity
- the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Secretary of State. I think the people are hopeful that we would be working together at times like these. I think it unwise to write a formal letter turning this down. A public session would be a disservice
- , which was North Vietnam. We did not recommend it in 1961, hoping that we could settle the issue of aggression within the confines of South Vietnam without going to the North. However, by the time I got there as Ambassador, following a disastrous
- and a little cocky and he went to General Marshall and said, 111 hope the General ~nows that I have spent many hours on this plan and that it is O. K. 11 General Marshall told him "Eisenhower, I hope it is too. You may be the one called upon to execute it. 11
- , the effects of this interaction on the American public and, consequently, on national policy. These phenomena are going to occupy the attention of sociologists, historians, politicians and, I hope, military career officers for a long, long time-as indeed
- :i.. ..} J . ·f .{ Thieu hopes to foster su~h moves, but his plans are va~e and in the hands of poor \ •• executors.. . . . Jn the meantime. Thieu has been having useful meetings with the le8:ders of all significant politic?-1elements
- . The President: That may be true. Clark Clifford: I hope we do not have to ask for a completely new program. This is a bad time to do it. On one hand the military has said we had quite a victory out there last week. On the other hand, they now say
- favorable Qn:--Communist - ... . . ...terms. - ... ·~..:. timetable, rigid results --- -· but they probably ...._.e;~ • • ~-+~-y:~l--~f~cr¢ -- • to a negotiate~ settlf:Inent to have a hope to achieve Comnunist forces
- to the ·1ack of warning from intelligence sources of the attacks on the Viet namese cities which began on January 30. · Because of the import ance of this matter to the President, they concluded that they should go more deeply into the matter in the hope
- here on the basis that we would hope for the best and expect the worst. I want to see what we should do in Vietnam. We ought to look at everything that we should be doing. Get the requirements ready to do what needs to be done. Let's be fully prepared
- will abandon SVNor force it to accept a coalition They would hope that this such a decision government. group would see a bombing halt by the US. Because the San Antonio ··formula is such a reasonable pa.rt, prese_nt pressures can be resisted. di_fficult
- don't think in any realistic way that [Vo Nguyen] Giap or anybody on the top figured that they could throw five hundred thousand Americans into the sea. They may have hoped to foment a bigger popular uprising than they did. The extent to which
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs a-z," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 47
(Item)
- for a shorter time and over shorter distances. I hope the foregoing may prove helpful. Rest assured that I share the assurance which the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others have expressed in our capability to retain our hold in the Khe Sanh area. Our 6,000 Marines
- we hope to accomplish with these .pursuit of ~ur current r him from. South Vietnam? .\ ... strategy of would only pave the way for an NLF takeover. in SVNare fighting -·-- our objective for the diverse_groups ARVNand the GVNcan deve,op c~nf
Oral history transcript, Thomas H. (Admiral) Moorer, interview 2 (II), 9/16/1981, by Ted Gittinger
(Item)
- ; but we don't want to hurt you too bad, so we just are going kind of to nick the edges for a while," in the hopes that they would get the message. Of course the problem was that they never got the message, because they were professional revolutionaries
- : Yes, Mrs. McSweeny, as you know I am President of the Naval Institute Proceedings, by virtue of being Chief of Naval Operations, and we have under way now an oral history program with which we hope to cover practically all activities of senior naval
- ARVNforces, physical destruction prod.uce a total rigid timetable·., ru1d to inflict on the GV~-J as to The Communists are not likely hope to achieve settlement to have a, decisive during the course of the Stl!!Jmer. The high importance results
- an optimistic view of the war, but let the facts speak for themselves and hope that in 4 or 5 months things will obviously be better. He also believes we should not influence Westy in what tactical course of action he should pursue: perhaps pursuing the enemy
Folder, "The President's file for Korea, Vietnam (Briefings)," Files of Walt Rostow, NSF, Box 10
(Item)
- to try lo char~~terlze their outcome one way or another. Obviously we hope that they will succeed. Q. Would the US favo1· inviting the Nol·th Ko~eans to participate in the Security Council proceedings? Do wo demand that they first release.the crew
Oral history transcript, Earle Wheeler, interview 2 (II), 5/7/1970, by Dorothy Pierce (McSweeny)
(Item)
- ] More on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh WHEELER -- II -- 21 describe the President to you? W: Well, yes. M:. I hope we didn't cover this before, but if we did, I'd rather do it again than not. W: I may have
- suggestive, though no people remember . that the war is People remember lost, or that it less or watch it on a powerful, than as a kind of flat announcement there's no hope or something . He didn't say that . G: How do you account for that? So