Discover Our Collections


  • Tag > Digital item (remove)
  • Subject > Tet Offensive, 1968 (remove)

Limit your search

Tag Contributor Date Subject Type Collection Series Specific Item Type Time Period

50 results

  • nature of my work in Vietnam and recognizing this, let me resort to my claim of friend and associate and attempt only to identify areas that at least deserve analysis for any comprehensive evaluation of the performance of the press in Vietnam. The first
  • Impact of the Tet Offensive; dealing with Vietnam information officers; effect in Vietnam of LBJ’s 3/31 announcement; government-press relationship; LBJ’s personality
  • that coverage by a group of younger reporters, good journalists, but young mavericks, rebels, young Turks, whatever label you want to put on them. David Halberstam of the New York Times, Malcolm Browne of the Associated Press, Neil Sheehan of UPI, Nick Turner
  • State of press relations in Saigon in 1964; coordination between various elements of the mission; generation gap and press relations; psychological operations; integration of the press relations efforts; JUSPAO; understanding of the Vietnam
  • to hang on. It made it awfully easy for the enemy and It's exaggerated in the press. sion is greater than the actual fact. interests of the United States. M: The impres- This all works against the There's no question about it. I have read
  • [For interviews 1a and 1b] Biographical information; first association with LBJ; foreign policy problems of the 1960s; investigation of the Bay of Pigs; military representative to President; contacts with LBJ; role of Joint Chiefs; relationship
  • Histories [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh ROBERTS -- I -- 4 There was a local reporter riding on the White House press bus. The only discussion I remember about possible crowd hostility
  • ; the Kennedy staff that stayed to work for LBJ; LBJ’s relationship with the press compared to that of previous presidents; (dis)advantages of getting close to the president; LBJ’s relationship with Phil and Kay Graham; Great Society speech; type of access press
  • participated in any other oral history project. T: Yes, I participated in the recordings for the benefit of the Kennedy Library covering essentially the period of time during which I was associated with President Kennedy. As you have indicated, that was from
  • [For interviews 1a and 1b] Biographical information; first association with LBJ; foreign policy problems of the 1960s; investigation of the Bay of Pigs; military representative to President; contacts with LBJ; role of Joint Chiefs; relationship
  • of business in this case? A: Yes, in some degree socially. M: What about his press relations in those days? very good. A: I seem to recall they were Is that your recollection? They were very good in the sense that he was much admired, but he
  • Early acquaintance with LBJ; how LBJ related to the press as a senator; Alsop's interactions with LBJ; Alsop's support of LBJ in 1964 against Goldwater; Alsop's and Philip Graham's role in JFK's selection of LBJ as the vice-presidential nominee
  • suppress the defensive fire, l\4ajor Dethlefsen ignored the enemy's overwhelming firepower and the damage to his aircraft and pressed his attack. Despite a continuing hail of antiaircraft fire, deadly surface-to-air mis.5iles,and co~nterattacks by MIG
  • to the President of March 4, final drafts and associated papers; Walt Ro stow' s agenda notes for Presidential meetings; and Papers for the Advisory Group Meeting, March 25-26. VOLUME 8 contains - Clifford - ExceTpts Committee working papers; from the Weekly
  • know, counterinsurgency was stylish, and Brute [Victor] Krulak, the marine, had a similar position on the Joint Staff. Same one I had much later. So the army was very anxious to get in the act and do the right things, and the Kennedys were pressing hard
  • chiefs of staff Richard Stilwell and William Rosson; working with Allied troops from Korea and Australia; DePuy's work with the First Division; DePuy's reputation for removing incompetent commanders from their posts; DePuy's view of press coverage
  • uprising and many defections. Our press had led the North Vietnamese to think the ARYN army was a pushover. That proved to be untrue. The enemy has laid land lines down the Laotian panhandle. This will permit them to operate on radio silence and give
  • . Johnson at that pOint? McC: Oh, he was a great host. went all over the Ranch. dozen more times. He was very keen. We went out and Since then, I've been over it half a It improves all the time. able association during that time. We had a very enjoy
  • to associate with President Johnson on a more-or-less personal basis? W: I had occasion to see him and talk to him once in Vietnam when he carne to Cam Ranh Bay. I talked to him for a few minutes. Then midway in my tour--I think it was February '66--1
  • correct. M: Before we go into your association with Lyndon Johnson, 1 would like to ask if you have participated in any other oral history project? W: I participated in an oral history project that was conducted after the assassination of President
  • the question of when we would resume arms aid to the Paks was a quite live orie, wi th the Pentagon--as I recall--and to an extent State pressing for some resumption and the Paks screaming for it because they had lost an incredible amount of resources
  • there is no time for 7 on-the-job training, the press, the Congress 4. he should In so doing, not merely support efforts reach should come from and administer he would ensure co-ordin~ted a master - - were for the war by rallying the· farmers
  • -- 45th report, President of delay) ----- ---------------------used at Press 3 Apr 68 -- Bunker msg to President, Vietnamese the burdens of the war effort-------------------------------4 Apr 68 - - Bunker's 46th report ---------- con£ #121 --- J
  • . And then it goes on to prescribe corrective measures, but they don't really make much sense. before. They are what they'd been saying For example, instead of, "We're going to win the war in the shortest possible time," which were the buzz words associated
  • activity through computer capability; CIA; Robert Komer and pacification; the Tet Offensive; Westmoreland press briefing after Tet; the media; infiltration; the importance of Cambodia; Sihanouk; problem of interpretation of intelligence; body counts; Sam
  • with me, placed great emphasis on the need for helping the people as well as for destroying the Viet Cong. He wanted rural electrification programs in Vietnam; he kept pressing for a whole series of developmental initiatives. Well, out of all
  • part. be defined. with with be played ·all ·The as.well directly no longer been of people break in on their line. noH not their roles h~s in also interference associated that·we has line front. Ky and not It elem9nts anti
  • , recommendations Wheeler reviewing press memo, 19 -- Ginsburgh communist briefing Clarke's memo, in "Second Wave" of Rusk-Clifford target possibilities ------- target ----------- report------------------------------ talking points deployment N
  • . casualties and fewer Vietnamese refugees. s. And it should hasten the end· of the war. 'POP SECRET = .NODf:S TOP OfJCft~T - NODIS I - 5- Our present practice of having virtually everything available to the press is also a loser. The enemy would never
  • . The General said this was true, and General Wheeler added that the losses the enemy has taken are very serious. He said there had been 53, 000 since the beginning of the offensive. The President asked why press reports were so bad. General Abrams said he
  • Press relations
  • in the United States. And I attribute this primarily to the press coverage at that time and to the dissident groups here in the United States, who were following the Hanoi line and had been before that. I went out to Vietnam late in February, about the twenty
  • . m. (These are the first units of the 10, 500 authorized and approved for immediate shipment in response to General Westmoreland's request. The Bunker announcement and press guidance are attached as Appendices A and B.) ~:"'\re~-• MEETl~~G ti>~OTliS
  • a mission in and because for American reporters covering Phnom Penh the war, we rarely went anyplace where there was a North Vietnamese possible contact, just about everybody who went to Phnom Penh least a pass in at and the guy, day, in the press
  • Time limit in dealing with Vietnamese situation; the Tet Offensive; Weyand's role; press reaction; impact of Tet on South Vietnamese forces; intelligence; Cronkite's visit to Vietnam; the pacification programs; decision to write Tet!; subsequent
  • activity through computer capability; CIA; Robert Komer and pacification; the Tet Offensive; Westmoreland press briefing after Tet; the media; infiltration; the importance of Cambodia; Sihanouk; problem of interpretation of intelligence; body counts; Sam
  • and the press humility to his "One war at a time". concerning is brevity, some eighty Sandburg with its Mason and Slidell to the public the circumstances want another on same time." destination outcry While the Secretary was very and wisdom
  • . . .Jee .SECRET - - - . ... , ............. iL.l MHTINO NOi ES COPYRIGHT!!) P\.i~liEQfiOA - 3 ­ aequices.. Per.ffli9!iou of Copy1 ignf Holder· 'A' T~oAlCil& Joboson face press questioning. If Cy Vance goes to Vietnam, he doesn't have to say
  • testimony before the committee. In light of this, Secretary McNamara said to go ahead and issue his statement.) Secretary McNamara said McCarthy went out and told the press that one of the . U.S. vessels penetrated North Vietnamese waters. "He just did
  • . I discussed why intelligence of this type is so important to us and why we do not escort these vessels. I also told them we are not preparing a way toward apologizing for the incident. The Meet the Press discussion was misinterpreted by many people
  • requests in the past. Now he finds that his campain plan has been pre-empted by enemy action. Secretary Rusk: Can it only be done by additional U.S. forces? press them to brigade U.S. troops with Vietnamese? Can't we General Wheeler: Before I answer
  • , because the minute you do that, they'll change the code. G: Is that the impeccable and highly secret source that Mr. McNamara referred to? M: Sure. G: Okay. It was intercepted radio traffic, is that the nature of the thing? M: Yes. But the press
  • . _ ., ::f:.-.:-'·:·· ...·•····.~ ...~~:-:-_........,_,.....,... .~- -; ..... ... . . ........... ___ ..,.,_,_~~· . .... .... .. ..... , '• .. ~:~-J ·:-:;:a_~~:\·_«._. --"'!!!"";;._,_ ..... pa--~ 14 26. The Foreign Press in Viet-Nam
  • to press and public optnton in the interest oi our common purposes. ·- --- ·- ­ •_ _...............!..•_ . _ • . :·--·· - ·· - ·• • ·---...:.....; :.•. :: .: ~----·--·-- .: . •...... ··.. _ ·-..:..:.-...:,,.,_.·.. s---z...·- · ­ f.-t f'""rr
  • and has been occurring ela~wha1·e t·n .and around the capital. Both Tan Son Nnut airfield serving _ 2. smnll fire ...Saigon and nearb1 B1en3ca air base have been under mort_nr fire. There b~s been no report of damage or casualties. Press reports